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Raising capital in foreign capital markets is common in 
today's business environment. Investors are aware of the 
advantages of a globally diversified portfolio and seek 
overseas investments. The Securities & Exchange Commission 
(SEC) adopted Regulation S in the United States to clarify 
the extra-territorial application of the registration 
provisions of the 1933 Securities Act. The regulation allows 
companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges to expedite 
issuance of securities offshore by avoiding the lengthy 
registration process if the securities are intended to "rest 
abroad." Characteristics of equity securities issued under 
Regulation S from November 18, 1996, the first date that
disclosure is required, through November 17, 1997 are
identified and summarized.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature 
and extent of the application of Regulation S and its impact 
on the wealth of stockholders. There is a paucity of 
research on international issuance of securities and
virtually no published works on Regulation S. This study is
a timely and important contribution to understanding the 
dynamics of securities regulations on capital market
participants as globalization proceeds.
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The financial soundness of issuing companies is 
quantified using Altman's Z and the effects of the issuance 
on stockholder returns is determined using event study
methodology. The average Regulation S issue discount is 
compared to other restricted issues. Finally, the study 
includes a regression analysis on the abnormal returns to 
identify issue and firm characteristics' influence on the
market reaction.
The data indicates that Regulation S has been used 
extensively, including use by financially distressed 
companies. Larger discounts than would be warranted with 
the forty day restriction period and negative abnormal
returns around the end of the restricted trading period
provide evidence that Regulation S buyers are short-term 
investors taking quick profits on issues only available to 
non-U.S. persons. Additional findings indicate that the use 
of Regulation S has a negative impact on the wealth of 
existing shareholders. Therefore, additional research is 
appropriate and continued monitoring by the SEC is warranted 
to protect U.S. capital markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you were the Chief Financial Officer of 
IBM or Procter & Gamble in the 1960's - 1980's during the 
development of the Euro-markets. You are taking advantage of 
lower cost of capital by obtaining capital from overseas 
investors. Some foreign investors pay more for your 
unregistered securities because U.S. blue chip securities 
are attractive, secure investments and because their overall 
taxes can be reduced while maintaining anonymity with this 
investment. However, every time you make these offerings 
overseas, you are in literal violation of the securities 
laws that require registration of any securities offered or 
sold using interstate commerce. Section 5 of the Securities 
Act of 1933 requiring registration was written to protect 
investors and did not stipulate boundaries.
In 1964, Release 33-4708 gave companies free access to 
the Eurobond market without registration of those securities 
(this encompassed debt securities only). It wasn't long 
until the Euro-markets evolved to include convertibles and 
Euro-equity securities but there was no specific exemption 
from registration for these foreign issues. The only 
assurance issuers had that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) would not penalize them for failure to 
register Euro-securities issued to foreign investors was 
reliance on "no action" letters of the SEC. Each "no action"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2letter considered the circumstances of an issue and 
indicated that the review staff would not recommend 
disciplinary action for failure to register as required by 
Section 5 of the Securities Act. The "no action" letter did 
not preclude the SEC from taking enforcement action against 
a different but similar issue, nor did it protect the issuer 
from private plaintiffs.
The need of a statute regarding securities issued 
offshore was addressed in 1990. Regulation S was enacted 
providing a safe harbor for securities offered and sold 
overseas. They would be exempt from registration if the 
securities were intended to "rest abroad,"1 were not a 
scheme to avoid registration, and there is no conditioning 
of the U.S. markets with regard to these securities. 
Regulation S was codified to protect U.S. markets and was 
written with large issuers in the Euro-markets in mind 
(Hanks, 1996).
It didn't take long for small and medium sized 
companies to discover the ease of tapping global capital 
markets under Regulation S (Hanks, 1996). Some companies 
issued debt and equity offshore under Regulation S, often
1 "rest abroad" is the term used in the Regulation S and 
refers to the intention that securities will be held 
offshore long-term. In later Rules and Regulations of the 
SEC, it is referred to as "resting offshore."
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3contemporaneously with a U.S. offering employing as many 
sources at the lowest cost (Scholl, 1996a), truly a step 
toward integration of capital markets.
Suppose now that you are the CEO of a small cash 
strapped company, either start-up or struggling for other 
reasons. Borrowing is stretched to the limit. The company 
needs a quick injection of capital but you resist the 
lengthy registration process and the scrutiny of the U.S. 
capital markets for new equity issues. You don't qualify for 
the simplified quicker registration methods established by 
the SEC. You prefer to avoid the high costs and especially 
the monitoring of an underwriter. Then Walda2 knocks on your 
door and proposes the perfect solution. She has some angels, 
foreign investors anxious to get their cut in the U.S. 
microcap and small cap markets, ready to buy your new issues 
immediately. Walda informs you that you can legally sell 
your equity to non-U.S. investors without SEC registration 
under Regulation S. The price you pay for getting capital
2 Walda Walling is the fictitious name given by Gene 
Marcial (1995) in his account of the inside story on 
Regulation S and one freelance broker with a knack for 
finding companies in need of a capital infusion but lacking 
the resources for raising it. Walda1 s five person firm is 
not licensed as an investment bank and does not possess the 
credentials to put together corporate underwritings. 
However, she has a unique ability to find and match offshore 
investors with cash hungry businesses selling Regulation S 
to both sides of the transaction.
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4quickly without registration is a deep discount on the 
securities. The benefit to you as CEO is that you avoid 
monitoring by underwriters, scrutiny from the SEC, and until 
November 18, 1996, you had no obligation to disclose the new 
issue to existing shareholders.
Walda is a typical "finder" who knows and can introduce 
you to foreign investors who are delighted with the 
arrangement. They buy the securities at thirty or forty 
percent below the market price of U.S. shares (Marcial, 
1995; Cohen, 1994; Morgenson, 1994). In forty days after the 
restricted period from selling Regulation S shares in the 
U.S., they sell the shares in the U.S. market. The foreign 
investors have made a substantial profit on their forty day 
investment and the company hasn't given up managerial 
control which venture capitalists would normally require. 
However, unsuspecting U.S. shareholders have protested that 
upon selling Regulation S shares in the U.S. a drop of the 
market price inevitably occurs with no advance warning. If 
the foreign investor fears the market value will drop before 
the end of the forty day restricted period, he may hedge the 
investment. He can sell the stock short and deliver his 
Regulation S shares after the forty day restriction. The 
foreign investor gets a profitable risk-free investment, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5CEO quickly obtains the desired capital without the lengthy 
registration procedure and without the monitoring involved 
with other capital raising options. The question asked by 
critics (Scholl, 1996; Morgenson, 1994; Greene and Schneck, 
1994; Cohen, 1994) of Regulation S is whether the SEC has 
fulfilled its intended purpose of protecting the U.S. 
capital markets and its participants.
On the other hand, there is a trade-off for easing 
regulations. The SEC is bound to loose some control as they 
reduce the burdens of U.S. companies seeking global capital, 
and as the global markets become more closely linked and 
communication and technology continue to develop at an 
explosive rate (Euromoney, 1997). Regulation S clarifies the 
applicability of the registration requirements and has 
reduced uncertainty and procedural burdens (Kelly and 
Bannister, 1993). The International Corporate Finance Office 
of the SEC emphasizes the benefits of Regulation S, and 
Hanks (1996) states that the abuses are small in dollar 
terms compared to the benefit. Although designed for 
reputable companies that traditionally had large Euro- 
securities issues, smaller high growth firms and start-up 
firms with a frequent need for quick financing have used 
Regulation S for small equity offerings. Regulation S
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6provides an important opportunity for these companies during 
their dynamic growth phase. It gives them competitive 
capital sources when they might otherwise fail given other 
capital allocation options (Hanks, 1996).
The SEC of the United States adopted Regulation S on 
May 2, 1990 in response to the globalization of the capital 
markets (Kelley and Bannister, 1993). The Commission 
recognized a need to redefine the jurisdiction of section 5 
of the Securities Act of 1933 which relates to the 
registration requirements for issuance of securities. With 
the development of international securities markets and with 
companies raising capital around the world, it became 
necessary to redefine the purpose and define the territory 
of SEC protection. The stated purpose of the registration of 
securities was to protect investors trading in the U.S. 
capital markets. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 
placed no geographical limitation to the registration 
requirement for any offers of securities to the public. 
Literally, any offering of securities using interstate 
commerce would require registration. The Commission cites 
the "Principles of comity and the reasonable expectations of 
participants in global markets" as well as "the primacy of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7the laws in which a market is located"3 to conclude that the 
registration requirements would not be applicable to 
securities offered or sold outside the United States. Such 
transactions will be regulated by the laws and regulations 
applicable to the market where the transaction is effected. 
Therefore, Regulation S provides companies issuing
securities in offshore transactions the flexibility to do so 
without the lengthy, costly process of section 5
registration, making them more competitive in attracting 
capital.
Regulation S clarified applicability of registration 
for both U.S. and non-U.S. issuers of debt and equity 
securities by creating a "safe harbor" for three categories 
of issuers. Foreign issuers with no "substantial U.S. market 
interest, SUSMI" (Category 1), would not be subject to the 
U.S. registration requirements for offers and sales 
conducted outside U.S. territory provided no "directed
selling efforts" are made in the U.S. (Kelley and Bannister, 
1993). This category is the least restrictive because it is 
the least likely that securities would naturally flow into 
the U.S. markets. Category 1 includes foreign governments,
3 Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 33-68 63, 
17 CFR Parts 200 and 230 RIN 3235-AD23 of the Rules and 
Regulations of the Federal Register/Vol. 55, No. 85/ 
Wednesday, May 2, 1990, page 18308.
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8the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund.
Category 3 is the most restrictive category for issuers 
where little information is publicly available, they are not 
currently filing with the SEC, and the securities are the 
most likely to flow into the U.S. as there is substantial 
U.S. market interest. Category 3 issues have a 1 year 
restricted period where they cannot be traded in the U.S. 
markets, unless registered, and the purchaser must certify 
that he or she is a non U.S. beneficial owner. Regulation S 
prohibits sale of Category 3 securities to U.S. citizens 
even if located abroad (Kelley and Bannister, 1993; Greene 
and Schneck, 1994).
Category 2 of Regulation S encompasses both U.S. and 
non-U.S. companies that are subject to reporting 
requirements under the Securities Act of 1934 as well as 
debt securities where there is substantial U.S. market 
interest (Greene and Schneck, 1994). To qualify for 
exemption from the registration requirement, an issue must 
be an offshore transaction4 and no "directed selling effort" 
may be made in the U.S. There cannot be any conditioning of
4 The offer or sale is made to a person outside the United 
States and either 1) when the buy order is originated the 
buyer is outside the U.S. (or the seller reasonably believes 
that he is not in the U.S.), or 2) the transaction occurs on 
the physical trading floor of a designated foreign 
securities exchanges (Greene and Schneck, 1994, page 3) .
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9the U.S. market nor any prearranged transaction with a buyer 
in the U.S. The securities are restricted for forty days in 
which resales cannot be made in the U.S. nor to a U.S. 
person. Furthermore, if sold to another distributor or 
dealer during the restriction period, then the seller must 
notify the new buyer of the resale restrictions (since there 
is nothing distinguishing the Regulation S shares from 
registered shares). The restriction period is designed to 
prevent immediate resale in the U.S. in the spirit of these 
securities "coming to rest abroad" as intended by the SEC. 
It is important to note that the preliminary notes to the 
Regulation make it clear that the issue will not qualify for 
exemption if the purpose is to avoid registration 
requirements even if the issuance is in compliance 
technically (Greene and Schneck, 1994) .
As with many new regulations, there are companies who 
see opportunities beyond the intended purpose of the 
exemption. Regulation S securities are extremely easy to 
issue; just find the foreign investors, deliver the minutes 
stating the approval of the board of directors to a transfer 
agent who prepares the new shares, and execute the exchange. 
The shares do not require a legend denoting their 
restriction; they may look just like registered shares of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the company (Scholl, 1996a).5 These Category 2 issuers are 
the source of cited abuses and the focus of this paper.
Since its enactment in 1990, the popular press has 
cited several instances of abuse of Regulation S (Business 
Week, 1996; Business Week, 1997; Scholl, 1996a; Palmer, 
1996; Cohen, 1994; Marcial, 1995; Greene, 1994; Euromoney, 
1997; Worth, 1994) including mob involvement and insider 
manipulation of stock prices in microcap issues. Many small, 
financially distressed firms have been reported as obtaining 
quick capital from Regulation S offerings, avoiding the 
monitoring of the registration process. The SEC did not 
envision the use of this provision by such companies (Hanks, 
1996) . The SEC has acknowledged problematic practices which 
include the evasion of registration, deep discounts for 
foreign investors who manage a risk free profit by selling 
short and delivering Regulation S shares after the 
restricted period, and payment of securities with promissory 
notes where the value to be repaid depends on the future 
market value of the equity securities. In Release No. 33- 
7190 (1995), the SEC expresses concern for the vulnerability 
of its abuse, " . . .  some market participants are conducting
Some foreign investors would not buy legended shares. 
Laws in some countries prohibit such shares to be reflected 
in the assets of the investors' books.
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placements of securities purportedly offshore using 
Regulation S under circumstances that indicate that such 
securities are in essence being placed offshore temporarily 
to evade registration requirements with the result that the 
incidence of ownership of the securities never leaves the 
U.S. market, or that a substantial portion of economic risk 
relating thereto is left in or is returned to the U.S. 
market during the restricted period, or that the transaction 
is such that there was no reasonable expectation that the 
securities could be viewed as actually coming to rest 
abroad" (Federal Register, 1995, pg. 35664). The SEC has 
recognized that while they sought to reduce barriers on 
capital formation, certain abuses of the safe-harbors have 
occurred. On the other hand, the international division of 
the corporate finance department of the SEC defends 
Regulation S as a valuable financing tool for small as well 
as large firms stating that the abuses are relatively few 
and immaterial. The question is whether the issuer's 
reliance on Regulation S registration exemption is within 
the intended use of facilitating access to international 
capital or if companies are using it to evade registration 
requirements in a manner which may be harmful to existing 
shareholders.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature 
and extent of the usage of Regulation S and its impact on 
the financial markets. The objectives are fourfold: to
determine the financial stability and soundness of the firms 
issuing Regulation S, to quantify the issue discount and 
consider its propriety given the forty day trading 
restriction period, to ascertain the impact of Regulation S 
on the wealth of existing stockholders, and to investigate 
the possible determinants of positive or negative market 
reactions to the issuance of Regulation S securities. We 
hope to develop an understanding of the purpose and use of 
Regulation S of the Securities Act based on analysis of 
actual Regulation S issues for one year, and to explore the 
impact of Regulation S on firm value and on existing 
shareholder wealth.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
In order to fully examine the impact of Regulation S on 
shareholders' wealth, it is important to understand the 
institutional aspects of acquiring foreign capital. An 
examination of other securities issued by U.S. corporations 
offshore will provide the backdrop for establishing our 
expectations of the wealth impact of Regulation S equity 
securities. Empirical studies on these issues are reported 
in the following literature review. Characteristics and 
results of event studies are summarized in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
A. Eurobonds
The Eurobond market evolved in 1963 to meet the needs 
of global business. It offered anonymity to investors, less 
stringent disclosure requirements for issuers, and less 
regulatory interference than similar bonds in local markets 
(Eiteman, Stonehill, and Moffett, 1994).
Kim and Stulz (1988) report positive abnormal returns 
at the announcement of Eurobond issues consistent with the 
clientele hypothesis, that is, the reaction depends on the 
demand for foreign issues. The excess returns were 
significantly higher than average abnormal returns for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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domestic bond issues of the same companies during the period 
1975 through 1985. They showed that the difference persisted 
even during subperiods when new regulations should have 
served to further integrate the international credit 
markets. They argue that there will be foreign demand for 
Eurobonds even if the global debt markets are integrated. 
Some investors are drawn to the anonymity of Eurobonds and 
can avoid local government and taxing authorities. They 
argue that overseas financing bargains for companies arise 
when an unexpected increase in demand for Eurobonds pushes 
the prices upward (yield-to-maturity lower) causing a 
widening of the domestic/Eurobond yield spread.
If a financing bargain exists, why doesn't corporate 
America respond to the excess overseas demand for dollar 
denominated debt and arbitrage the benefit away immediately? 
Higher contracting and issuing costs for Eurobonds than for 
domestic borrowing may partially provide the answer. 
Restrictive covenants are more difficult to enforce and thus 
less valuable for Eurobonds than they are for domestic 
bonds. Because Eurobonds are not listed on a major exchange, 
do not require registration with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and do not require a credit rating, the scrutiny 
and regulation which provide comfort to foreign investors 
does not exist. Underwriting costs are considerably higher
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for a Eurobond issue than a domestic issue of comparable 
size (greater than two percent of net proceeds of a Eurobond 
issue compared with less than one percent for domestic per 
Kim and Stulz, 1988, page 193). Prominent, credit-worthy 
companies can compensate for some of these high contracting 
and issuing costs with their favorable reputation. The 
larger the domestic/Eurobond spread, the more companies can 
take advantage of gains provided by a large yield spread 
caused by occasional excess demand for Eurobonds. However, 
because of the excess contracting and issue costs of 
Eurobond issues, the primary borrowers are reputable 
companies. They generally issue Eurobonds only if they 
planned to expand their borrowing anyway. They normally 
would not incur the costs of retiring domestic bonds in 
order to issue Eurobonds. Furthermore, the value of the 
Eurobond may decrease if the domestic bonds are retired 
because the foreign investors rely on domestic bondholders 
to monitor the company and its management. Because of the 
higher contracting and issuing costs associated with foreign 
issues and the experience from the Eurobond markets, it is 
apparent why Regulation S was written with large, reputable 
reporting companies in mind. Smaller companies or companies 
with greater default risk could not sell overseas issues 
based on their reputation alone.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Marr and Trimble (1993) attempt to explain why the 
abnormal returns found by Kim and Stulz (1988) were larger 
than the per share present value of the preferential 
interest rate benefit on the Eurobond compared with 
comparable domestic bonds. The secondary market yield spread 
used by Kim and Stulz (1988) to calculate the gain to 
shareholders did not reflect rebates which are commonly paid 
by underwriters in the Eurobond issuance. The lower the 
issuer's default risk and the larger the yield spread, then 
the easier it will be to place a Eurobond offering and the 
foreign bank will issue a rebate. Marr and Trimble (1993) 
estimated the rebate value and concluded that although they 
contributed to the large abnormal return gains for
Eurobonds, the rebates did not account for all of the 
difference between shareholder wealth gains and the per 
share cash flow gain due to lower interest payments.
Additionally, their research documents that regulatory 
differences could explain larger-than-expected average
abnormal returns on Eurobond issues. It would be logical 
then, that the clarification of rules for offshore issues 
which provide a safe-haven from registration for Regulation 
S offerings, would similarly be beneficial to companies 
obtaining global funding. We expect that foreign investment 
banks could easily find investors who are anxious to invest
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in reputable companies with low default risk.
The works of Kim and Stulz (1988) and of Marr and 
Trimble (1993) both discuss institutional changes in the 
Eurobond and domestic bond markets which might cause the two 
bond markets to become either more segregated or more 
integrated. Both examined sub-samples which reflect the 
changes in the regulatory environment affecting these 
markets. Each paper provides support that these 
institutional aspects influence the shareholders'' wealth. 
Similarly, Regulation S reduces regulatory barriers which 
should encourage large reputable companies to obtain some 
offshore financing at a lower cost than having purely 
domestic financing.
In January 1979, the "bought deal" was introduced (Kim 
and Stulz, 1988) whereby a lead manager commits to the terms 
of the Eurobond issue before organizing an underwriting 
syndicate. The introduction of the "bought deal" 
significantly reduces the lead time for issuance of 
Eurobonds and makes issuing offshore more attractive. A 
reduction in the overseas interest rates or market 
imperfections can be more quickly reacted to by 
corporations. Similarly, Regulation S reduces the lead time 
to a number of days for issuing offshore, something which 
cannot be easily matched with offerings in the U.S.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Shelf registration was allowed for the first time on 
domestic securities of larger corporations after March 1982 
facilitating quicker issuance of domestic bonds and 
partially closing the gap in the bond markets created by the 
"bought deal." The Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 
415 allows pre-registration of debt or equity securities 
which can be used anytime management chooses up to two years 
from the date of registration. Bhagat, Marr and Thompson 
(1985) found "that shelf offerings cost 13% less for
syndicated issues and 51% less for non-syndicated issues" 
(abstract, p. 1385), referring to issuing costs. Although 
shelf registration has been liberalized, it is still 
unavailable for companies that have not been reporting
companies to the Exchange Act for at least 12 months or if 
they have a public float of less than $75 million (Greene 
and Schneck, 1994), making shelf registration unavailable 
for small companies. Furthermore, shelf registration is not 
accessible for certain uses. For example, if an acquisition 
is probable, certain financial information about the target 
company and the effect on the acquirer must be provided in
the registration statement. Regulation S permits companies
to secure financing for acquisitions without compiling and 
reporting the proforma financial information. Primerica 
Corporation used Regulation S to finance an acquisition in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1993 (Greene and Schneck, 1994).
A huge deterrent of foreign investors to the domestic 
market was the withholding tax on interest paid to non­
residents. The statutory withholding rate was 30% although 
some tax treaties agreed to lesser withholding amounts. The 
withholding tax was repealed effective July 4, 1984 aiding
the integration of the markets.
Kim and Stulz (1988) and Marr and Trimble (1993) both 
showed a marked increase in the abnormal returns in the
period following the adoption of the bought deal. The 
benefit decreased after shelf registration was adopted in 
March 1982. The Kim and Stulz sample covered a larger time 
frame and showed no statistical difference between the 
abnormal returns of the Eurobond and domestic bond issues 
after the repeal of the withholding tax in July 1984.
B. Convertible Eurobonds
Smith's (1986) summary of empirical studies of security 
offerings reveals that convertible securities generally lead 
to negative announcement returns which are larger in 
absolute value than the non-convertible debt issue
announcement effects. Kim and Stulz (1992) examine the 
announcement effect of 166 convertible Euro-bond issues
between 1965 through 1987 by firms listed either on the New
York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange. Offshore
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convertible issues before July 1, 1984 had no significant
announcement effect. New convertible domestic issues in the 
same period had a strongly significant and economically 
important negative effect. This difference provides strong 
evidence to market segmentation prior to July 1, 1984 and
indicates that firms issuing debt could reduce the cost of 
capital by issuing convertible debt offshore rather than a 
domestic issue. After June 1984 and through 1987, their 
study shows no significant difference in the abnormal 
returns of Eurobond and domestic issues. The withholding tax 
for non-U.S. residents holding domestic issues was repealed 
in July 1984 and explains part of the difference in the two 
markets' announcement effect before that time. Kim and Stulz
(1992) report that firms offering convertibles offshore, on 
average, are much larger and less risky than issuers of 
domestic convertibles. They have a lower market beta, lower 
volatility, and lower debt ratios. When controlled for firm 
characteristics, they still found no significant difference 
between announcement effect of Eurobond and domestic 
convertible issues. However, using the conversion premium 
as a control variable, their cross-sectional regressions 
showed a significant positive coefficient for the offshore 
dummy variable, even after the withholding tax was repealed. 
They did not attempt to interpret the strong differential
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impact that the conversion premium had on the two markets 
(negative effect on stock price returns on the announcement 
of offshore issues and strongly significant positive effect 
on the domestic issue) . They simply state that this result 
for Eurobond issues is inconsistent with the Brennan and 
Kraus (1987) model whereby a greater conversion premium 
signals a riskier firm making the convertible debt bad news 
for debtholders but positive news for equity holders.
In summary, Kim and Stulz (1992) study of convertible 
bonds gives strong evidence that the offshore and domestic 
markets were segregated during the time withholding was 
required on interest paid to non-residents of the U.S. 
Although they show that the differential stock price effect 
disappears after June 1984, U.S. firms still self-select 
into either the offshore or domestic convertible bond market 
and there are issue factors, like the conversion premium, 
which have differential effects on the abnormal returns.
C. Euro-equity
The same institutions which had developed the 
infrastructure for the active Eurobond market, later created 
the Euro-equity market (Eiteman, Stonehill, and Moffett, 
1994) . Now investors and issuers can enjoy some of the 
benefits of the Eurobond market with equity securities. 
Euro-equity for an American company results from issuing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2
stock in two tranches simultaneously. The tranche targeted 
offshore is registered to an overseas financial institution. 
The institution then sells the stock as "bearer instruments" 
to the ultimate investor, catering to foreigners who find 
anonymity attractive. A Euro-equity offering must be made 
simultaneously with a registered domestic offering. 
Furthermore, the targeted registered shares offered in the 
Euro-equity market can only be created under special SEC 
procedures. The shares are intended to remain abroad in the 
hands of long-term investors and they revert to standard 
registered shares if repatriated to the United States.
Marr, Trimble, and Varma (1991) describe the conditions 
required for stock to be classified as a targeted registered 
offering qualifying for the foreign tranche. The overseas 
registered owner must be a financial institution, dividends 
must be paid to the registered financial institution 
offshore and the institution can then forward dividends to 
the owners. The issuer must certify that it has no knowledge 
of any U.S. taxpayer having beneficial ownership of the 
shares, and both the issuer and the registered overseas 
financial institution must follow elaborate SEC 
certification procedures.
Euro-equity offerings provide foreign investors 
diversification opportunities, anonymity, and liquidity
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since the instruments can be sold in the U.S. secondary 
markets. Euro-equity may enable U.S. companies to capture 
favorable financing opportunities where the demand for U.S. 
investments is high. Euro-equity issues avoid the 
substantial listing fees and reporting requirements of 
listing on an international exchange. The shares can be 
readily sold on the U.S. market, unlike foreign listed 
shares. Although Euro-equity is subject to certain SEC 
certification procedures and restrictions, some of the 
barriers to market integration are removed (they can avoid 
registration). Therefore, Euro-equity provides corporations 
with opportunities for achieving lower cost of capital while 
giving foreign investors greater options.
Marr, Trimble and Varma (1991) point out that the Euro- 
equity issue and resale requirements constrain financial 
arbitrage opportunities between the secondary markets of 
registered shares and the Euro-equity. If this is the case, 
corporations should be able to derive greater benefit (lower 
cost of capital) the greater the offshore proportion of the 
issue. Their study compared Euro-equity with domestic equity 
issues in the period 1985 through 1988 for companies listed 
either on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock 
Exchange. The sample firms issuing Euro-equity were on 
average significantly larger and the offering size
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significantly greater than domestic-equity offerings. 
However, the probit regression indicated that the
probability of choosing Euro-equity over a domestic offering 
is driven by the size of the issue and not by the size of
the firm, supporting the hypothesis that issuers sought
financing bargains in the overseas market. Marr, Trimble,
and Varma (19S1) went on to show that the offshore tranche 
as a percentage of the total issue significantly reduces the 
negative stock-price reaction. This evidence of market 
segmentation supports the hypothesis that there is a foreign 
clientele for dollar denominated equity which permits
anonymity. We expect that Regulation S reduces barriers, 
allowing U.S. reporting companies to take advantage of
offshore financing bargains and meets the needs of the 
foreign clientele seeking U.S. investments.
D. Private Placements
Equity private placements defy the generalizations 
which are made about new equity issues based on studies of 
public issues. Despite large discounts on equity placed
privately, the market reacts favorably to the announcement 
of private placements. Wruck (198 9) reports substantial
discounts and positive announcement returns of 4.4% on 
average for private placements by large, exchange-listed 
firms. Her study showed that increases in ownership
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concentration related positively to the changes in firm 
value upon private equity placement for low and high 
ownership concentration levels, supporting a favorable 
alignment of manager/shareholder interests.
Hertzel and Smith (1993) also consistently find 
significant discounts and positive market reaction to 
private placements. However, they did not find any 
significant impact on abnormal returns due to changes in 
ownership concentration. They did find that both discount 
size and the positive returns are significantly affected by 
a larger proportion of new equity in relation to total 
equity.
Book-to-market-equity negatively affects the discount 
and discount-adjusted abnormal returns. Therefore, firms 
with significant value in intangibles, which have the 
greater potential for under-valuation, gain from the 
information which investors gather to determine the true 
value of opportunities and assets.
Eighteen of the one hundred and six placements were 
indicated as unregistered shares and therefore subject to 
resale restrictions. These restricted shares had a forty-two 
percent discount on average and a significant positive 
impact on discount-adjusted abnormal returns.
Hertzel and Smith (1993) consider firm size important
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in explaining the differences in their results from those of 
Wruck (1989). Wruck included only exchange listed firms 
while seventy-five percent of the Hertzel and Smith sample 
are smaller over-the-counter (OTC) firms. They suggest that 
while private equity placements of large firms may provide 
monitoring benefits of more concentrated ownership, for 
smaller firms, positive market reaction reflects favorable 
information about firm value signaled by choosing private 
placement. Managers elect to issue discounted shares 
privately as an invitation for investors to evaluate the 
firm's assets and opportunities. They hope to disclose that 
their shares are undervalued by the market. This is 
particularly true for firms with substantial intangibles and 
firms with past financial distress, evidenced by significant 
negative cumulative market returns in the period of five 
hundred days to thirty days prior to the announcement. By 
encouraging investors to obtain information about the firm 
(providing a substantial discount to pay for information 
costs), management signals positive investment opportunities 
and under-valuation of its assets in place. They argue that 
the signaling factor is more important for small, growth 
firms with poor liquidity than the alignment or monitoring 
benefits gained by larger firms placing equity privately.
One-third of the one hundred and six private placements
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of their sample were to foreign investors. The placements to 
foreign investors were larger than the average placement.
The foreign investors paid more for the stock (smaller 
discounts) and the discount-adjusted abnormal returns were 
lower. "Foreign investors are significantly less likely to 
have invested in firms engaged in speculative product 
development or facing financial distress or to purchase 
unregistered shares," (footnote 16, pg. 471, Hertzel and 
Smith, 1993). Foreign investors are less likely to spend 
money on information to determine the value of the assets or 
opportunities and are less likely to actively monitor their 
U.S. investments. Therefore, they would prefer registered
shares of more reputable firms with less uncertainty in the 
value of the shares.
An important contribution of the Hertzel and Smith
(1993) paper is that their sample includes over-the-counter 
issues compared with other studies of only exchange listed 
companies. They also consider the effects of a significant 
sub-sample of foreign placements. The majority of the 
Regulation S issues in the sample period of our study are 
also over-the-counter issues.
E. Regulation S (Offshore Equity Offerings)
Securities offered to the public must be registered
under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. The act did
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not set geographic limits and would therefore include 
securities offered to the public anywhere in the world. As 
the Eurobond market developed in the 1960's, large companies 
offered debt overseas without registering with the SEC.
Securities Act Release No. 33-4708 was written in 1964 
to clarify the scope of registration of securities. Because 
Section 5 of the Securities Act is intended to protect
"American investors," a domestic company may issue debt
securities offshore without registering, provided that "the 
offering is made under circumstances reasonably designed to 
preclude distribution or redistribution of the securities 
within, or to nationals of, the United States." "The 
distribution is to be effected in a manner which will result 
in the securities coming to rest abroad" (Release 33- 
47081964). Procedures were established to ensure that 
securities did not end up in the United States and include 
the following: 1) securities were not issued immediately in
definitive form until a ninety day lockup period had
elapsed, 2) the underwriter was bound by agreements not to 
sell unsold allotments in the U.S. or to U.S. persons, 3)
underwriters had to deliver confirmations to other dealers 
to whom they sell, notifying them of selling restrictions.
When the Securities Act Release 33-4708 was written, 
debt securities issued by U.S. companies were the object of
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concern. The status of convertibles, equity offerings and of 
foreign issuers was unclear (Greene and Schneck;, 1994) . The 
following concerns were left without specific guidance: If
U.S. institutions buy foreign securities, does this subject 
the foreign issuer to the SEC registration requirements? 
When, if ever, can securities which were issued under 
reliance of Release 33-4708 be resold in the U.S. or to U.S. 
persons? Do unsold allotments of a foreign offering preclude 
all underwriters from reselling the security into the United 
States? Release 33-4708 was consequently followed by 
numerous "no-action" letters which were provided by staff at 
the SEC for various issuer's offerings where the compliance 
with Release 4708 was unclear. In other words, Release 4708 
was not sufficiently clear nor specific in setting 
guidelines for what was meant by "American investors" and 
"coming to rest abroad" to assure that large traditional 
overseas offerings were not in violation of the registration 
requirement of Section 5 of the 1933 Securities Act (Hanks, 
1996) . The Commission saw a need to clarify and codify the 
extra-territorial application of the securities registration 
requirements and adopted Regulation S to set forth new 
guidelines (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 1993).
Hanks (1996) reports that, "the bulk of Regulation S 
offerings" are of the type intended by the SEC, large
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Eurobond and Euroequity offerings. She notes that Regulation 
S has also facilitated smaller offshore equity offerings and 
asserts that it is a valuable capital market tool for 
smaller start-up and growth firms in the U.S. A company
needing money immediately to complete a project, to quickly
respond to opportunities or threats, or to remain solvent
can attain overseas capital simply, quickly and with low
transaction costs.
Hanks argues that the issuing speed of Regulation S is 
particularly vital for small start-up firms that do not have 
access to the same tools which are available to established 
firms for avoiding lengthy SEC registration procedures. For 
example, streamlined registration procedures are available 
to certain companies who have made timely, complete filings 
with the SEC for three years (Form S-2) or one year (Form S- 
3). Shelf Registration, Rule 415, which allows companies to 
register in advance all securities it intends to offer 
during the following two years, is only available if certain 
criteria are met, usually excluding new and smaller 
companies. Greene and Schneck (1994) claim that some of 
these constraints are being eased by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Shelf registration is now available for 
companies which have a public float of $7 5 million and have 
reported for twelve months to the SEC. However, the shelf
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registration would not be available for an acquisition where 
specific information about the company to be acquired and 
the impact on the acquiring company must be reported.
The "no review" procedure may be selectively granted by 
the SEC staff for offerings by companies for which they have 
recently reviewed a registration statement. Of course, the 
"no review" is not likely to be granted to a newer company 
or one with a weak financial condition.
Venture capital is also an alternative for smaller 
firms. Private offerings to venture capitalists involve a 
resale restriction period, deep discounts, and generally 
involve relinquishment of some management control. Companies 
prefer to sell with minimal formalities to eager foreign 
investors who do not demand management control.
Direct Regulation S issuers tend to be small start-up 
NASDAQ quoted companies, often high-tech companies with a 
constant need for cash (see Hanks, 1996). The offerings are 
small ($500,000 to $10 million) with substantial discounts 
from market value and the overseas purchasers few (usually 
no more than ten) . A simple purchase or subscription 
agreement is generally entered into and frequently no 
offering document is provided. Typically "finders" match up 
the issuer with the investors and no intermediary 
(investment bank or underwriter) takes temporary ownership.
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Regulation S sales are quick and the transaction can be 
completed in a few days. By not registering with the SEC, 
the company reduces the time to get funds from months to 
days. The costly registration statement preparation and 
review procedures of accountants, attorneys, and internal 
administrative time are avoided as well as high underwriting 
fees. Hanks defends Regulation S as a valuable tool for 
global competitiveness for firms with dynamic growth 
potential. It breaks barriers to free market forces and 
allows the markets to allocate capital without undue 
regulation. She supports Regulation S as the best way small 
companies can circumvent general failures of securities 
regulations which stifle capital-raising for smaller 
companies. Greene and Schneck (1994) also believe that 
Regulation S equity is a valuable means of financing 
material acquisitions. A company can use Regulation S to 
quietly acquire capital for a major acquisition (Scholl, 
1996a).
In the next section reported abuses of this freedom 
provided by Regulation S are summarized. Hanks (1996) 
summarizes problematic practices identified by the SEC. She 
attributes abuse of Regulation S to certain issuers, 
investors, and "finders" not complying with the spirit of 
the regulation. Examples of the type of activity which has
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given Regulation S bad press would be: 1) intentional
evasion of registration where the issuer is not selling to 
bona fide long-term investors, 2) foreign investors who do 
not take economic risk with their investment, and 3} 
"finders" with no reporting responsibility to the SEC and 
who often make misrepresentations to the investor and the 
small companies in need of cash. These abuses of Regulation 
S are summarized next.
F. Anecdotal Evidence of Problems and Abuses of 
Regulation S
Marcial (1995) reiterates the SEC corporate division's 
assertion that Regulation S does a good job of facilitating 
global capital market transactions in an efficient manner. 
American companies can easily and inexpensively provide 
convenient investment opportunities to investors. For 
example, Allied Waste Industries, issued $10 million of 
convertible debentures under Regulation S. The company's 
president, Thomas VanWeelden, explained that while the 
company was doing well, the industry had fallen out of favor 
on Wall Street. Regulation S was the preferred way to 
fulfill financing needs.
However, there is nothing to prevent ailing businesses 
from creating cash flow through Regulation S issues and 
prolonging their distressed existence while diluting
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earnings, if any, and causing the share prices of existing 
shareholders to drop. Some freelance "finders," who are not 
licensed brokers nor registered representatives of any 
brokerage firm and do not have the credentials to practice 
investment banking, are introducing this attractive means of 
acquiring capital to companies that are not worthy of fresh 
capital and are unable to fund operations in another way. 
For example, Marcial's 1995 account of Walda (the unique 
character mentioned in the introduction) reveals that of the 
15 companies her firm helped capitalize with Regulation S in 
1993, five ceased trading on the NASDAQ OTC market, implying 
that these companies no longer met the listing 
qualifications. While the SEC Corporate division defends the 
value of Regulation S as a step toward breaking down 
barriers to acquiring global capital, the SEC enforcement 
division has its hands full with the abuses. Shareholders 
complain that the SEC is not doing its job of protecting 
U.S. investors. Jerry Isenberg of the SEC's division of 
enforcement is quoted in Barron's (Scholl, 1996a) "For 
crooks, the object of the game is to get freely trading 
stock that you can turn into cash as quickly as possible, .
. . Before Regulation S, you had to jump through a lot more
hoops to do that - holding periods, lawyers, transfer 
agents. With Regulation S, you don't. And that is why a lot
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of bad guys have Regulation S as an element in their 
schemes," (page 32).
Domestic investors are at a double disadvantage when 
companies issue Regulation S equity securities. First, it is 
illegal for them to participate in the purchase of shares 
selling at a discount of 10 to 50 percent from the current 
market price (Marcial, 1996). Secondly, until November 1996, 
these unregistered issues were not disclosed to shareholders 
and the extent of the dilution was a mystery until quarterly 
reports showed increases in shares outstanding for which 
they had no legal right to buy. Since the shares are 
restricted for a short period of time, forty days, it is 
easy for foreign investors to hedge their investment by 
selling short and delivering the discounted shares, making a 
large risk-free profit. U.S. investors are excluded from 
buying the discounted shares and from maintaining their 
ownership percentage since the issue can only be made in an 
offshore transaction. U.S. investors, with the means to do 
so, have set up offshore companies using foreign nominees to 
trade in the Regulation S market (Marcial, 1995). Included 
in this category are members of organized crime using 
Regulation S, offshore shell companies, and control (using 
significant dubious power and influence) of brokerage and 
smaller underwriting firms to manipulate micro-cap stock
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prices for their benefit (Business Week, 1996, 1997) .
If the Regulation S equity were to remain offshore then 
the U.S. investor might not be injured by its effects 
(Morgenson, 1994). Greene and Schneck (1994) argue that 
several main aspects of Regulation S trigger overseas 
investors to sell back to the U.S. market or to hedge 
against loss, thus shifting risk and losses back to the U.S. 
markets. The deep discounts and short restriction period 
provide a market imperfection that is extremely attractive 
to foreign investors. Investors can capture the spread in 
price between their Regulation S shares and the current 
market price by selling short in the United States and 
delivering their shares after the forty day restriction 
period. If the restriction period were longer, such as the 
24 month restriction of Sec. 14 4 private placements 
(Solberg, 1979) , then it would not be possible to hedge by 
selling short. Even if the stock is redistributed in the 
U.S. market after 24 months, the market has time to react to 
full information, a fairer playing field for existing 
shareholders.
Greene and Schneck (1994) suggest that the restrictions 
on Reg. S encourage short-term investing. Also, because
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Regulation S shares are not required to be legended,6 they 
may simply ignore the 40-day restriction period and sell 
their shares immediately for a quick substantial profit. Of 
course, if these stocks had an active market outside the 
United States and were listed on a foreign exchange, then 
there would be no need to sell back into the U.S. stock 
market. The discount encourages investors to take their huge 
profit before it diminishes, thus encouraging resale as 
quickly as possible.
The customary discount brings many critics to another 
reproach. We know that a discount for lack of marketability 
of restricted stock is appropriate and frequently 
substantial (SEC, 1977). Courts have valued restricted stock 
at discounts from market value ranging from 10% to 90% 
depending on the circumstances. The mean discount of 15 
cases reported by Solberg (1979) was 37.4%. The five ways 
that these restricted securities can be sold according to 
Solberg are much more restrictive and only after a much 
longer waiting period than Regulation S (in limited amounts 
and only after two and five years for Rule 144 and Rule 237 
sales, respectively). The percentage discount on
The issuer might place a legend on the face of the 
certificates indicating that the stock has not been 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
that transfer is restricted.
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institutional investor transactions of letter stock; (stock 
placed privately and without registration is restricted from 
trading on the open market for a period, usually 24 months) 
was 25.8% for a major SEC study (Pratt, et. al., 1995). It 
is logical, therefore that Regulation S stock would bear 
some discount for the lack of liquidity for the forty day 
restricted period but it should be much smaller than the 
more restrictive unregistered securities. Regulation S 
investors are dissimilar from the private placement investor 
who requires a discount for investigating the true value of 
the firms assets and opportunities. Generally the foreign 
investor is probably not going to become deeply involved 
with management and with the investigation of the firm's 
true valuation.
Hertzel and Smith (1993) found the average discount on 
private placement to the thirty-five foreign investors was 
9.8% compared with an average 25.2% discount for seventy-one 
U.S. investors. The price of Regulation S shares is reduced 
as much as 50% for the same shares U.S. investors are buying 
at full price. Is this discount warranted given the 
relatively short restriction period? The answer to this 
question which surfaces in the popular press is "definitely 
not." They attribute the large discounts as a desperation 
measure by poor quality, cash strapped firms that cannot get
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financing elsewhere. "Healthy companies rarely mark down 
their stock's price in order to attract investors" (p.38, 
Morgenson, 1994). Stockholders of Regulation S issuers are 
warned, "If the company is selling discounted shares 
overseas, think about selling yours here at home" (page 40, 
Morgenson, 1994).
With "astronomical profits" in Regulation S offerings, 
it is no wonder that there are some non-reputable "finders" 
and investment banking firms out to get their cut. Sellers 
who have had prior securities fraud charges and SEC 
disciplinary action against them are damaging the reputation 
of these offshore equity markets (Cohen, 1994 and Marcial, 
1996). "Even a baboon could double its money if it could buy 
shares in an American company at $7.50 while the same firm's 
shares were trading at $11.50 at home" . . . "It's what all
the overseas money managers are talking about" (p. 37,
Morgenson quoting an overseas investor talking about the 
Regulation S deals). And hedging with a short sale creates a 
risk-free haven for foreign investors, which "finders" or 
boutique investment banks love to sell to its clients 
overseas, a loophole that the SEC did not anticipate (Cohen, 
1994) .
The problems mentioned above may cause a well- 
intentioned issue to backfire on the company and its
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existing shareholders. Jerry Isenberg, the SEC deputy 
director of enforcement, has said that some Regulation S 
placements appear to be "schemes to evade registration" 
(Cohen, 1994) . An example of this is where the purchaser 
takes no financial risk. The purchaser may make the purchase 
with no money down and none to pay until the stock is sold 
after the forty-day restriction period. The overseas 
investor pays for the Regulation S stocks with non-recourse 
promissory notes due in 40-70 days. Payment is made to the 
corporation with the proceeds of the stock sale in the U.S. 
(Scholl, 1996a). Clearly, the transaction was constructed 
with the intention that the shares would be sold back into 
the U.S. market soon after the restricted period and not as 
a long-term investment. This scheme may simply be providing 
an overseas holding agent, allowing them to serve this 
purpose with no investment risk, a slick way to issue equity 
without registration.
A sale may be made with the intention of redistributing 
the shares in the U.S. to a predetermined final buyer and 
with the sole intention to avoid the registration process. 
Preliminary Note 2 of Regulation S would make reliance on 
Regulation S invalid where the purpose of the issue is the 
avoidance of registration under Section 5 of the Securities 
Act of 1933.
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It is no wonder that companies are eager to avoid 
preparing a registration statement. The registration is a 
lengthy and very costly process, not to mention disruptive 
to corporate management. To register new financing with the 
SEC is a major decision. Attorneys, accountants, 
underwriters help prepare and review the statement. There is 
an opportunity cost for the significant investment of 
managers' time planning the offering. Underpricing of new 
shares is prevalent (Bhagat, Marr, and Thompson, 1985). 
After the SEC reviews the statement it is probably reworked 
and resubmitted. But perhaps the largest deterrents to 
registration are the legal liability of the issuer and its 
directors for the content of the registration statement and 
the monitoring and attention that a registration for new 
equity attracts. The registration of a large block may 
provide a cue for an unwanted take-over bid (Solberg, 1979); 
such action can be quieted with Regulation S.
Whether Regulation S equity offerings were made in good 
faith to offer long-term investors ownership while the 
corporation accesses capital world-wide or whether the 
offering had the intention of avoiding the burdensome 
registration process, the anecdotal evidence consistently 
indicates that the market price takes a beating after a 
small firm issues Regulation S equity securities. Should
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free capital markets signify no regulatory intervention with 
a "buyer beware" attitude? Scholl's (1996a) advice to small 
cap investors is to "tread carefully," and ask whether the 
company has made Regulation S deals and whether it plans to 
or not.
See Appendix A for a description of some of the actual 
Regulation S cases and the types of abuses cited in the 
popular press.
G. SEC's Assessment of Regulation S
Jaye Scholl sums up the SEC's Regulation S position or 
lack of one consistent position in the Barron's April 1996 
article "Easy Money." The SEC is split with its stance on 
Regulation S. The Corporate Finance office defends it as an 
important and valuable step forward toward achieving a 
global free market for attaining capital. The former Chief 
of the Office of International Corporate Finance, Sara Hanks 
(1996), the lawyer, Solberg (1979) and academics (Bhagat, 
Marr, and Thompson, 1985) aptly explain the tremendously 
burdensome, slow, costly, and disruptive security 
registration procedure. Regulation S lessens this burden and 
allows companies to respond quickly and quietly to 
investment opportunities and to take advantage of expanded 
financing opportunities worldwide, thus reducing their cost 
of capital (Hanks, 1996). Furthermore, codifying the
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guidelines reduced uncertainty about procedural requirements 
or international capital transactions (Kelley and Bannister, 
1993) .
On the other hand, the SEC enforcement division is 
overwhelmed with the unscrupulous participants of the 
Regulation S market. Jerry Isenberg of the SEC's enforcement 
division voices the concerns of the U.S. investor, who they 
feel responsibility toward. Existing shareholders are at a 
disadvantage due to the disparate treatment. They are 
excluded from the bargains on new issues and they are 
victims of stock dilution. Until November 1996, there was no 
disclosure or warning that new shares were out there and 
might return to U.S. markets reducing the share prices. Late 
in 1996, the SEC passed a provision which requires companies 
to disclose a Regulation S equity security sale within 15 
days (Illiano, 1997).
It seems that the conflicting sentiments about 
Regulation S within the SEC boil down to the goals of each 
division. The enforcement division is attempting to squelch 
the abuses in order to protect the U.S. investors while the 
corporate division relies on a new purpose of protecting the 
capital markets and promoting free market exchange. Barron's 
quoted the SEC's new head of corporate finance; "We want to 
put everyone on official notice that we are serious about
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
going after Regulation S abuses" (Scholl, 1996d).
Congress instructed the SEC to investigate the abuses 
claimed in the popular press. Purported offshore offerings 
under Regulation S which "are in essence being placed 
offshore temporarily to evade registration requirements with 
the result that the incidence of ownership of the securities 
never leaves the U.S. market, or that a substantial portion 
of the economic risk relating thereto is left in or is 
returned to the U.S. market during the restricted period, or 
that the transaction is such that there was no reasonable 
expectation that the securities could be viewed as actually 
coming to rest abroad" are transactions in violation of
Preliminary Note 2 of Regulation S and would not be covered 
under the safe harbors and "would be found not to be an
offer and sale outside the U.S. for purposes of general
statement under Rule 901" (page 35664). Certain transactions 
claiming exemption from registration under Regulation S have 
been cause of concern of the investing community and of the 
Securities & Exchange Commission.
Among the problematic practices listed by the SEC
release are the following.
1. Parking securities with an offshore affiliate of 
the issuer or distributor for the restricted period in order 
to evade the registration requirements of the Act.
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2. Instances are discussed where economic or
investment risk never shifts to the offshore purchaser or 
where securities were offshore for less than the restricted 
period. In this case, the purchaser is not a long term 
investor but serves as a statutory underwriter for a delayed 
sale in the U.S. rather than a long-term investor. Examples 
of these abuses are:
a. purchases of Regulation S securities with 
promissory notes where the expectation of repayment stems 
from the resale of the securities in the U.S. market,
b. fees paid to the purchaser to hold the securities
offshore during the restricted period. This may be in the 
form of a significant discount from market value. The 
question arises whether the fees or discount are such to 
indicate that the transaction is a parking scheme to evade 
registration requirements.7 In their footnote #14 of the 
1995 release, the SEC indicates that some discounts of 
Regulation S stock have been so unrelated to economic 
reality that the only justification they see is that it is
part of a parking or holding scheme for what in essence is
7 Footnote 14 of the July 10, 1995 release states legitimate 
reasons for discounts; "lack of marketability during 
restricted period, historical volatility of the stock, 
financial condition of the issuer, dilution represented by 
new issue, market conditions, information disclosed to 
purchaser but not otherwise disclosed to the market."
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onshore financing.
Based on the problematic practices identified by the 
SEC and other anecdotal information, it appears that 
Regulation S may allow for evasion of security registration 
requirements and can cause financial loss for stockholders.
H. February 1998 Amendments to Regulation S
In response to these problematic practices identified, 
amendments to Regulation S were adopted by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission on February 17, 1998. The amendments 
were designed to prevent the abusive practices involving 
securities offerings offshore and restore investor 
confidence in the integrity of offshore equity offerings 
made on reliance of Regulation S. The problematic practices 
observed were by domestic issuers and therefore the 
amendments apply to domestic issuers of equity securities, 
including convertibles, and not foreign issuers unless their 
primary market is the U.S. The key changes are described 
below.
Distribution Compliance Period. The restricted selling 
period has increased from 40 days to one year. Equity 
placements offshore by domestic issuers are now classified 
as "restricted securities" within the meaning of Rule 144 
and cannot be resold in the United States for one year 
unless they are registered or qualify for an exemption from
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registration under Rule 144.
Hedging. Purchasers must agree not to engage in 
hedging transactions except with registration or in 
compliance with provisions of the Securities Act.
Purchaser Certification. Category 2 issuers will be 
subject to the more restrictive compliance procedures of 
Category 3 issuers. Purchasers of domestic equity securities 
must certify that they are not U.S. persons nor are they 
acquiring the securities for the benefit of a U.S. person 
or, if they are a U.S. person, that they are acquiring the 
securities in a transaction qualifying for exemption from 
registration. Furthermore, purchasers must agree to resell 
or to engage in hedging transactions, only in accordance 
with exemptive provisions of the Securities Act and 
Regulation S or only once shares are registered with the 
SEC. A distributor of Regulation S securities is required to 
send a notice to each purchaser informing them that they are 
subject to the same restrictions (within the one year 
distribution compliance period).
Leqending and Stop Transfer. Equity securities offered 
under Regulation S must bear a legend stating the transfer 
restrictions and hedging prohibitions. If the securities are 
issued without a stock certificate, then the issuer must 
inform the holders and subsequent purchasers of the
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restrictions by other reasonable means. Subsequent 
purchasers will be informed of resale and hedging 
restrictions by the legending requirement.
The issuer is now required to refuse to register any 
transfer of restricted securities unless the transfer is in 
compliance with the exemption provision of the regulations 
or unless registration of the securities is carried out. The 
issuer must provide contractual documentation that they are 
bound by this restriction. This places accountability and 
monitoring responsibility with the issuer.
Promissory Notes. In some instances the payment for 
Regulation S shares was made with non-recourse promissory 
notes with the amount paid depending on the value of the 
shares after the forty day restriction period. Clearly, both 
the issuer and the purchaser expected the U.S. resale of 
stock on the 41st day to repay the note; it was never 
intended for the shares to "rest abroad." Payment with 
promissory notes continues to be allowed but with the 
following restrictions.
1) The one year holding period restriction will begin 
when full recourse is provided against the purchaser. The 
note must be secured by collateral (not the securities 
purchased) with value equal to or greater than the market 
value of the securities purchased.
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2) The note must be paid in full before the resale of the 
securities in the United States.
Reporting Requirement. As of November 1996, equity 
securities issued under Regulation S are required to be 
reported within 15 days to the SEC on Form 8-K. This 
reporting requirement will continue for sales through 
December 31, 1998. After that, Form 8-K reporting will no
longer be required. The Regulation S issue must then be 
reported on the quarterly report 10Q (or 10K for the last 
quarter.) This change is due to the increased restricted 
holding period. The Commission believes that investors will 
have adequate time to react to the information before the 
shares can be resold in the U.S. markets.
These amendments were enacted to prevent further abuses 
and evasion of registration. They create more record-keeping 
and require more accountability by issuers. Purchasers must 
now provide certification of their non U.S. status and have 
a longer restrictive period before shares can be resold in 
the U.S. markets. They may require a larger discount for 
lack of liquidity.8 However, the SEC believes these changes 
are necessary to enhance investor confidence in the 
integrity of Regulation S offerings. The commission has
A study of the SEC Office of Economic Analysis indicates 
the average discount for Regulation S equity issue was 22%.
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considered its responsibilities of investor protection, 
promotion of efficiency, competition, and encouraging 
capital formation.
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III. OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES
The objectives of this study are fourfold (i) ascertain 
the financial characteristics of firms issuing Regulation S,
(ii) determine the size of the discount and discuss its 
appropriateness considering the 40 day restriction period,
(iii) analyze the valuation effects of Regulation S, and
(iv) investigate the sources of cross-sectional variation of 
the valuation effects.
A. Financial Characteristics of Issuing Firms
Firm characteristics of the Regulation S issuers are 
used to identify the proportion of issuing firms that are 
financially sound compared with those that are not. This 
information is beneficial to understand the use of 
Regulation S.
B. Is the Discount Appropriate?
"Because equity securities sold by US issuers in 
reliance on Regulation S are subject to restrictions on 
resales, the securities are generally sold at a discount to 
the US market price."9 "The size of the price discount is 
affected by a variety of factors including how long the
9 Page 28, Muglia and Tierney (May 1998), International 
Financial Law Review, "SEC Tightens Regulation S rules for 
US Issuers."
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restricted shares must be held before they can be sold in 
the public markets."10 Liquidity is a significant factor in 
the valuation of securities. Silber (1991) finds that the 
discount on restricted securities varies directly with the 
proportion of new issues to publicly traded stock and 
inversely with the credit-worthiness of the issuing company. 
Silber's results indicate that credit-worthy companies offer 
blocks of restricted stock (a 2 year restriction during his 
sample period) at discounts from market value of more than 
30 percent and that firms with low or no earnings have much 
larger discounts. Discounts are common for restricted 
securities due to their lack of marketability (Valuing a 
Business, 1995). Securities issued under Regulation S have a 
40 day trading restriction.
A study by the SEC Office of Economic Analysis 
indicates that the average discount for Regulation S equity 
issues is approximately 22% (p. 9639, Federal Register
1998). Securities which were restricted from trading for two 
years or more were issued at discounts ranging from 20% 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993) to 45% (Valuing a Business, 1995)
relative to the market price.
The average 20% discount from market price for private 
placements in the Hertzel and Smith (1993) study reflects
10 P. 9639 Federal Registrar, February 25, 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 3
the information costs of private investors in addition to 
the discount for lack of marketability for two years. The 
average discount for the sub-sample of 35 foreign investors 
of the private placement sample was 9.8% compared with 25.2% 
discount for domestic investors. Hertzel and Smith (1993) 
concluded that foreign investors were less likely to invest 
in firms facing financial distress or with speculative 
product development (greater intangibles).
The discount for the Regulation S issues should be 
substantially lower than the 20% average discount found in 
the Hertzel and Smith 1993 sample because it is restricted 
from U.S. trade for only 40 days rather than 2 years. Since 
all Regulation S issues are offshore, we expect the discount 
to be less than the 9.8% discount of the Hertzel and Smith 
(1993) foreign sub-sample. Hypothesis 1: The average
discount on 40-day restricted Regulation S issues will be 
less than 9.8%.
C. Valuation Effects of Regulation S
Jaye Scholl (1996a) points out that there are three 
Tiers of users. Each Tier uses Regulation S for different 
purposes and this results in conflicting hypotheses about 
the market impact. Our study examines the market impact 
around the date that the securities are issued, the date 
that the 8-K is filed with the SEC, and the end of the
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restriction period which is 40 days after the issue.
Tier 1 companies are most similar to the large, stable 
companies (market value of equity over $1 billion) that have 
traded in the Euro-capital markets. They are established 
companies with accumulated earnings and therefore, their Z- 
score is expected to be in the "safe" zone, (that is, 
greater than 2.675. Altman's (1968) Z-score is a measure of 
financial soundness based on a combination of financial 
ratios and is explained in detail in section V.A.
Large corporations obtaining financing abroad use 
Regulation S and eliminate printing, legal, and accounting 
costs that often run into millions of dollars (Scholl, 
1996a) . It can be argued that Regulation S offshore issues 
would provide a positive signal to the markets that the 
company is taking advantage of financing bargains overseas. 
As with Euroequity, foreign investors have confidence in the 
firm as a long-term investment. Tier 1 companies should 
experience a non-negative reaction to the offering because 
they can access global capital markets and lower cost of 
financing (Hanks, 1996; Scholl, 1996a). Hypothesis 2: The
market impact around the Regulation S issue and filing date 
will be non-negative.
Because investors in Tier 1 companies are attracted to 
the reputation of the issuer, we expect them to be long-term
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investors. If their ownership "rests abroad," then no 
significant trading should occur at the end of the 40-day 
restriction period, and no abnormal returns should be 
observed for the existing shareholders forty days after 
issue. Hypothesis 3: There will be no impact on market
price at the time that the restriction for selling 
Regulation S securities is lifted.
Tier 2 companies, with market value of equity between 
$100 million and $1 billion, issue some debt and some equity 
offshore, often contemporaneously with a U.S. offering 
(Scholl, 1996a). Tier 2 firms are similar to those included 
in the sample of private placements of the Hertzel and Smith 
(1993) study; they are over-the-counter listed companies 
seeking smaller amounts of new equity to fund attractive 
investment opportunities. Private placements had a positive 
discount adjusted market reaction. The discount adjusted 
abnormal return for the foreign sub-sample of Hertzel and 
Smith (1993) was 1.1% compared with 11.7% for domestic 
investors and 8.2% for the full sample.
Tier 2 companies use Regulation S to tap many sources 
of financing (Scholl, 1996a) . They also use Regulation S to 
raise capital for major acquisitions. Our expectations of 
the market reaction to Regulation S issues of Tier 2 firms 
parallel those for Tier 1 firms; the issue and 8-K filing
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are not negative information for the markets (as articulated 
in Hypothesis 2).
We expect that Tier 2 issuers would attract long-term 
investors who want to participate in the growth of the
company. As with Tier 1 investors, there is no reason to 
sell on the forty-first day after the issue. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 relating to Tier 1 also holds for Tier 2 
companies. The impact on existing shareholders is expected 
to be non-negative because foreign investors are attracted 
to long-term investments in companies with positive growth 
opportunities.
Tier 3 companies are small (market value of equity less
than $100 million), cash starved companies which are often
forced to rely on Regulation S (Scholl, 1996a). These 
companies, which use Regulation S to pay operating expenses 
and to avoid bankruptcy, are those that raise commentary 
(Scholl, 1996a).11 One question that shareholders and
researchers need to address is whether or not the firm is 
better off because the capital injection helps the company 
survive and turn its distressed position into positive 
growth opportunities.
11 P. 32 Scholl (1996a) section title "Deals with the Devil 
Raise Cash Quickly" depicts the offerings at deep discounts 
which will flow back to U.S. markets harming the uninformed 
existing shareholders.
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Tier 3 companies are characterized by signs of 
distress, low liquidity, high debt, and poor performance. 
These firms are likely to be associated with an Altman's Z- 
score less than 2.675. Raising quick, unregistered capital 
under Regulation S may not be in the best interest of 
shareholders. Hypothesis 4: Negative abnormal returns are
hypothesized at the filing date, the first day that a 
Regulation S issue becomes public.
If the markets are strong-form efficient, then we 
expect to see the market react to the negative signal prior 
to the filing date, i.e. around the issue date. Hypothesis 
5: Shares of Regulation S issuing companies will experience 
a negative market reaction at the issue of Regulation S 
securities.
Large discounts (discussed in section B above) combined 
with a short holding period encourage opportunistic sales by 
foreign investors (Federal Register, 1997; Muglia and 
Tierney, 1998). Many of the abusive practices under 
Regulation S involve significant discounts from the U.S. 
market price (Federal Register, 1997) which encourage resale 
in the United States immediately after the restricted period 
expires, in order to realize a profit (Muglia and Tierney, 
1998). The purpose of the 40 day restricted trading period 
was intended to encourage long-term foreign investment, "to
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provide assurance that the securities will come to rest 
offshore."12 A test of the market reaction at the end of the 
40 day restricted period will be used to determine whether 
Regulation S equity securities are "resting offshore" or 
flowing back into the U.S. market.
Discounts on private placements compensate long-term 
investors for their costs of investigating the true value of 
a firms' assets or opportunities (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). 
To the extent the discount on restricted issues represents 
compensation for foreign investors to determine the firm 
value, then there should be no excess returns at the end of 
the required holding period. Hertzel and Smith attribute the 
positive market reaction in their sample of private 
placements to management signaling the firm's under­
valuation. In their sub-sample of unregistered shares, 
opportunistic resale is precluded by the 2-year required 
holding period. However, the shorter, 40-day restricted 
period of Regulation S may not be sufficiently long to 
prevent opportunistic resale. The length of the required 
holding period appears to be decisive as to whether the 
restriction period encourages or precludes opportunistic 
behavior.
12 P. 9635 Federal Register, Feb. 25, 1998, Rules and
Regulations, "Offshore Offers and Sales."
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If the equity has "come to rest offshore," as is the 
intent of Regulation S, there would be no reason for an 
abrupt flow of sales into the U.S. markets when the required 
holding period ends. The end of the restriction period would 
have no significant impact on shareholders because the 
information effect would already be incorporated into the 
prices at the issue and/or filing dates. Hypothesis 6A: 
There will be no market reaction at the end of the 
restricted holding period.
"Of course, some discounts may well be warranted in 
order to compensate for the length of the restricted period, 
historic volatility of the stock, financial condition of the 
issuer, the dilution represented by newly issued shares, 
current market condition, availability of current 
information as to the issuer, information the issuer may 
have disclosed to the purchaser, or other factors. 
Nevertheless, some discounts have been so unrelated to the 
economics of the transaction that the only justification 
that can be ascertained is that they are part of a parking 
scheme where the offshore purchaser is simply being used as 
a conduit for what is in reality an onshore (emphasis added) 
financing."13 Some issuers of Regulation S have been
13 Footnote 14 of p. 35664 of the Federal Register, 1995 
Rules and Regulations "Problematic Practices Under 
Regulation S."
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accused of evading the registration process by having 
securities held offshore just long enough to meet the
restricted time period knowing they will flow back into the 
U.S. markets (Federal Register, 1995). This may be harmful 
to the unsuspecting U.S. shareholders who have not been
informed of the equity securities issue (Marcial, 1995; 
Morgenson, 1994; Scholl, 1996c).
Another potential problematic practice involves selling 
securities at a deep discount to short-term investors who 
will sell the shares immediately after the restricted period 
is over. They may sell stock short in the meantime to assure 
a risk-free profit. If either of these abuses are 
significant, we would expect to see an increase in selling 
in the U.S. markets on the forty-first day after issue, 
causing downward pressure on the market price at the end of 
the restricted period. Hypothesis 6B: There will be a
negative market reaction at the conclusion of the restricted 
period.
Registration of securities with the SEC is intended to 
safeguard investors. Evasion of this procedure may not be 
consistent with acting in the best interest of existing 
shareholders. Hypothesis 7: There will be negative
cumulative abnormal returns around the end of the restricted
trading period.
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In summary, the abnormal returns found at the issue, 
filing date, and end of restriction period will help explain 
the effect Regulation S has on existing shareholders. A 
reaction at the issue date would indicate that something 
other than the public news of the Regulation S offering is 
influencing the returns. Significant abnormal returns at the 
filing date will help to explain the market beliefs with 
regard to public news of Regulation S offerings. News should 
be incorporated into the market price long before the end of 
the 40-day restriction period (see time line of events in 
Section IV C) . Negative abnormal returns at the end of the 
restriction period could provide support for either of the 
following:
1) The securities are not held by long-term foreign 
investors. They are flowing back into the U.S. markets as 
soon as possible, thus hurting the share price.
2) Shares are placed offshore to avoid registration with 
the SEC.
Persistent cumulative abnormal returns would provide 
evidence that Regulation S is not consistent with the 
creation and maintenance of value for shareholders.
D. Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Valuation Effects 
One focus of this study is the effect of Regulation S 
on shareholder value. After determining the market reaction
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to the offshore offering, the sources of cross-sectional 
variation in the valuation effects will be examined. In the 
following discussion, motivation for the explanatory 
variables used in the cross-sectional analysis is presented.
The companies'' level of financial soundness (Z-score) 
should be a factor influencing the perception of the 
offshore issue by the market. If the company is financially 
sound, the foreign issue may be a signal that management is 
taking advantage of lower cost of capital and avoiding costs 
of the registration process. It is expected that distressed 
firms with a low Z-score (Tier 3 companies) would have a 
negative market impact.
"Very often, Regulation S deals are evidence of a 
company's weakening financial state."14 Using Altman's Z- 
score as an explanatory variable is one method of 
determining the effects of financial characteristics on the 
abnormal returns. Tier 1 firms, which are more established 
would be expected to have a Z-score in the safe zone. Tier 2 
firms, with positive investment opportunities, should also 
reflect a Z-score in the safe zone. For Tier 3 companies, 
financial distress will be reflected in a low Z-score. 
Therefore, low Z-score companies are those charged with 
taking financing actions which harm existing shareholders.
14 see p. 38, Morgenson 1994.
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Hypothesis 8: The cumulative abnormal returns around the
event window (-1 to +1) will vary directly with Altman's Z- 
score.
Discounts ranging from 10 to 50 percent are reported on 
Regulation S issues (Marcial, 1995). "Healthy companies 
rarely mark down their stock's price in order to attract 
investors" (see p. 38, Morgenson, 1994). The discount then, 
may provide another indication of the reputation of the 
firm. Quality firms should not need to mark down their 
securities while Tier 3 firms may need to offer the steep 
discounts to entice foreign investors. A deep discount may 
provide evidence of financial distress, a desperate cash 
position, or evasion of the registration process. Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 firms should have lower discounts than Tier 3 
companies. Tier 3 firms, represented by issues with large 
discounts, would have more negative abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis 9: The abnormal returns will vary inversely with 
the size of the discount.
The size of the issue relative to the total equity 
outstanding should impact the extent of the market reaction 
to the issue. Myers & Majluf (1984) suggest that equity 
offerings result in a signal by management that the equity 
is overpriced and leads to a negative market reaction. 
Therefore, whenever a company floats new equity, whether
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domestic or foreign, the reaction should be negative. The 
greater the relative size of the offering, the more negative 
will be the expected impact on existing share value. 
Hypothesis 10: The abnormal returns will vary inversely with 
the size of the issue relative to the total market value of 
equity.
Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 issuers are segmented by 
firm size. Larger firms are those which Scholl (199 6) and 
Hanks (1996) suggest that Regulation S serves as a valuable 
financing tool. They suggest that smaller companies use 
Regulation S issues because of poor management and planning 
or as a last resort in troubled times. Therefore, the firm 
size, represented by the variable market value of equity, 
should be positively related to abnormal returns on 
Regulation S offerings. Hypothesis 11: Abnormal returns will 
vary directly with the market value of equity.
Whether a company is traded over-the-counter or is 
exchange listed is closely related to the size of the firm. 
Tier 3 companies would likely be traded over-the-counter, 
while Tier 1 firms would be exchange listed. We expect 
exchange listed firms to have a more positive market 
reaction to a Regulation S offering than over-the-counter 
listings. Hypothesis 12: The abnormal returns are expected
to have a negative coefficient for an over-the-counter (OTC)
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dummy variable compared with the exchange listed firms.
The type of security issued will also be considered as 
dummy variables. The three types of securities categorized 
for this study are common stock, convertible securities 
issued, and units which are a combination of securities 
(such as stock and warrants, convertibles and warrants).
Finally, issuance of equity securities offshore is a 
strategic decision. The discount on Regulation S issues, the 
size of the issue, the type of security and the terms of 
payment are determined by management and affect shareholder 
value. Agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
198 6) resulting from the separation of ownership and 
management should be reduced where managers and directors 
have an equity stake in the firm. Managers with stock 
ownership would be less likely to misallocate financial 
resources (Jensen 1986, 1993). H13: Managerial ownership
percentage will have a positive impact on abnormal returns 
at issue, filing date, and the end of the restricted holding 
period.
By investigating these issues and testing these 
hypotheses, we expect to learn more about the users of 
Regulation S and the effects on existing shareholders.
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IV. DATA - SELECTION AND CHARACTERISTICS
This section describes the sample selection and 
characteristics of the data. The following will be 
discussed: identification of the sample and SEC reporting
requirements, financial characteristics of issuing firms, 
Regulation S issue characteristics, frequency of 8-K filings 
with a description of multiple filings, type of transaction, 
and the source of financial and market data.
A. Identification of the Sample, Source, and 
Reporting Requirements
This study uses offerings of equity securities pursuant 
to Regulation S on or after November 18, 1996, the first day 
that these offerings are required to be disclosed to the 
SEC. These issues are reported to the SEC in item 9 of Form 
8-K within 15 days of issuance. The study period is between 
November 18, 1996 and November 17, 1997. During this time
four hundred and six Regulations S transactions were 
reported by one hundred and seventy-two companies. These 
companies filed three hundred and thirty-nine form 8-ks with 
the SEC. The following information about Regulation S equity 
sales is disclosed on Form 8-K:
a. The title and amount of the securities
b. The date of the transaction
c. The name of the underwriter or placement agent
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d. The consideration received
e. Persons or classes of persons to whom the securities 
were sold
f. In the case of convertible securities, warrants and 
options, the terms of conversion or exercise.
Summary information extracted from the 8-Ks can be found in
Appendix B and selected summary issue characteristics are 
reported in Table 2, Panel A.
[Insert Table 2 about here. (Panels A and B)]
B. Financial Characteristics of Issuing Firms 
Financial data and characteristics of firms issuing 
equity securities under Regulation S have been gathered from 
the Compact Disclosure database. Table 2 contains summary 
information of the sample characteristics. The major 
findings of financial characteristics of the issuers in
Panel A include the first, second, and third quartile of the
sample having a loss for the year prior to the issue as well 
as negative retained earnings. In addition, the mean and 
median Z-scores of the sample firms are in the distressed 
zone (less than 1.81).
Other financial characteristics of the sample found in 
Panel A of Table 2 include the following. The issuing firms 
vary in size from $257,000 to $85, 987,850,000 in market 
value of equity, with the median size being $36,670,000. The
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value of equity, with the median size being $36,670,000. The 
median book value of total assets is $11,873,000 and median 
net sales amount for the year preceding the Regulation S 
issue is $8,369,000. The majority of issuers are small 
firms. The degree of leverage varies greatly and the mean 
debt/total assets ratio is 162% and the median is 52%. 
Included in the sample are some insolvent companies which 
raise the average debt ratio. More important information 
about the financial stability of the sample companies can be 
observed from the prior year's net income or loss and the 
retained earnings, both of which are negative at the third 
quartile. Altman's (1968) Z-score mean (.47) and median 
(1.32) are both in the financially distressed zone (below
1.81). Some large firms and some profitable firms have 
issued Regulation S securities but the majority of the 
issuers are smaller firms and indications of financial 
distress are apparent.
In Panel B of Table 2, financial information of the 
sample is disclosed by 13 industry groupings. The median net 
income for each industry classification is negative with one 
exception, financial institutions and insurance, which has a 
mean and median net income of $42,207,000 and $44,468,000 
respectively. The median Z-score is less than 2.675 (in the 
distressed zone) for all industries except Communications,
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which has mean and median Z-scores of 3.62 and 2.80, 
respectively. Manufacturing/production (which has the 
largest number of issuing firms) has a low mean and median 
score of .50 and .91 respectively. Only one-third of the 
firms lie in the safe zone (Z-score greater than 3.0) with 
thirteen percent in the gray zone and fifty-four percent in 
the bankrupt zone (Z-score less than 1.8). The sign of 
troubled companies is not concentrated in a few industries 
of the sample, but is spread across industries.
C. Characteristics of Issue
The main finding of the issue characteristics include a 
26% discount from market value on Regulation S offerings. It 
is interesting to note that both the mean and median 3-month 
holding period return for the sample measured from the date 
of issue is a 12% loss.
The securities issue characteristics are extracted from 
the 8-K forms, item 9, as filed with the SEC and reported on 
the SEC Edgar database. The information including type and 
size of issue (stock, convertible securities, warrants), the 
method of payment (cash, promissory notes, stock in 
exchange, etc.), and the price or discount from market value 
of the securities is summarized in Appendix B.
The bottom portion of Table 2, Panel A contains summary 
characteristics of the issues. Gross proceeds range from
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$18,000 per reported transaction to $300,000,000, with a 
median issue size of $442,000. There were 2 instances in the 
sample where stock was purchased from one foreign holder and 
reissued to another simply as a change of ownership. The 
negative $5,000,000 proceeds shown as the minimum therefore 
reflects one of these examples where change of ownership was 
reported on the 8-K.
The size of the issues vary from .000001 to 120 times 
the existing equity market value with the median relative 
issue size of .024 times the existing equity market value. 
The first and third quartile of relative size of the issue 
is .002 and .084, respectively.
The discounts from market value vary. There are a few 
premiums where bonds or notes payable were converted to 
stock of lesser value or where the conversion price is 
greater than the current market price of common stock. 
However, discounts prevail with the average discount of 26% 
and the median discount on the offerings of 25%. The 
discounts are either discounts on the issuance of common 
stock, or discounts reflected in the conversion price of the 
convertible issues.
Three-month holding period returns were negative for 
211 out of 341 issues for which stock return information was 
available. The mean and median holding period returns for
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were both negative twelve percent (-12%). The three-month 
holding period losses provide more support to those who 
criticize Regulation S as destructive to shareholder value 
(Scholl, 1996; Cohen, 1994; Morgenson, 1994; Marcial, 1995). 
Fourteen of the one hundred and seventeen companies in the 
sample had at least one reverse stock split after November 
1996. This is further evidence that many companies issuing 
Regulation S stock have experienced declines in stock 
prices.
D. Frequency of 8-K filings
Table 3 lists the exchange where the stock is traded 
and the number of Regulation S issues by each company during 
the one-year sample period. Only 32 of the 172 issuers 
(18.6%) are exchange listed. The majority of the companies 
(107 or 62.2%) trade over-the-counter. One hundred and six 
of the issuers had one Regulation S issue during the one- 
year sample period while the rest are multiple issuers. The 
following discussion profiles some of the Regulation S 
multiple issuers. [Insert Table 3 about here]
Proctor & Gamble,15 the largest company in the sample, 
and Allied Signal filed twenty-nine and fifteen 8-Ks,
15 The companies mentioned here and in the following pages 
have filed one or more 8-Ks with the SEC during the sample 
period and the summary of these 8-K information can be found 
in Appendix B.
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and Allied Signal filed twenty-nine and fifteen 8-Ks, 
respectively, disclosing common stock issued to employees 
offshore as part of their respective employee stock purchase 
plans. These shares were not sold at a discount from the 
market price. Similarly Primark Corp, also listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange, issued and exercised options under the 
Executive Stock Option Scheme throughout the year. The 
exercise price of Primark shares was between 27% and 51% 
below market value at the date of exercise.
Eftek Corporation filed eleven 8-Ks and reported 
twenty-eight issues of common stock. The gross proceeds were 
between $3,750 and $603,605. Stock prices were unavailable 
prior to May 8, 1997, but the ten issues of common stock
under Regulation S after that date were issued at a discount 
from market value of between 62% and 8 6%. Eftek Corporation 
had two reverse stock splits on May 21, 1997 and June 24,
1997, each time giving 1 share for 3 shares held. Curtis 
Mathes Holding Corporation was also active with 11 
Regulation S transactions reported on 6 SEC filings. Four of 
the transactions were conversion of previously issued 
securities into ten million shares of common stock, three 
were exercise of warrants adding 3,200,000 shares 
outstanding, and the remaining four transactions were 
Regulation S issues of convertible notes, preferred stock,
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and sale of units (warrants issued in connection with 
preferred stock and convertible notes). Neither prices nor 
financial information were available for Curtis Mathes 
Holding Corporation for the sample period.
Lithium Technology Corporation converted notes payable 
to common shares on 16 occasions throughout the sample 
period. The market price of shares during the sample period 
fluctuated between $0.75 per share to $1.25. Conversion was 
carried out at a discount of 54.55% from market value and 
was in satisfaction of covenants of a convertible note 
agreement. In February and March 1997, the company placed 
3,463,203 and 1,201,550 shares of the company's common stock 
in escrow (satisfying covenants of a note payable 
agreement).
Another multiple issuer was XCL, Ltd., an American 
Stock Exchange listed company that filed 9 8-Ks and reported 
13 Regulation S transactions. In eleven instances, warrants 
previously issued were exercised at $0,125 to $0.21, a 
reduced price from the exercise price of $0.25 stated on the 
warrants. In September 1997, three million stock purchase 
warrants were issued by XCL as compensation for a consulting 
agreement to obtain Canadian capital, and in October, 1997, 
800,000 shares of common stock were paid to a resident of 
Taiwan in consideration for services performed since 1991.
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On February 18, 1997, XCL had a 1 share for 15 reverse stock
split.
Two companies reported seven Regulation S transactions 
each during the year. Queen Sands Resources, an OTC traded 
company, received $3,968,000 on the sale of Regulation S 
common stock at a weighted average discount of 31% on six 
transactions. It also reported both a repurchase and sale of 
$5,000,000 in transactions, which resulted in a change of 
ownership of 32.7% of the shares. In addition, 100,000 
shares were issued under a March, 1997 agreement whereby a 
significant shareholder agreed to raise $5.4 million 
overseas by December 31, 1997. Advanced Gaming Technology,
Inc. had seven Regulation S transactions from September 24, 
1997 through October 27, 1997. During this month the stock
price opened at $0.22 per share and dropped to $0.15. 
Between December 5, 1997 through January 23, 1998, the price 
was zero. The stock price increased but returned to zero 
after March 6, 1998. Debt of $412,500 reported in 3
transactions was converted into stock valued at $261,000, 
which may indicate that the conversion was a consequence of 
default on the repayment of the debt.
The above discussion describes issues by companies with 
seven or more Regulation S transactions during the sample 
year. Similar instances are found in the remainder of the
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sample and the types of transactions are summarized in Table
4.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
E. Type of Transactions
In Table 4 we find that four hundred and six equity 
security offerings were reported between November 18, 1996
and November 17, 1997. Of these, two hundred and eighty-
eight were common stock transactions. Convertible securities 
are a large portion of the 406 Regulation S transactions. 
Seventy four (18%) are issues of convertible securities and 
seventy-five of the common stock issues are on conversion of 
debt, preferred stock, options, or warrants.
Regulation S has been a convenient way of issuing stock 
to employees of foreign subsidiaries (47 of 288 common stock 
transactions). Although there are a large number (47) of 
issues due to employee stock ownership plans, these are 
multiple issues by a few large companies, as explained 
above.
Regulation S is used in exchange for stock of acquired 
companies (39 issues), and as compensation for services and 
asset purchases (16 reported transactions). Fountain Oil, 
Inc., an OTC company, traded shares of its stock for mineral 
rights in the Ukraine as part of a joint venture agreement 
while General Automation, Inc., AMEX listed, traded shares
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in consideration for software and assets.
Regulation S complements larger offerings under Rule 
14 4A or Regulation D. Six offerings of common stock and 
twelve of convertibles were reported as the foreign portion 
of a larger equity offering. Cellstar Corp., Adaptec, Inc., 
AES Corporation, and Iridium, LLC are some of the companies 
issuing Regulation S securities as the foreign portion of a 
larger Rule 144A offering.
Thirty-eight of the transactions involve "units" 
generally consisting of common stock shares or convertibles 
issued with warrants. Four reports were for exchanges of 
securities of one class with another. In summary, many types 
of transactions were reported as offshore equity offerings 
during the one-year period of the sample.
F. Sources of Financial and Market Data
Stock price information is gathered from the 
Investor .MSN. com Internet site and from the Prophet 
database. The financial information and firm characteristics 
such as profitability, liquidity, debt/equity measures, and 
firm size are extracted from the Compact Disclosure 
database.
In summary, with this data we have more insight about 
the sample and we can test our hypotheses developed in 
Section III. The next section describes the methodology and
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V. Methodology and Empirical Evidence
The hypotheses are tested in four steps: a) financial
characteristics of issuing firms are quantified using 
Altman's (1968) Z-score, b) discounts on issues are 
determined, c) the market response to Regulation S is 
analyzed for three event dates and, d) the source of 
valuation effects is tested using regression analysis. Major 
findings of each procedure are presented within its 
corresponding section.
A. Financial Characteristics
Due to the controversy regarding the type of firm and 
the reasons for issuing Regulation S securities, it is 
important to evaluate the issuer's past profitability, 
capital structure, liquidity, asset productivity, revenue 
generating ability, and going concern potential. Altman's 
(1968, 1983) model of corporate bankruptcy integrates
measures of these attributes into a dependable predictor of 
financial distress. In a recent comparison of bankruptcy 
models (ratio models, cash flow models, stock return models, 
and the return variability model), Mossman, Bell, Swartz, 
and Turtle (1998) found that no model can predict more than 
two years in advance but Altman's ratio model is the best 
predictor of bankruptcy in the year immediately preceding 
bankruptcy. Therefore, Altman's Z-score is determined to
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provide one continuous numerical variable of financial 
soundness of the sample firms.
Altman's (1968) Z-score is calculated as follows:
Z = 1.2 Xi + 1.4 X2 + 3.3 X3 + 0.6 X4 + 1.0 X5 
where:
Xi = Working capital/Total assets 
(Liquidity ratio),
X2 = Retained earnings/Total assets
(Cumulative profitability ratio),
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets 
(Profit generating power of assets),
X4 = Market value equity/Book value total liabilities 
(Solvency measure),
X5 = Sales/Total assets
(Capital turnover ratio).
Altman's Z-score combines measures of liquidity, 
cumulative profitability over time, operating profitability 
of assets, solvency, and the revenue generating ability of 
the firm's assets. The Z-score helps assess a firm's 
financial condition and has the ability to predict problems 
early. "There is an overwhelming tendency to underestimate 
the financial plight of companies that go bankrupt" (Altman, 
1968, p. 608). The Z-score classification of firms according 
to Altman's 1968 study was 94% accurate in classifying firms 
as bankrupt or not within the succeeding 15 months. Rankings
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are summarized as follows; firms with a Z-score of 1.81 or 
less are "sick firms," definitely financially distressed, 
those with a Z-score over 3.0 are in the safe zone, with no 
serious threat as going concerns. The financial condition of 
firms which fall within the "gray area" of 1.81 to 2.99 or 
the "zone of ignorance," is not as clear but Altman (1968) 
arrived at 2.675 as the critical value to discriminate 
distressed and non-distressed firms.
The Z-score unites many factors at once that individual 
ratios cannot. Sorting our sample by Altman's Bankruptcy 
Index may provide an indication of whether firms are issuing 
equity securities quietly as a last resort to quickly 
resolve a cash flow problem or whether the company has rapid 
growth potential and benefits from this quick source of 
capital.
Financial information was available for 132 sample 
companies. Using the 3 classification categories, only 32.6% 
of the firms have Z-scores in the safe zone (above 3.0) 
while 72 firms or 54.5% of the sample are in the bankrupt 
zone (below 1.8). Both the mean and median Z-scores of 0.52 
and 1.36 for the sample, respectively, are in the bankrupt 
zone. The following are Z-score classifications for the 
sample.
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Summary Z-scores (3 Classification Categories)
Number of Observations 132
Median Z-scores 
Mean Z-scores
Number of negative observations 




% of total observations 
Z-score 1.8 — 3.0 Gray Area 17
54 . 5%
% of total observations 12. 9%
3.0 or above - Safe Zone 43
% of total observations 32.6%
Table 5 shows the distribution of issuing firms by- 
industry. Forty-two percent of the one hundred and fifty- 
four sample firms, for which financial information is 
available, are in manufacturing and production. Twenty-eight 
percent are in services, with more than half of those in 
computer related services. Eight percent are in oil 
extraction and mining, and the remaining twenty-two percent 
are in wholesale and retail, utilities, construction, 
communications, and transportation. Table 5 also shows 
bankruptcy index categories by industry classification. 
Complete information to compute the bankruptcy index is 
available for only one hundred and thirty-two companies. Of 
these, eighty-six (or sixty-five percent) have a Z-score in 
the "distressed" zone and the other forty-six (thirty-five 
percent) are healthy companies as categorized by the Z-
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score. It is interesting to note that the only industry that 
has more companies in the "safe" zone than in the 
"distressed" zone is communications.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 contains a breakdown of Altman's two- 
classification Z-scores by industry. Sixty-five percent of 
the sample companies have Z-scores of less than 2.675 and 
only 35% of the sample are above the critical score of 
2.67 5. From the breakdown by industry, it appears that 
distressed issuers of Regulation S are not concentrated in 
any one industry. More than half of the sample across 
industries are financially distressed based on the Z-score 
measure of financial soundness.
B. Discount From Market Value
It is expected that restricted securities bear a 
discount for lack of immediate liquidity. Table 6 summarizes 
the discounts on restricted securities from previous 
studies. These average discounts are from 9.8% on private 
placements to foreign investors (Hertzel and Smith, 1993) to 
a median discount of 45% on 28 private placements (Standard 
Research Consultants, 1983). It is important to distinguish 
the 40 day restricted period of the Regulation S sample from
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these prior studies where the restricted period was at least 
2 years.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
The average discount on 15 9 issues of Regulation S 
securities is 21.9%. The discount on exercise or conversion 
to common stock during the year (39 conversion transactions) 
is 24.5%. Regulation S convertible securities issued during 
the sample period disclosed average discounts, available 
upon conversion, of 33.5%. Common stock was issued under 
Regulation S during the sample period at an average discount 
of 21.9%. The mean and median discounts for the entire 
sample, regardless of type of transaction were 26% and 25%, 
respectively, as reported in Table 2. It is apparent that 
the Regulation S discount of 26% is larger than warranted 
for its 40 day restriction period when compared to that of 
9.8% on Hertzel and Smith's (1993) private placements to 
foreign investors with a 2 year restricted period. The large 
discount lends support for the argument that foreign 
investors require a higher return due to investing in 
riskier firms (Tier 3 companies) , or that issuers are 
effectively offering a discount with the intention of 
avoiding the registration process, knowing that the 
securities will not "rest abroad."
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C. Valuation Effects of Regulation S Stock
1. Methodology 
Standard event study methodology, adjusting for thin 
trading where appropriate, is applied as a joint test of the 
effect of the offshore equity offerings on existing 
shareholders and the efficiency of markets toward Regulation 
S issues. It is important to understand the timing of events 
involving the Regulation S issues.
Until November, 1996, there was no requirement to 
report a Regulation S transaction to the SEC.
Time Line of Transactions Related with Regulation S









Effective November 18, 1996, all offshore equity issues 
are required to be reported on a Form 8-K within 15 days of 
the securities issuance. This 8-K filing date is the first 
day of public information. The end of the restriction period 
is also an important event date as short-term holders can 
legally sell their securities on the U.S. markets. Market 
reaction to Regulation S offerings is therefore analyzed for 
three distinct dates, the issue date, the filing date which
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follows the issue date, and the end of the restriction 
period which is 40 calendar days after the date of issuance.
Many of the issuers are smaller, thinly traded firms. 
In this study, therefore, returns are calculated between 
adjacent trades in both the parameter estimation period and 
the event window. Market returns are measured over the same 
calendar period used to calculate the individual stock 
returns. The procedure follows Dimson and Marsh (1983), and 
the trade-to-trade market regression model is:
where Rjc is the trade-to-trade return of security j during 
time period t (period between two recorded trades, 
regardless of the length of time) . dt is the length of 
period t (in number of days) between adjacent trades. Rmc is 
the market return measured over precisely the same calendar 
period as Rjt. This method of estimating the parameters of 
the market model allows for different period lengths between 
trades by weighting observations due to thin trading and 
ensures that the beta estimates are efficient and unbiased 
(Dimson and Marsh, 1983). Actual returns are compared with 
the estimated return from this market model to determine the 
abnormal returns at each of the three event dates. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for various
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windows around each of the events (issue date, filing with 
the SEC, and the end of the restriction period).
In addition to determination of average abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns around the three 
different event dates, the median abnormal returns are 
calculated. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is 
performed for the event dates and for cumulative abnormal 
returns in the windows around the event. This is a test of 
the median; a significant Z statistic would provide evidence 
that the median abnormal return is different from zero.
The source of the price information used to calculate 
both the security returns and the market returns is the 
daily closing prices quoted on the Internet site, 
Investor.msn.com. Several sample companies had more complete 
stock price information on the Prophet CD database; 
therefore, it was used to supplement the Investor.msn.com 
data. Twenty-five companies in the sample did not have 
sufficient return information for calculation of the market 
model parameters and were eliminated from the sample.
The sample period begins November 18, 1996 as this is
the effective date of the SEC's "Final Rules on Periodic 
Reporting of Unregistered Equity Sales," and therefore, the 
first date Regulation S issues were required to be reported 
to the public. The market return measure is extracted, using
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the daily closing quotation of the composite index for its 
respective market (NASDAQ Composite, AMEX Composite, and New 
York Stock Exchange Composite). To determine the market 
model parameters, 120 trading days are used, starting 130 
trading days prior to the first Regulation S issuance in the 
sample period (thereby avoiding any possible information 
effect relating to the issuance which may exist within the 
10 days before the sale of the securities).
The SEC has noted instances of larger than expected 
discounts for Regulation S securities and has indicated that 
these discounts may denote a payment to offshore buyers 
acting as holding agents for 40 days in order to avoid 
registration. Two procedures may contribute to our 
understanding of the use of Regulation S as a means to evade 
registration. First, mentioned above is the procedure where 
discounts on Regulation S securities for the sample period 
are compared with discounts documented for other restricted 
securities. Furthermore, if the use of Regulation S is a 
means of parking securities offshore until the restriction 
is lifted, then we expect to see the securities flow back 
into the U.S. market on that date. The increased securities 
sales could cause the market price to decline, and negative 
abnormal returns, at the end of the restricted period.
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2. Empirical Results 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 show the results of the mean and
median abnormal returns for the issue date, the filing date, 
and the end of the restriction period, respectively. In the 
top panel of each table, the average abnormal returns and 
the cumulative average abnormal returns for the 16-day 
period from 5 days prior to the respective event (securities 
issued, filing of 8-K, and end of restricted holding period) 
through ten days after the event are disclosed. At the 
bottom of each table, the mean and the median cumulative 
abnormal returns for several windows around the event date 
are reported.
a) Results At and Around the Date of Issue 
At the issue date (day 0 of Table 7) there is a 
positive but insignificant market reaction. Cumulative 
abnormal returns from day -5 through +10 show no significant 
trend on or after the Regulation S issue date.
[Insert Tables 7, 8, and 9 about here.]
It is interesting to observe that although the mean 
abnormal return on the issue date and the day prior to the 
issue date are positive, the median abnormal return is 
negative (-0.0051) and significant at the 10% significance 
level on the issue day (see the bottom portion of Table 7). 
While some issues in the sample have pulled the average
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abnormal return up, 59% of the observations are negative at 
the issue date. The median is negative for each event window 
and the non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum Z-statistic 
provides evidence (at the 10% level) rejecting a zero median 
at the issue date. In summary, the average market impact is 
not significant around the issue date, lending support to 
Hypothesis 2 that Tier 1 and Tier 2 firms will experience a 
non negative market reaction at the issue date.
However, the negative reaction of 59% of the issuing 
firms offers conflicting results. This negative reaction 
reflected in the nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test would 
support Hypothesis 5, that the issue is a signal of distress 
for some firms.
b) Market Impact at the 8-K Filing Date
Average abnormal returns (AARs) at the filing date (0 
day) , the first public announcement of the Regulation S 
issue, are negative and insignificant (see Table 8) . 
Hypothesis 2 for Tiers 1 and 2 is supported by AARs of no 
significance at the filing date. However the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Z-statistic (see bottom of Table 8) shows 
the median excess return at the filing date to be 
significantly negative (at the .01 level). There are 61.1% 
negative reactions for the sample, (significant at the .01
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level) with a median abnormal loss of .0053 on the filing 
date.
It is interesting to note that negative abnormal 
returns of -.0171 and -0.0207 on the second and fourth day 
after the filing date, respectively, are significant at the 
.01 level. Either the markets are slow to react to the news 
of the SEC filing or some other event is driving down the 
price after the issue is made public. This could be illegal 
selling by Regulation S security holders before the trading 
restriction is lifted.
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from -5 through 
+ 10 days (see the top portion of Table 8) reflect no
significant reaction. However, for the windows beginning at 
the filing day (0 to +5 and 0 to +10) , then CARs are
significantly negative at the 1% level (see the bottom of 
Table 8). The CARs encompassing the filing date plus the
five subsequent days are -.04. The loss in shareholder value 
following the filing date is economically significant as 
well, 6.29% mean cumulative loss (mean dollar value loss 
$26, 959,000) for 11 days from day 0 to +10, 4.66% median
loss ($799,000 median dollar value loss) for the same
period. The cumulative loss lends support to Hypothesis 4 
that Tier 3 issuers are using Regulation S to the detriment 
of existing shareholders.
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There is no significant mean reaction at the filing 
date but a significantly negative reaction persists after 
the filing date. We might ask if this type of information is 
slowly interpreted and incorporated into the share price or 
if there is some other force besides public information 
pulling the price down after the announcement. Illegal 
selling by foreign investors before the expiration of the 40 
day restricted period would cause negative returns between 
the 8-K filing date and the end of the restricted holding 
period.
The negative reaction is supported by the non­
parametric test of the median where curiously we see 
evidence (.10 level or better) of a negative median for the 
filing date and for each event window. The reaction around 
the end of the restriction period (discussed in the next 
section) may provide some further insight into the reaction 
which begins after the issue date.
c) End of 40 day Restricted Trading Period 
If the market reaction to Regulation S is based on 
information signaled by issuers, then the information should 
be priced when it becomes public. No market reaction would 
be expected at the end of the restricted period, especially 
if the securities "rest abroad." This is not what we find 
with our sample. The abnormal returns at the end of the 40-
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day restriction period provide evidence that the issuing 
companies' returns are not aligned with the expected returns 
of the market model. Negative average abnormal returns of 
2.07% on the day that the trading restriction is lifted (0 
day on Table 9) is statistically significant (.01 level). 
The mean and median dollar value of the one day loss are 
$137,554 and $99,322, respectively. This supports Hypothesis 
6 that securities are sold back into the U.S. markets at the 
end of the restriction period causing downward pressure on 
prices. The cause of the loss or sell-off is ambiguous. 
Management's evasion of the registration process and planned 
offshore holding for 40 days could lead to abnormal returns 
at the end of the restricted period. Similarly, the reaction 
at the end of the restriction period could be attributable 
to the success of "finders" who aggressively promote Tier 3 
company stock overseas as short-term high yield investments.
Cumulative abnormal returns for each period from 5 days 
prior to the event (-5) through the 10 days following the 
end of the restricted period (+10) is overwhelmingly 
negative and significant at the 1% level (See Table 9). The 
16 day cumulative abnormal returns average is negative 
10.21%. This represents a total dollar value loss for 
shareholders of the entire sample (excluding Proctor and 
Gamble) of $672,683,556 with the mean company loss of
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$3,330,117 and the median 16 day loss of $529,198.
Table 9 also reports the larger window of the daily and 
cumulative abnormal returns beginning ten days prior to the 
end of the restricted period (day -10). Each daily abnormal 
return is negative starting at day -9. Statistically 
significant cumulative negative abnormal returns begin 6 
days prior to the end of the restriction period. Average 
cumulative returns prior to the event date (CAR -10 to -1) 
are -5.36% showing a significant negative impact before the 
legal date for selling stock back into the U.S. markets. 
Cumulative abnormal returns for the 21-day event window -10 
to +10 are -0.1177 and significant at the .01 level.
The negative market reaction for several days prior to 
the end of the 40-day restriction period is worthy of 
consideration. If a company were using Regulation S to avoid 
the registration process, there may not be motivation to 
have the stock flow back before the 40 days. However, the 
foreign holders of unlegended securities in financially 
troubled companies might be tempted to jump-the-gun and sell 
before other sellers drive the price down. Although illegal 
to sell before 40 days, during the period of our sample 
there were no enforcement safeguards against early sales.
The bottom portion of Table 9 reveals negative mean and 
median cumulative window returns which are all highly
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significant for each event window. The CAR for the eleven 
day window -5 to +5 is -.0900 (.01 level of significance) .
Only -.0521 cumulative abnormal returns are attributed to 
the period of 0 to +5. A large part of the loss in 
shareholder value is attributable to a decline in returns 
prior to the end of the restriction period, an indication of 
trading or market reaction prior to the lifting of the 
trading restriction. These findings are not consistent with 
the "resting offshore" intention of Regulation S.
Notice that 70.8% of the sample companies had negative 
cumulative abnormal returns in the event window 0 to +5, 
where 0 is the day that the trading restriction ends. All of 
the windows around the event date show a significant (at the 
.01 level) negative median CAR.
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In summary, the main findings of our market reaction 
analysis show no support for an abnormal market reaction on 
the issue date while the median on the zero day (date of the 
issue) is negative and significant at the .10 level (Table 
7). There is no significant average market reaction for the 
8-K filing date although the median is negative and 
significant at the .10 level (Table 8). Following the filing 
date, the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns 
are negative and both economically (i.e. 4.66% cumulative
decline in value for the period day 0 to +10) and 
statistically significant (at the .01 level). This negative 
market impact continues until 10 days following the end of 
the restriction period as is reflected in Table 9.
The news of the Regulation S offering upon filing of 
the 8-K did not result in any significant reaction. However, 
the persistently negative reaction following the filing date 
and through the end of the restriction period is consistent 
with Hypothesis 6B. This supports allegations that the 
Regulation S investors are not long-term investors and do 
sell the shares when the restriction is lifted and even 
before the end of the 40 day restriction period. Because the 
shares were not required to be legended, it is very possible 
that the investors have sold the shares before the end of 
the restriction period, thus causing the negative and
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significant reaction after the filing date and before the 
end of the restriction period.
Negative CARs continue after the 40 day restriction 
period, harming existing shareholders. Looking at a slightly 
longer holding period, Table 2 shows that 211 (62%) of the
341 issues resulted in an average 36% three month holding 
period loss from the date of the issue. The entire sample 
had a negative 3-month holding period loss of twelve 
percent. Both mean and median losses were 12%. This provides 
support for Hypothesis 7. Existing shareholder value 
declines following Regulation S offerings.
D. Cross-Sectional Analysis
1. Regression Model 
We next estimate a model that predicts the factors 
affecting the market reaction to Regulation S at the issue 
date, the corresponding SEC filing date, and at the end of 
the restricted holding period. The dependent variable is the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAR) for the -1 to +5 
window for both the issue and filing dates. (The 0 day is 
the day securities are issued and day the 8-K is filed, 
respectively.) A wider event window is used for the end of 
the restricted trading period (CARs -10 to +10 around the 0 
day which is 40 calendar days following the Regulation S 
issue date). Our choice of explanatory variables is guided
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
by the discussion in Section III. The expected sign is 
hypothesized in that section also. The resulting ordinary 
least squares multivariate regression model for each event 
date is:
CAR = a + Pi Z-score + p2 Size of the Issue + p3 Market Equity 
+ p4 Discount + p5 OTC + P6 Common + p7 Convertible + e. 
Refer to Tables 10 through 12 for an explanation of the 
variables.
2. Multivariate Results 
In Table 10, we present estimates of the coefficients 
from the OLS model at the issue date. As hypothesized, the 
Z-score is positively related to the CARs, giving support 
that financially sound firms benefit from Regulation S 
issues more than distressed firms do. The relative size of 
the issue is negatively related to the CARs as predicted. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, firm size is negatively related 
to issue date CARs.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Table 11 shows no significant relationship of the 
independent variables with the filing date CARs in models 
(1) and (2) . However, when we remove the Z-score variable 
from the model, the discount has a positive coefficient, 
significant at the .01 level. The model fit improves
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(adjusted R2 was negative in model (1) and is .0748 in model 
(4) ) and the F-statistic becomes significant after removing 
the Z-score independent variable. The positive coefficient 
of the discount at the filing date is puzzling. However, it 
is consistent with the argument of management manipulation 
of the stock prices associated with micro-cap companies that 
would require a deep discount (Business Week, 1997).
[Insert Table 11 about here]
Finally, in Table 12 we report the cross-sectional 
regressions at the end of the restricted period. The 
coefficient for common stock is significant (.05 level) and 
negative (compared to the other dummy variables for 
convertible securities and units). This implies that common 
stock (which is more liquid and has a more active market 
than convertible securities) is traded around the end of the 
40 day restricted period, pulling prices down.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
Again, for the end of the restriction period as with 
the issue date regression, the relative size of the issue is 
negatively related to CARs, as predicted (Hypothesis 10). 
The discount and OTC dummy variables are also negatively 
related to the CARs, supporting Hypotheses 12 and 13.
Overall, the results are consistent with the view that 
common shares issued under Regulation S for over-the-counter
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firms are not held long-term by foreign investors. The 
results are consistent with the claims that management of 
Tier 3 firms exploit the ease of issuing Regulation S 
securities at deep discounts for short-term investors to the 
detriment of existing shareholders. This leads to the final 
hypothesis regarding the effect of managerial stock 
ownership to ameliorate the agency problem which may be 
associated with issuing Regulation S.
3. Regression Model and Results Including
Directors and Officers Ownership
The ease of issuing Regulation S and lack of
restrictions has been one reason for its popularity with
valid users and with the abusers. To identify the managerial
ownership influence on the impact of Regulation S issues,
the multivariate regression model was extended to include
director and officer ownership percentage as follows:
CAR = a + Pi Z-score + p2 Size of the Issue + p3 Market Equity 
+ P4 Discount + ps OTC + p6 Common + p7 Convertible + p8 D&O +
e,
where the new D&O variable represents common stock 
percentage held by the director and officers of the firm.
The results of this model are presented in Tables 13, 
14, and 15 for the issue date, filing date and end of 
restricted holding period, respectively. Adding the director
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and officer variable improved the model fit substantially at 
the issue date; the adjusted R2 for model 1 of Table 13 with 
all variables increased to .2005 from .0537 in Table 10. The 
joint significance of the variables also becomes higher 
providing an F-statistic of 3.9778 (Table 13) for the issue 
date regression. However, the added explanatory power of 
managerial ownership at the issue date does not hold true 
for the filing date and the end of the restricted holding 
period. Tables 14 and 15 reveal lower R2 and lower F- 
statistics than the models without the director and officer 
variables of Tables 11 and 12.
[Insert Tables 13,14, and 15 about here]
Managerial ownership had a positive impact on 
shareholder returns around the Regulation S issue date 
(window -1 through +5 with day 0 as the issue date). This is 
significant at the .01 level and supports managerial 
ownership as a mechanism to align management with 
shareholders' interests.
The results of the regression at the issue date (Table 
13) including directors and officers ownership reveals three 
clear explanatory variables, the negative impact of relative 
size of the issue (.01 level), the negative coefficient of 
the discount from market value (.05 level) and the positive 
influence of managerial ownership (.01 level). Model 4 best
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explains the cross-sectional variation of the cumulative 
abnormal returns around the issue date. As hypothesized, the 
relative size of the issue and the discount have a negative 
impact on shareholders while managerial ownership has a 
positive offsetting effect on abnormal returns. Controlling 
for size of the firm (model 5 of Table 13) does not change 
the explanatory power of these three variables but it does 
cause the Z-score to become significant and positive at the 
.05 level. As hypothesized, the effect of the Regulation S 
issue on shareholder wealth is more favorable for more 
financially stable firms.
The effect of managerial ownership on returns during 
the filing date window and the end of restricted holding 
period is not significant as shown in Tables 14 and 15. It 
may be noted in Table 15 (end of restricted period) that 
controlling for managerial ownership does confirm the 
negative impact of the discount from market value and the 
relative size of the issue as expected.
In summary managerial ownership positively impacts 
abnormal returns at the issuance of Regulation S in 
agreement with theory of using stock ownership to control 
agency costs (Jensen, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, ownership had no significance in explaining cross-
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sectional differences in abnormal returns at the filing and 
end of restriction period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 3
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Regulation S has been widely used by small and large 
firms. The impact of Regulation S, its benefits and possible 
problematic practices surrounding it, has been the topic of 
debate within the SEC and in the popular press. Furthermore, 
there is a paucity of research on international securities 
issuance and virtually no published research on Regulation
S. This paper not only summarizes much needed information 
about offshore offerings and the impact on U.S. investors 
but provides direction for future research into a current 
and highly sensitive area. The topic is timely, informative, 
and is currently under review and being monitored as the SEC 
determines the appropriate level of regulation and sets the 
pace for the integration of global capital markets.
Regulation S has provided guidelines for companies 
issuing abroad, thus reducing uncertainty about registration 
and reporting requirements. It provides a competitive means 
for companies to take advantage of global capital 
opportunities. On the other hand, it has created investment 
instruments which are off limits to U.S. shareholders while 
foreign investors reap profits due to sizable discounts. 
Although Regulation S equity issues are intended to "rest 
abroad," this study offers evidence that securities may be
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held by short-term investors. Selling back into the U.S. 
markets could account for the significant losses experienced 
by existing shareholders and reported in this study.
This study provides evidence that Regulation S has 
served the financing needs of distressed companies. Such 
financing might be acceptable if foreign capital is long­
term and is utilized to turn the company around and create 
shareholder value. However, the evidence provided reveals 
that the existing shareholders experience negative abnormal 
returns as the restriction period nears and the loss in 
value persists. The discounts offered are greater than 
warranted for the 40-day period of restricted trade, 
creating a benefit to the foreign investors while existing 
shareholders experience a deterioration in the value of 
their holdings.
If managers are protecting the interests of the owners 
then they would not enter into value deteriorating financing 
arrangements. Evidence from this study reveals that 
managerial ownership does reduce the negative effect of 
Regulation S issues providing support for managerial stock 
ownership as an effective control mechanism and could 
ameliorate the negative effect of Regulation S financing.
The problematic practices have been addressed by the 
SEC in amendments adopted in February, 1998, eight years
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after the original enactment of Regulation S. The amendments 
include the following changes intended to thwart abuses and 
make short-term investing less attractive:
a) The restricted selling period is extended from 40 
days to one year,
b) purchasers must agree not to engage in hedging 
transactions except with registration,
c) purchasers must certify that they are not U.S. 
persons nor are they acquiring the securities for 
the benefit of a U.S. person,
d) distributors of Regulation S are required to send 
notice to each purchaser informing them of the 
restrictions of Regulation S,
e) securities issued under Regulation S must bear a 
legend stating the restrictions and hedging 
prohibitions,
f) the one year holding period requirement begins only 
when full recourse is provided against the 
purchaser, thus avoiding abuses using non-recourse 
notes, and
g) the 8-K reporting of Regulation S issues will be 
replaced by reporting in the quarterly 10-Q.
The intent of the amendments is to discourage abuses and to 
hold issuers accountable. Future research on Regulation S
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offerings after the amendment will help to determine the 
effectiveness of the SEC response to the problematic 
practices debate. Was the action sufficient to restore 
investor confidence in Regulation S? Has the SEC carried out 
its responsibilities towards investor protection while 
encouraging competitive capital formation?
Another puzzle is why it took the SEC eight years to 
react to alleged problematic practices when the popular 
press was reporting windfalls for foreign investors as early 
as 1993 (Kelley and Bannister, 1993). Is the SEC adequately 
responding to globalization issues to protect CJ.S. capital 
markets and investors? Small publicly traded firms should 
provide a positive contribution to U.S. investors. However, 
in recent years we have seen capital flight to established 
"blue chip" securities. Regulation S makes small-cap firms 
riskier by providing quick capital to extend the life of a 
faltering company, while destroying shareholder value. We 
may wonder if such lack of attention to small-cap companies' 
financing problems is commonplace. Is the SEC providing 
sufficient protection for the small-cap investors who 
finance innovative growth industries in our economy? Are 
there other areas besides Regulation S which may be 
responsible for increased risk in the small-cap market? This 
study expands knowledge about offshore equity offerings.
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However, further research is necessary to analyze 
effectiveness of the SEC changes regarding Regulation 
protect shareholders and the capital markets.
the
to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 8
REFERENCES
Altman, Edward I., 1983, "Exploring the Road to Bankruptcy," 
The Journal of Business Strategy, Fall, pp. 36-41.
Altman, Edward I., 1968, "Financial Ratios, Discriminant
Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy," The 
Journal of Finance, 23:4, pp. 58 9-60 9.
Altman, Edward, I., Robert G. Haldeman, and P. Narayanan 
1977, "Zeta Analysis: A New Model to Identify Bankruptcy
Risk of Corporations," Journal of Banking and Finance 1, 
pp. 29-54.
Barron's, 1996, "SEC vs. a Vampire," 76:25, p. 15.
Bhagat, Sanjai, M. Wayne Marr, and G. Rodney Thompson 1985, 
"The Rule 415 Experiment: Equity Markets," Journal of
Finance 5 (December).
Brennan, M.J. and Kraus, A. 1987, Efficient Financing under
Asymmetric Information. Journal of Finance 42 (December).
Business Week, 1997, "The Mob On Wall Street: Why you can't 
see it," March 24, pp. 186-190.
Business Week, 1996, "The Mob On Wall Street," December 16, 
pp. 93-110.
Cohen, Laurie P. 1994, "Rule Permitting Offshore Stock Sales 
Yields Deals That Spark SEC Concerns," The Wall Street
Journal, April 26, pp. Cl and C21.
Eiteman, David K., Arthur I. Stonehill, and Michael H.
Moffett 1994. "Sourcing Equity Globally," Multinational 
Business Finance, Addison-Wesley Publishers, New York, 
373-409.
Euromoney, 1997, "SEC Rules Not OK," July, pp. 64-68.
Federal Register, 1998, "Offshore Offers and Sales," - Final 
Rules 63:37, pp. 9632-9647.
Federal Register, 1997, "Offshore Offers and Sales," 
Proposed Rules 62:40, pp. 9258-9275.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 9
Federal Register, 1996, "Periodic Reporting of Unregistered 
Equity Sales," - Final Rules 61:203, pp. 54506-54509.
Federal Register, 1995, "Problematic Practices Under 
Regulation S," Interpretive Release; Request for Comments 
60:131, pp. 35663-35666.
Federal Register, 1990, "Offshore Offers and Sales," - Final 
Rules, Rule Amendments and Solicitation of Comments 55:85, 
pp. 16306-16329.
Federal Register, 1989, "Offshore Offers and Sales,"
Revised Proposed Regulation and Request for Comment 
54:136, pp. 30063-30075.
Federal Register, 1988, "Offshore Offers and Sales,"
Proposed Rules 53:117, pp. 22661-22678.
Gelman, Milton, 1972, "An Economist-Financial Analyst's 
Approach to Valuing Stock of a Closely Held Company,"
Journal of Taxation, June pp. 353-54.
Greene, Edward F. and Jennifer M. Schneck, 1994, "Recent
Problems Arising Under Regulation S," Insights 8:8, pp. 2- 
5.
Hanks, Sara, 1996, "Direct Regulation S Offerings and the 
SEC's "Problematic Practices" Release," Stanford Journal 
of Law, Business & Finance 2:2, pp. 303-330.
Hertzel, Michael, and Richard L. Smith, 1993, "Market 
Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity 
Privately," The Journal of Finance 48:2, pp. 4 59-485.
Illiano, Gary, 1997, "SEC Announces New Reporting Rules for 
Unregistered Equity Sales," The CPA Journal, February p. 
71.
Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 1971, "Discounts Involved in
Purchases of Common Stock, Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. March 10, 5:2444-2456, Document No. 92-
64, Part 5.
Jensen, M.C., 1993 "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit,
and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," The Journal 
of Finance, 48(3), pp. 831-880.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 0
Jensen, M.C. , 1986, "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance and Takeovers," American Economic 
Review, May, 76, 323-29.
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.F., 1976, "Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure," Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305-
360.
Kelley, Kevin and Alan Bannister, 1993, "US Investors and 
Offshore Offerings," Euromoney April, p. 166.
Kim, Yong Cheol, and Rene M. Stulz, 1988, "The Eurobond 
Market and Corporate Financial Policy," Journal of 
Financial Economics 22, pp. 18 9-205.
Kim, Yong Cheol, and Rene M. Stulz, 1992, "Is There a Global 
Market for Convertible Bonds?," Journal of Business 65:1, 
pp. 7 5-91.
Marcial, Gene, 1995, "The Regs on Reg-S," from Secrets of 
the Street, pp. 215-225.
Marr, M. Wayne, and John L. Trimble, 1993, "Eurobond 
Financing Bargains and the Clientele Hypothesis," Journal 
of Business Research 27, pp. 201-214.
Marr, M. Wayne, John L. Trimble, and Raj Varma, 1991, "On 
the Integration of International Capital Markets: Evidence 
from Euroequity Offerings," Financial Management, p.11-20.
Morgenson, Gretchen, 1994, "Foreign Stock Sales: Don't Get
Blindsided," Worth, p. 37-40.
Moroney, Robert E., 1977, "Why 25 Percent Discount for
Nonmarketablity in One Valuation, 100 Percent in 
Another?," Taxes, May pp. 316-20.
Mossman, Charles E., Geoffrey G. Bell, L. Mick Swartz, and 
Harry Turtle, 1998, "An Empirical Comparison of Bankruptcy 
Models," The Financial Review 33, p. 35-54.
Muglia, Richard and Annemarie Tierney, 1998, "SEC Tightens 
Regulation S rules for US Issuers," International 
Financial Law Review 17: 5, pp. 27-29.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
Palmer, Jay, 1996, "First-Time Loser; Executive Convicted of 
Fraud in Regulation S Case," Barron's 76:20, p. 15.
Pratt, Shannon P., Robert F. Reilly, and Robert P. Schweihs, 
1995, "Discounts for Lack of Marketability," Chapter 15 in 
Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely 
Held Companies, 3rd ed. Irwin Professional Publishing, pp. 
331-365.
Scholl, Jaye 1996a "Fixing Regulation S; SEC Closes up
Loopholes," Barron's, 76:42, pp. 12-13.
Scholl, Jaye 1996b, "Storm Brewing Offshore?," Barron's
76:38, pp. 12-13.
Scholl, Jaye 1996c, "Easy Money; How Foreign Investors
Profit at the Expense of Americans," Barron's 76:18, pp.
31-34 .
Senate Hearings 99-661, 1986, "The Internationalization of
Capital Markets Hearings before the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs on February 26-27, ed. U.S. 
Government Printing Office.
Silber, William L., 1991, "Discounts on Restricted Stock:
The Impact of Illiquidity on Stock Prices," Financial 
Analysts Journal, July-August pp. 60-64.
Smith, Clifford W., Jr., 1986, "Investment Banking and The 
Capital Acquisition," Journal of Financial Economics 15, 
pp. 3-29.
Solberg, Thomas A., 1979, "Valuing Restricted Securities:
What Factors do the Courts and the Service look for?," The 
Journal of Taxation, September 1, pp. 150-153.
Trout, Robert R. , 1977, "Estimation of the Discount
Associated with the Transfer of Restricted Securities," 
Taxes, June pp. 381-85.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1993. "Regulation 
S," Office of International Corporate Finance, Division of 
Corporate Finance, September 14.
Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely
Held Companies, 1995, Irwin Professional Publishing, Burr 
Ridge, Illinois, 3rd ed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 2
Wruck, Karen Hopper 198 9. "Equity Ownership Concentration 
and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Offerings,"
Journal of Financial Economics 23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 3
Actual Regulation S Cases Cited in the Literature Appendix A
Discounts Aura Systems, penned "The King of Regulation S" is among the 
"vampire companies” reported by Barron's as selling shares at 
huge discounts to foreigners, thus diluting U.S. shareholders' 
holdings. The June 17, 1996 Barron's article reports that the 
SEC enforcement division recommended filing suit against the 
company and officers for reporting violations. (The company 
continued to raise capital to fund significant losses.)
Market Price 
Declines
Interdigital Communications raised $12 million in 1992 and 
early 1993 at a 40% discount. Issued $4.5 million more at 
$4.50 while U.S. investors paid $9 per share. The stock price 
went from $11 per share in 1992 prior to Regulation S issues 
down to $5 per share in early 1994 (Morgensen, 1994).
Shares outstanding at Belmac Corp. went from 13 million to 
19.3 million while the price tumbled from $13.50 in 1992 to 
$2.00 per share in March 1994 (Morgensen, 1994) .
Unscrupulous
Finders
"Walda Walling” and her 5 person finding firm making contacts 
in an unconventional manner. Walda's license as a broker was 
revoked in the 1980's (Marcial, 1995).
Onyx Financial Group, Inc. sales documents contain 






Affinity Entertainment made two $40 million dollar sales (4 
million shares 0 $10 and 5 million shares 0 $8) in 1996 to an 
unknown Canadian business. Although the discount appeared 
slim, payment was made with 18 month interest-free promissory 
notes. So the firm didn't get the money immediately, the 
Canadian company owns stock and continues to use it's money 
interest-free, and the company now has 9 million shares issued 
without registration. (Affinity had losses in 1995 and 9 




Members Service Corp. - Arthur Feher, Chairman & CEO was 
convicted of Fraud after issuing 200,000 shares in 1992 to a 
95 year old Canadian woman. The shares were placed in a 
brokerage account controlled by Feher. Similarly 1.2 million 
shares were issued to 7 companies he controlled in the 
Bahamas. Feher was also accused of putting out "false and 
misleading" press releases about the company and 
"substantially mis-stating financial statements to pump prices 





Organized crime members have traded in Regulation S "chop 
stocks" (easily manipulated micro-cap stocks) and avoid 
regulatory and public scrutiny by using offshore companies and 
control over brokerage firms for their shenanigans. First, 
they are not allowed to participate in Category 2 and 3 issues 
if they are U.S. citizens. Secondly, they use their 
"influence" to artificially pump up prices before selling 
shares back in the U.S. or before selling short. Business Week 
(1997) elaborates on the mob's manipulation of finances at 
SCST and on the mob's trading and brokerage scams in the 
December 16, 1996 article.
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1a ADBS CS $250,000
b ADBS CS $28,600 58.97%
c ADBS CS $13,010 41.18%









2 AS I Contingent issue acquisitions
Contingent issue based on future 3 years performance - 
w/acquisition agreement.
3 ACTT CS $1,146,353 Exercized 1995 warrants @ 3.25 and $3.50. 53.64%- •
4 ADPT
4 3/4 %CvSbNts 
due 2004 $230,000,000 Includes both 144A and Reg S.
-18.08%
5a AGTI
CS promissory nt $300,000
In connection with a financing arrangement evidenced by a 




conv 75,000 Db 
Cv prom nts 




CS $500,000 Fin. arrangement evidenced by $500,000 with 1.5 million shares 
pledged as security and 1 million shares paid as a fee.
i
j 0.00%
CS conv 225,000 Db
-31.58%
CS Conv 62,500 Db! -61.29%
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CS conv 125,000 db -150.00% IIf
6 AES
Cv $2.75 Ser B 
Preferred Stock $300,000,000 Issued by AES Trust II (sub) with Rule 144b+R36. I |
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Co. Ticker Type Gross
no. symbol Security Proceeds
8a ALD CS £29,461.44
b ALD CS £ 34,975.47
c ALD CS £33,125.71
d ALD CS £ 36,853.04
e ALD CS £ 30,258.01
f ALD CS £35,141.6
g ALD CS £ 35,500.27
h ALD CS all of APL stock
i ALD CS £ 37,726.97
J ALD CS $4,793
k ALD CS £ 32,094.66







9 ALHY(W) CS $1,000,000
10 ALYD CS $2,250,000
11 AALA CS nts of $293500
12a ACSI Cv Db $200,000
b
13a AETG 7% Cv Db $500,000
CS ($ 0 .10 -$0 .20 /b AETG sh)
CS ($0 .15 -$0 .25 /c AETG sh)
14a AHIC 8% Cum Cv Db $2,600,000
b AHIC
8$ Cum. Conv. 
Debentures $3,550,000

















For foreign employees under ESPP,
Bought Aerospace Performs Ltd. (APL), A UK Corp. 
Employee Stock Purchase Plan.
Bought on London St Exc. for employees' ESPP.
In cancellation of notes payable totalling 293,500.
Cv after 41 day restriction period+Z55.
Completes (amends) above 8-K.
Cv 45 days after 3/21/97.
Proceeds not given.
Proceeds not given.
Cv after 41 days.
Convertible anytime after 82 days.
50% convertible on 1/10/97, the rest after 2/9/99.
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Stock in exch for 20% stock ownership of Thai Corporation. (Also 
paid merch. credit of $1,250,000).



















Cv at any time. Part of larger issue, 2,300,000
sh.($115,000,000).at the rate of 1.7344 shares of Common Stock
for each Security (conversion price: $28,828 per share).
_____ ___














CS Class A 
8% Cum Cv Db




Exchange of shares and 108,517 options in acq. of UK co. (No 
exercize price or expiration given for options.
In exchange for 1 year consulting re: acq, jv, inv opportunities in 
China, England, and Europe.
1/3 Cv in 45 days, 2/3 in 75 days, 100% 90 days after issue, 
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5% Cv Sb Nts 
8% Cv Secured 
Db
CS (Cl A) and
31a Warrants (Cl A )
Cv Pfd units (Cv
b Pfd + warrants)
c Share exchange









all o/s sh of Acq 
Co
all o/s sh of Acq 
Co.
3,590,000 Cv Pfd cv at 45, 80 115 days.
Exchange of shares in acquisition of all sh CBT Systems 
Benelux.
Exchange of shares in acquisition of all sh Ben Watson 
Associates Ltd.
in exch shs oft Exchange for 138,800 shs of Ceco Filters, Inc. - with Restrictive 
affiliate! Legend.









All shs of acq co 
$82,500
Part of larger Rule 144A offering ($150,000,000). 
issued db $1,627,500 plus 1,050,000 sh CS ($525,000) to 
replace Db of 2/19/97 of $1,750,000.
Each Unit @ $0.05 bot 1 CS sh and 4 warrants.
Unit @ $0.65 bot 1 Pfd sh and 30 wrnts (Wrnts to buy 8,943,750 
Sh).
No details provided.
Each cv share has a warrant for 1 addl. sh @ $ 1.50.
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Secured by a lien on all Co assets (but sobordinated).
Int. payable in cash or in shares Cv @ 80% mkt.
CS issued to foreign II in full release of alleged claims against 
Co.
Finders Warrants @ $7.25/sh expire in 2 years.
Holder of Cv Pfd converted to registered CS, sold shs, and 















Pfd.) Pfd $6,185,000 Cv of Prfd. Stock issued June/July 96.
43b CRTM
CS (exercized 








Cv Pfd Stock 
Cv Pfd Series L
$1,050,000
$1,500,000









Pfd. and Nts) 
CS (Converted 
Pfd K & L sh) 
CS (Converted 
Pfd.) Pfd $1,625,000
Converted from notes and pfd stock. O/S sh 36,709,186. 
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3,200,000 warrants issued Sept. 1996 in consideration for $10 
Million line of credit.
Cv revolving Line 
of Credit Note
$1,000,000 Int = Prime + 1 1/2%, No restrictive legend on note.
Warrants issued 
with Pfd stock 49,997 warrants in connection with Pfd St - No legend.
44 CYI 10% Cv Nts $3,000,000
1/4 cv after 5/28/97,1/2 after 8/28/97, 3/4 after 11/28/97, rest 
after 2/28/98. 10.00%
45 CV
6% Cv Sub Nts $21,150,000
$153,850,000 Notes Sold to qualified institutional buyers under 
Rule 144A. The company will file a shelf registr. for the stock 
issuable upon conversion, within 90 days of last issue date.
]
!
- - - - -  j - -45.38%
46 CS for services rec'd. In exch for public relations services performed. j
47a DCXI 6% Cm Cv Rd Pf $800,000
Cv after 120 days. Demand and Piggy back registration right. 











Caused change of control (92% ownership), Change of name 
from Zeron Acquisitions II.
25,00%
25.00%
49 DETC CS (Legended) Exch Stock In acquisition of French company stock (Value $600,000).
„
50a DBII CS (on Cv of Db) Db $750,000 Cv of 8% Db + Int, (Issued 10/11/95). 36.35%
b DBII CS (on Cv of Db) Db $110,893 Cv of 8% Db + Int. (Issued 10/11/95). 20.48%
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d DBII CS (on Cv of Db) Db $ 889,775 Cv of 8% Db + Int. (Issued 10/11/95). 50.16%
e DBII CS (on Cv of Db) Db $ 448,658 Cv of 8% Db + Int. (Issued 10/11/95). 21.50%
51 DVGL CS $75,000 3.85%
52 a DRYD CS $285,000 Turks & Caicos, B.W.I. @ avg. price $0,075 / sh ! 5161%
$inn non Says avg price @ $0.01 /sh - Math doesn't correlate with I
b DRYD VsO <4> I UU,UUU proceeds. | 33.33%
53 DYPR CS (Legended) Acq Assets Partial payment for certain assets of Pannolini de Mexico. I
A 5% discount to the last reported sale price of $18.00 on
CS $4,860,000 10/15/97, which was the last trading date prior to the date an 1
54 DVI agreement in principle was reached. 11.84%| !
55a EFTX CS $3,750!
' T 
; |
b EFTX CS $36,112 : i
c EFTX CS $104,718j |
d CS $83,719 j
e EFTX CS $27,775 |
f EFTX CS $45,031
g EFTX CS $5,437 ’ !
h EFTX CS $603,605 ! | , j










CS $46,875 84.31% j
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CS $28,387 I 82.35%
66 EGiT CS $481,250 Shares + 1,925,000 Warrants.
f .............
67 EOPT CS Assets, Stock In exch for Real estate, assets, stock acquisition. ■ t
58 ENGY
5% Cv Rd Sb Pfd 
Equiv Db $950,000 30 yr Db part of $350 Million Rule 144A offering i




59 EUGS proceeds used to buy subsidiary in Austria. -18.65%
60 EVEN v b  (convened
CS (concerted 
Db)
Db $ 250,000 Cv Db issued 7/18/95. 42.67% 35.00%
Db $ 250,000 Cv Db issued 7/18/96. 58.04% 35,00%|
61 FHC
8% Cv Db + 
warrants $2,020,000
1/2 Cv in 45 days, rest in 65 days, (warrants 67,333 sh @ $5.00 , 
beg 5/1/97). j 20.00%
62a FASI CS + warrants $167,485 Part of larger offering of 200,000 units (Sept. 1996). -62.51%
b FASI CS + warrants $200,200 fl 24.64%)
c FASI 8.5% Sub Rd Db $10,000,000
Mandatory Cv if during 20 day trading period price exceeds $ 
12.00/sh/Piggy-back regis. rts. Il
15.00%
63 FTRN
CS + 8% Cv Sb 
Nts $2,600,000 $ 2.6 Million Notes + 337,500 shares.
I
j -173.91% -24.44%
64 FASC CS $220,092 ] 28.54%
66 FSA(C,U,
Increasing Rate 
Sr Sb Cv Db $15,000,000
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68a BYCL CS (Cv from Nt)
CS (ex warrants fr
b BYCL ex warrants)
CS (ex warrants fr
c BYCL ex warrants)
680a FGLD CS subscription
b FGLD CS subscription
69 GA CS
70 GERN CS







Cv Pfd(B) + B 
warrants



















. . . .  f
Ser A Pfd + wrtsj
t
$1,525,000!
Exercized warrants at $1.50 expiring 11/3/97.
Exercized options at $1.50 expiring 8/16/99.
Part of joint venture agreement- got rights to Ukraine oii & gas 
field.
Exercized options at $1.50 expiring 8/16/99.
Converted $ 75,000 + interest Jan 12, 96 notes.
On 3/19/96 Units (incl. wrnts) sold, 8/7/96 wrnts ex and 5000 
more warrnts issued. Now 10,000 warrants exercized @ $ 
3.00/sh.
On 3/19/96 Units (incl. wrnts) sold, 8/7/96 wrnts ex and 5000 
more warrnts issued. 2/28/97 ex wrnts .
Accepted Subscription proceeds for shares authorized for private 
sale on 9/24/97 (8,636,262 shs authorized).
Accepted Subscription proceeds for shares authorized for private 
sale on 9/24/97 (8,636,262 shs authorized).
CS in exchange for software and assets.
Proceeds so far; cash 235,520, shares of co - value $312,500.
I 100,000 sh for sevices, 615,365 shs for mining plant & equip.
Placement fee 10% + expense allowance 3% + 600,000 wrts. ex 
@ $.85.
Cv mandatory in 2 yrs. 221,204 wrts @ $2.50 exp 1/31/00. Orig 
Ser A shs 9/25/96 - 1/31/97 for $2,355,948.
Cv after 3/25/97. Mandatory Cv 1/17/98. 762,500 Wrts 
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Discount on % Discount on Stated implied dsct(-
no. symbol Proceeds Comment ConvertedSecurities
Common (- 
premium)




75a TELI CS #REF!
Pursuant to offshore securities subscription agreement of 
3/12/97.
b TELI CS #REF! Pursuant to offshore securities subscription agreement of 1/6/97.
76 HCIA CS int. in acq. co
CS issued under the notes to subs former SHs , pmt for their 
interest.
77a HDST(W 5% Cv Db $190,000 Convertible after 45 days. 40.00%
end HDST(W) Arthur Anderson declines to stand for re-election to audit co. 40.00%
b HDST(W 6% Cv Db $550,000 Convertible after 45 days.
CS $2,570,400 Part of larger offering total 465,000 shares @ $10.08 (price 1578 HZP days pt agreement.) 27.35%
79 IASCA CS (legended) #REF!




warrants $2,100,000 Convertible in 45 days and up to 3 yrs. Wrts ex price $1.63.
.
25.00%
81 IMRS CS shs of Unk Stock exchange. -
82 IDCC





1/3 Cv 5/7/97,1/3 Cv 8/5/97, rest 11/3/97.425,000 Wrts.
Restricted resale for 1 year. Bot by Genplex Ltd. and Perfect 
Union Industrial Co, both part of Hong Kong group WKK, one of
20.00%
83 LINK largest electronics Mfg serv. providers. 26.98%.....................
84 IFC(I)(W) CS Cv of Pfd Conversion of 1982 shs Pfd issued Feb 97 when bot company. 77.81%'
5.5% CvSbDb $1,000,000 18.89%
CS Cv of $900,000Db Conversion of securities issued Feb 97 when bot company. 81.48%




4% CvDb Due 
10/1/97 $100,000 Principal + Int Cv after 45 days and within 1 year.
III 25.00%
b ISSM
4% CvDb Due 
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Co. Ticker Type Gross
no. symbol Security Proceeds
86a IPG CS
shs of Spanish 
Co.
b IPG CS






88 11 1/4% SrNts $4,100,000




91 KEST I CS $5,004,000
92 KOL CS Stock of sub
93 KVA CS $3,500,000
94a LSH CS $12,655
b LSH CS $27,503
c LSH CS $338,965
95a LITH CS Cv Nts
b LITH CS Cv Nts
c LITH CS Cv Nts
d LITH CS To extend Nts



















Partail Pmt (rest in cash) for Schmidlin Partner Barcelona S.A.
In consideration for 40% of stock of Treyna Holdings (Stock given 
valued at $1,750,000).
Part of Rule 144Ajssue - the Notes are not convertible. 
To British Virgin islands, Isle of Man, and Mauritius.
Interest payable in CS at conversion - mandatory Cv in 12 
months.
In exch for 9 % stock of Israel software co. (Now Co holds 90% 
of Servotronix).
Agreements of 10/25/96 (CvNts $1.75 million) convertible if Co. 
defaults on payment may be worth $3,850,000 CS.
Satisfies certain covenants of post closing occurances, 10/25/96 
agreement.
Satisfies certain covenants of post closing occurances, 10/25/96 
agreement.
Consideration for extending maturity of Cv Nts to 2/22/97. 
3,463,203 Sh placed in escrow reserve account.
Satisfies certain covenants of post closing occurances, 10/25/96 
agreement.
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96 LDDI CS $2,682,801
LDDI CS $500,000'
97 MQUE
8% CvSbDb due 
11/1/98 $150,0001
98 MBFA iI










b MRTI CS Db & Pfd
c MRTI CS Db ($ not given)
d MRTI CS LT debt
e MRTI CS Db ($ not given)
f MRTI CS






Discount on [ % Discount on 
Converted i Common (- 
Securities premium)
Stated 





1st 80,274 units X 5000 sh rec'd wrnts 401362@ $4/sh. Agrees 
to file regis stmt by 12/19/96.
150,000 C.S. warrants ex $.50, after 10/31/97, expires 10/31/99.
As result of non-fulfillment of conditions of subscription 
agreement.
Warrants given to placement agent Ex @ $5.00 thru 11/6/02. 
Converted $ 500,000 Db @ $.50 for 1,000,000 shares.
Part of offering up to 430,000 sh @ $1.50. This purchase by 
Dominion Fin Grp Inf'l gives 1 partner beneficial interest in the co 
>5%.
CS issued under a subscription agreement of January 1997. 
Compromise and settlement agreement of 6/2/97 in exch for db 
and pfd.
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CS + wrnts + 
options
CS
8% Cm Rd Cv Vt 
Pf
JDS + Warrants 





















Each unit buys 1 share + 1/4 warrant ex before 4/16/98 @ 3.00. 
The fee wrnts @ $2,50.
1Unit = 1 CS + options(@ $2.4)+ .44 wrnts,ex @ $3.5 for 3 yrs. 
(wrts callable if CS sells > $7.5 for 30 days. If price/sh < $6 for 10 
consec days during first 24 months, then co must issue addl shs 
to holders.
Mandatory redemption (Cv) by 9/1/00. If not sufficient shs 
authorized, then Int incr. to 12%.
Each unit 1 sh CS + 1 Wanant ex @ $1JX5 for 3 years.
Part of $218,500,000 issue- Rule 144A and other accredited 
investors.
Part of $3,161,400 private offering of 526,900 shs to O&D, 
Inst.lnv., and non US persons.
Closing price at 12/13/96 was $17.25/sh. So issue at very small 
disct .7%.
In conjunction with Rule 144A Gross Proceeds Includes total 
offering.





Gave reg S stock in exchange forcommon stock of United (parent 







127,750 Wrnts ex @ $15.00 between 1/2/98 and 12/31/99.
Part of $175,000,000 Pr. PI. to qualified institutional investors.
Issued shares in connection with the acquisition of assets of A-C- 
I, a Canadian corp.
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120a PLAT(G) CS Shares of acq co In acquisition of Australian Technology Resources Pty Ltd.
b PLAT(G) CS Shares of acq co O/S securities of German software company.
c PLAT(G) CS Shares of acq co As part consideration of acquisition.
121a PNDR CS $450,000 17.15%
b PNDR CS and warrants $450,000 761,904 CS + 389952 Wrnts @ $1.08, expire 4/23/99.
i
46.00%
c PNDR CS $300,000 28.57% J
122 PCWR 1CS + 1 Wrnt. $177,749 Wrnts expire in 2 years. Ex pr within 1 yr $3.11, after that $3.58.
II
-34.49% i
PQ q m  a e c o t c Paid $211,111 cash + CS in acquisition of hardware, software
I
123a D.PCT V/O aCt] aSSolS and other assets.
b D.PCT CS + wrnts $325,000 To raise the cash to pay 5/2/97 acquisition.
c D.PCT CS + Wrnts $812,500 250,000CS + 500,000 wrnts ex pr @ $3.50. !
124 CDRM
6% CvDb, due 
10/31/99+wmts $250,000 Cv after 60 days, redeemable @ 130%. I 25.00%
125a PMK Options Exec SH Option Scheme-11,250 options-exercize price $14.42. 46.34%
125b PMK CS $25,760 46.61%
125c PMK CS $443,205 Options exercized under Exec Sh Option Scheme @ 14.07. 41.38%
125d PMK CS $209,450 Options exercized under Exec SH Option Scheme @ 14.20. 27.18%
125e PMK CS + options $64,400 Exercized options under Exec SH Option Scheme. 51.51%
CS $120,360 46.69%
126a PG CS $717,920 2.44%
b PG CS $1,050,640 -1.90%
c PG CS $731,577 2.07%
d PG CS $2,493,329 | -1.02%
e PG CS $521,595 -1.02%
f PG CS $785,467 i -1.49%
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h PG CS $828,350 ! -1.53%
I PG CS $616,021 -1.25%
J PG CS $755,910 ! -0.59%
k PG CS $2,036,899 | -3.01%
I PG CS $896,568 0.32%
m PG CS $783,416 -0.06%
n PG CS $343,458 -0.01%
o PG CS $741,096 -1.06%
P PG CS $1,357,727 -1.25%
q PG CS $663,080 j -1.33%
r PG CS $1,181,941 j -5.47%
s PG CS $700,312 ; 0.05%
t PG CS $490,831 ; -0.07%
u PG CS $631,739 -1.92%
V PG CS $1,838,820 -2.72%
w PG CS $403,190 | -1.82% !
X PG CS $1,503,051! 4.88%
y PG CS $1,555,058 21.80% i
z PG CS $5,162,020 j -0.53%
bb PG CS $1,029,232! ! 0.46%
26a PG CS $415,058 -1.42%
cc PG CS $802,297! ! -0.08%
127 PRGX CS Sh French Co. Co. acquired 98.3% of equity in French Corp.
pc 10,000 sh Pfd On 9/30/96 co issued 200,000 shs of Ser B Pfd Stock and128a QDEK warrants for $20M. 21.59%
pe ah nnn eK dm Announced 9/30/97 the repurchase of all CvPfd and all wrnts O/S I
b QDEK Us) 4U,UUU Sli rTO. for $10 Million leaving no CvPfd O/S. 20.21%
CS 40,000 sh Pfd. n 18.50%
CS 10,000 sh pfd 9.06%
129a QSRI CS ~ $250,000 i 14.89%
b QSRI CS $1,000,000 28.57% ii
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  Part 1 - Type of Security Issued, Discount and Comments_____________
Co. Ticker Type
Security
Gross Discount on j % Discount on Stated Implied dsct(-











$5,000,000 32.7% Ownership for 5,000,000 + 3,000,000 wrnts @ 2.50 or 
conting pmt up to $9,400,000.
e QSRI CS $305,000
Under March27 agreement JEDI (signif SH) agrees to raise 
$5.4M overseas by 12/31/97. !
f QSRI CS $305,000 1 30.29%
g QSRI CS $762,500 39.00%
Repurchase 
9,600,000 CS -$5,000,000
Buy 32.7 O/S, pay $5,000,000 + 3,000,000 wrnts @ 2,50 or 
conting. pmt. up to $9,400,000.
130 a RHCSC CS $500,000 ' 84.62%
b RHCSC CS $300,000 ! 89.09% j
131 RGUS CS (legended) $165,000 ' 8.02% |





All stock of 2 
Cos. 
$49,980
Resale of CS by SHs of Spanish Cos. has been registered.
1i
j
134a RCPH CS $159,964 52.94%
b RCPH CS $178,000 61.90%
c RCPH CS $99,960 i 61,90%
d RCPH CS $49,980
I
61.90%
135a RTIC 10%CmCvDb $750,000 Cv after 60 days. ! 25.00%
b RTIC 10%CmCvDb $750,000 Cv after 60 days. 25.00%
c RTIC 10%CmCvDb $5,500,000 Cv after 60 days, redeemable @ 110% in 30 days or 125% after. 25.00%
d RTIC 10%CmCvDb $5,000,000 Cv after 60 days , redeemable @ 110% in 30 days or 125% after.
;
: 25.00%
136a LOCKC CS $200,000 I 53.52%
b LOCKC
8% CvDb, Due 5 
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d LOCKC CS + Wrnt3 $2,500,000
Co. agrees to Fin. / Consulting and Mkting & Pub. Rel. 
agreements of $250,000 and 375,000 respectively.
j
36.16%
137a SCMS CS $830,000 Commission wrntrs ex @ $0.61/sh. | 42.11%
b SCMS CS $472,000 Commission wrnts ex @ $0.74 - $ 0.875/sh. j 32.79% ii
138 SCRH
CvDb ] $90,000 Mkt price @ 12/16/96 = $0.19. No details provided re: int., maturity. ' 40.00%
139 SEPC CS $2,600,000
Purchasers must represent in subscription agreement their 




140a SVSY Cs + wrnts $56,250 75,000 Wrnts Ex @ $1.25 within 2 yrs. ! 53.85%
b SVSY
12%SrSbCvRdDb 
Due 7/31/98 $50,000 12% Db $62,500 sold for $50,000 Offering closed 7/15/97. 36.00%
d SVSY
12%SrSbCvRdDb 





Due 7/31/98 $210,268 Face amount of debt $262,535 (issue @ 20%dsct.).
I
36.00%
141 CS + wrnts $850,000 Wrntgs Ex in 1 yr @ $0.60/sh, Commission wrnts @ $0.50. 44.44% i1
142 SGI CS shs of acq co.
143 GOLDF CS $550,000 I 50.77%
144 SIMS
8% Cv Nt, due 
10/15/99 $910,000 Cv after 12/3/97. ;‘ 34.50%
145a SWW
CS Shares of acq co Acquisition of U.K. co. worth UK 100,000 pounds sterling.
t
b SWW CS Shares of acq co Acquisition of Levita, New South Wales Co. A$ 17,830,000.
I
c SWW CS Shares of acq co Acquisition of Swedish Co., Svanberg U.S.$ 2,263,084. i
d SWW CS
CS
Shares of acq co 
Shares of acq co
Acquisition of Irish Co., Telephone Marketing Services, Ltd.
)
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5 3/4% CvSbNts, 
due 9/15/04 $1,600,000




























SSL ownership in Spacetec shares cancelled.
In exch. for 87,404 Mohawk. Co. issued shs to participants of 










1/3 Cv in 50 days, 1/3 Cv in 65 days, and rest after 80 days.
25.58%i
19.00%
c SRMI 7% CvDb CvDb $4,262,500 Cv after 45 days, Mandatory Cv in 36 months. t 20,00%









1/3 convertible on 7/19/97,1/3 on 8/18/97 and rest on 10/2/97.
No more than 50% of CS issuable on Cv can be sold or 
transferred within 60 days of Cv.




105,000 CS wrnts ex from 12/16/97-11/5/98 @ 1.90. 615.000CS 
wrnts as commission ex @ 1.90 from 12/16/97-11/5/00.
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% Discount on! Stated 

























8% CmCvDb, due 
3/25/00 
CS
Special wrnts ex 
1 for 1 



























Shares constitute a portion of the total purchase price which TMP 
paid for all outstanding securities of Lorraine Jones & Associates 
Ltd.
To acquire all O/S/ shs of Thirty Dogs, S.A.
5 3/4%CvPf issued by Tosco Fin Trust to retire 5 3/4% CvDB of 
Tosco Corp.
Cv after 45 days, mandatory Cv in 36 mo.
Inv. firms committed to raise US$ 5.72 million for co to fund farm- 
in in Yemen.
1 share per 1 warrant earlier of a) 10 days after prospectus or b) 
1st anniversary of closing date.
Above 4,400,000 wrnts (already paid for) converted to CS.
Investors warranted that purchase was for investment and not 
with view to distribute.
Wrnts to pi. agent 225,625 @ ex pr $3.50, 50,000wrnts @ ex. pr 
$4.20, expire 3 yrs.
No interest rate, maturity date, nor Conversion price discount 
disclosed.
Int and Princ. convertible.
Int and Princ. convertible.
Int and Princ. convertible^
Must be redeemed or converted within 5 years.
Convertible after 11/8/97.
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Swiss Fr. Bonds 
+ Wmts
Micromass Stock

































In partial consideration for acquisition of all O/S stock of 
Micromass stock (Aggregate value of Waters Stock $13.1 
million.)
Exch bridge loan same amount+30,000 wrnts exer. @ $0.91 exp. 
3/20/99.
Securities are legended. 300,000 wrnts ex @ $2.0 after 3/27/97.
Sold at 97% princp. amount 100,000,000 notes to investment 
companies (3 million disct.) who resold 3,830,000 to non U.S. 
citizens and rest to institutional buyers under Rule 144A, 
announced 9/26/97.
Warrants were originally issued 12/22/95 with Ex. Pr of $0.25/sh. 
Price was reduced.
Warrants were originally issued 12/31/96 in connection with unit i 
offerings.
Warrants were originally issued 12/22/95 with Ex. Pr of $0.25/sh. I 
Price was reduced.
Did not provide proceeds nor fees to agent. Other CS from wmts 
ex by Providence were es. @ $0,125.
3 million warrants as compensation per consulting agreement to 
find Canadian capital.
Warrants were originally issued 12/22/95 with Ex. Pr of $0.25/sh. 
Price was reduced.
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CS $2,872,000 Pursuant to agreement of 6/30/97 where Flanders would own 5.1%. On 9/29/97 Xiox Flanders N.V. incorporated in Belgium.
-3.90%
680b FGLD CS $200,000 Subscription agreement. 32,35%
This Information is summarized from 8-Ks filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Refer to the "Guide to Abbreviations for Appendix B" for explanations of the abbreviations.
Discounts were either stated in the 8-K or were calculated where shares were issued, warrants were exercised, or securities were converted to shares 
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Part 2 - Issue Characteristics and Date of Issue
:o . no. Company # 8-Ks Date filed Dateissued Exchange
Market Price 
Per share # shs. iss. Pr/sh Gross Proceeds Type of transaction
1a ABS Group Inc. 5 12/16/96 12/2/96 NA 100,000 2.5000 $250,000 CS issue
b ABS Group Inc. 2/19/97 2/5/97 NA 14,300 2.0000 $28,600 CS issue
c ABS Group Inc. 4/29/97 4/14/97 4.25 5,204 2.5000 $13,010 CS Issue
d ABS Group Inc. 6/26/97 6/13/97 3.63 50,000 2.0000 $100,000 CS issue
e ABS Group Inc. 8/19/97 8/6/97 4.75 25,000 2.0000 $50,000 CS issue
ABS Group Inc. 2/13/97 3.38 400,000 2.5000 $1,000,000 CS Issue
2 Accustaff 1 11/14/97 11/4/97 NYSE (was NASD) 29 acquisitions Acquisition agreement
3 ACT Teleconferencing Inc 1 7/15/97 6/30/97 NASD 7.5 329,670 3.4773 $1,146,353 Exercise of warrants
4____ Adaptec Inc 1 3/10/97 1/31/97 NASD 43.75 $230,000,000 Issue Cv with 144A
5a Advanced Gaming Technology, Inc. 2 10/6/97 9/24/97 NASD 0.22 150,000 2.0000
promissory nt 
$300,000 Consideration for services.
b Advanced Gaming Technology, Inc. 11/3/97 10/24/97 NASD 0.22 513,698 0.1460 conv 75,000 Db Conversion of debt
Advanced Gaming 
Technology, Inc. 9/24/97 0.21 1,921,053 0.1741
Cv prom nts 
$334,545
Advanced Gaming 
Technology, Inc, 9/26/97 NASD 0.2 2,500,000 0.2000 $500,000
Advanced Gaming 
Technology, Inc. 9/30/97 0.19 900,000 0.2500 conv 225,000 Db
Advanced Gaming 
Technology, Inc. 10/6/97 0.16 250,000 0.2500 Conv 62,500 Db
Advanced Gaming 
Technology, Inc. 10/27/97 0.15 333,333 0.3750 conv 125,000 db
6 AES Corporation (AES Trust II -Sub) 1 11/10/97 10/27/97 NYSE 42 Pfd 6 Million 50.0000 $300,000,000 Issue Cv with 144A
7 All American Food Group Inc 







Issue Cv Db 
Issue Cv Db
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Part 2 - Issue Characteristics and Date of Issue
Co. no. Company * OD i s Date filed Date _ ., . Exchange Issued
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All American Food Group Inc 8/7/97 NA $50,000 Issue Cv Db
8a Allied Signal Inc 13 11/26/96 1 1 / 1 9 / Q f i  London'CSX 11/12/96 NYSE pSE 35.5 678 £29,461.44 Employee Stock Ownership plan
b Allied Signal Inc 12/16/96 12/11/96 CSXp ^ SEl 34.31 824 £ 34,975.47 Employee Stock Ownership plan
c Allied Signal Inc 1/15/97 1/13,97 CSX, NYSE, 35.06 776 £33,125,71 Employee Stock Ownership plan
d Allied Signal Inc 2/20/97 2/12/97 CSXp ^ SE’ 36.31 838 £ 36,853.04
Employee Stock 
Ownership plan
e Allied Signal Inc 3/18/97 3/12/97CSX' sNeYSE' 37.25 642 £ 30,258.01 Employee Stock Ownership plan
f Allied Signal Inc 4/15/97 4/10/97 CSX' NpYSE’
rob
34.88 800 £35,141.6 Employee Stock Ownership plan
g Allied Signal Inc 5/22/97 5/13/97 CSXpg YSE' 37.56 766 £ 35,500.27
Employee Stock 
Ownership plan
h Allied Signal Inc 6/19/97 6/9/97 CSX’ sNeYSE' 39.06 26,430 all of APL stock Acquisition
i Allied Signal Inc 7/18/97 7/11/97 CSX’ SNYSE' 40.13 738 £ 37,726.97 Employee Stock Ownership Plan
J Allied Signal Inc 8/14/97 7/31/97 CSX^ SE- 43.47 51 93.9804 $4,793
Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan
k Allied Signal Inc 9/23/97 9/11/97 46.13 598 £ 32,094.66 Employee Stock Ownership Plan
1 Allied Signal Inc 10/22/97 10/10/97 CSXp s E SE' 44.94 1,874 £ 48,806.22
Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan
m Allied Signal Inc 11/17/97 11/12/97 NYSE 42.13 1,914 £ 40,707.57 Employee Stock Ownership Plan
Allied Signal Inc 6/11/97 41.25 746 £ 36,602.67 Employee Stock Ownership Plan
Allied Signal Inc 8/12/97 34.88 650 £ 37,923.81 Employee Stock Ownership Plan
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10 Alydaar Software Corp 1 10/14/97 9/30/97 NASD 20.38 150,000 15.0000 $2,250,000 CS issue
11 Ameralia Inc 1
........
3/13/97 2/21/97 NASD 0.63 293,500 1.0000 nts of $293500 Conversion of notes
12a American Cinemastores Inc 4/23/97 4/15/97 NASD NA $200,000 Issue Cv Db
amends b American Cinemastores Inc 5/6/97 4/15/97 NASD NA Amendment
13a American Entertainment Group 3 3/26/97 3/21/97 none 3.75 $500,000 Issue Cv Db
b American Entertainment Group 7/25/97 7/21/97 none 0.45 200,000
($ 0 .10 -$0 .20 / 
sh) CS Issue
c American Entertainment Group 9/5/97 8/22/97 none 0.38 73,333
($ 0 .15 -$0 .25 / 
sh) CS issue
14a American Healthchoice, Inc. 2 5/12/97 4/22/97 NASD 2.19 $2,600,000 Issue Cv Db
b American Healthchoice, Inc. 9/30/97 9/16/97 NASD 6 $3,550,000 Issue Cv Db
15a American Technologies Group Inc 2 11/26/96 11/26/96 NASD 2.31 $1,400,000 Issue Cv Db
b American Technologies Group, Inc 10/31/97 10/16/97 NASD 5.25 $3,000,000 Issue Cv Db
16 Audiovox Corp 1 4/4/97 9/19/96 AMEX 5.5 250,000 Stock of Bliss-tel Acquisition
17a Avitar Inc. 6 2/4/97 1/21/97 NASD 0.34 500,000 0.2060 $103,000 CS issue
b Avitar Inc. 3/12/97 2/26/97 NASD 0.51 355,555 0.2813 $100,000 CS issue
c Avitar Inc. 3/20/97 3/5/97 NASD 0.47 873,599 0.2188 $191,100 CS issue
d Avitar Inc. 4/1/97 3/18/97 NASD 0.47 508,474 0.2950 $150,000 CS issue
e Avitar Inc. 6/4/97 5/20/97 NASD 0.44 439,676 0.4344 $191,000 CS issue
f Avitar Inc. 6/9/97 5/20/97 NASD 0.44 Amendment
18 BEA Systems Inc 1 8/4/97 7/21/97 NASD 18.38 1,200,000 17.0000 $20,400,000 CS issue
19 Bell Technology Group Ltd 1 10/8/97 9/24/97 NASD 6.69 382,609 5.7500 $2,200^000 CS issue
20 Big Flower Holdings, Inc. 1 10/31/97 10/17/97 NYSE 22.63 154,000 50.0000 $7,700,000 Issue Cv Pf (Part of Irger iss.)
21 Bio-Plexus inc. 1 2/12/97 2/6/97 NASD 7.5 $5,000,000 Issue Cv Db
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Per share # shs. iss. Pr/sh Gross Proceeds Type of transaction
23 Borders Group Inc 1 11/4/97 10/21/97 NYSE 25.38 138,938 Sh of Acq. co. Acquisition
24 Bria Communications Corp. 1 3/27/97 12/2/96 NASD 18.13 2,000,000 Consultingservices Compensation for services
25a Butler National Corp 4 11/27/96 11/27/96 NASD 2.98 $560,606 Issue Cv Db
b Butler National Corp 7/1/97 6/18/97 NASD 1.3 127,601 1.0188 Db$130,000 Conversion of debt
c Butler National Corp 9/26/97 9/16/97 NASD 1 61,538 0.9750 Db $60,000 Conversion of debt
d Butler National Corporation 10/24/97 10/14/97 NASD 1 110,384 0.9313 Db $102,800 Conversion of debt
26a Camelot Corp. 2 12/12/96 12/6/96 NASD 46.25 not given Issue Cv Pf
b Camelot Corp. 9/26/97 9/16/97 NASD 2.12 100,000 1.0000 $100,000 CS issue
27a CBT Group PLC 2 3/14/97 2/28/97 NASD 27.25 17,840 all o/s sh of Acq Co. Acquisition
b CBT Group PLC 9/10/97 8/31/97 NASD 31.75 9,408 all o/s sh of Acq Co. Acquisition
28a Ceco Environmental Corp. 2 12/4/96 11/21/96 NASD 2.5 138,800 in exch shs of affiliate Acquisition
b Ceco Environmental Corp. 6/16/97 6/12/97 NASD 3.31 186,000 in exch shs of affiliate Acquisition






Announcement of Cv 
offering 
Issue Cv with 144A
30 Chadmore Wireless Group, Inc. 1 10/6/97 9/19/97 NASD 0.69 Db $1,627,500 Restructuring
"31a Channel 1 Inc. 3 2/19/97 2/3/97 NASD 1.28 1,785,000 0.0500 $89,250 Sale of Units
b Channel 1 Inc. 2/6/97 2/6/97 NASD 1.09 $193,781 Sale of Units
c Channel 1 Inc. 6/11/97 5/21/97 NASD 0.72 Acquisition
32 Charter Comm Intern Inc. 1 8/15/98 5/13/97 none 3.25 $1,000,000 Issue Cv Db
33a Cheniere Energy Inc 2 8/7/97 7/24/97 none 3.3 350,000 3.0000 $1,050,000 CS issue
33b Cheniere Energy Inc 8/27/97 8/1/97 none 3.38 100,000 3.0000 $300,000 CS issue
34 CHS Electronics Inc. 1 1/17/97 1/10/97 NASD 16.75 183,237 All shs of acq co. Acquisition
35 Classic Restaurants Intern Inc Co. 1 5/14/97 4/2/97 none 1.5 100,000 0.8250 $82,500 Exercise of warrants
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37 Computone Corporation 1 11/13/97 10/16/97 NASD 4.38 187.500 3.2000 $600,000 CS issue
38a Country Star Restaurant Inc. 2 6/12/97 5/28/97 NASD 0.38 $500,000 Issue Cv Db
38b Country Star Restaurant Inc. 11/7/97 10/24/97 NASD 0 $150,000 Issue Cv Db
Country Star Restaurant Inc. 11/7/97 10/24/97 NASD 0 5,000,000 release of claims To settle claims
39
40
Covol Technologies Inc 





















Sale of Units 
Sale of Units 
Issue Cv Db
41 Crown Laboratories Inc 1 11/14/97 9/29/97 AMEX NA 1,285,715 0.7000 $900,000 Sold Reg. CS, bot Reg S CS
Crown Laboratories Inc 35748 9/29/97 NA depends $500,000 Issue prepaid wrnts
42 CUC International Inc 1 2/4/97 1/23/97 NYSE NA 21,296 All o/s shs & note Acquisition
43a Curtis Matties Holding Corp. 6 3/14/97 9/96 - 11/95 NASD NA 5,200,136 1.1894 Pfd $6,185,000






Curtis Mathes Holding Corp. 
Curtis Mathes Holding Corp. 
Curtis Mathes Holding Corp.






















Exercise of warrants 
Issue Cv Pf 
Sale of Units 
Conversion of preferred 
stock
43f Curtis Mathes Holding Corp. 7/25/97 7/10/97 NASD NA 1,894,542 Conversion of preferred stock
Curtis Mathes Holding Corp. 12/96 - 2/97 NA 1,481,140 1.0971 Pfd $1,625,000
Conversion of preferred 
stock
44
Curtis Mathes Holding Corp. 
Curtis Mathes Holding Corp. 
Curtis Mathes Holding Corp. 
Curtis Mathes Holding Corp. 



















Exercise of warrants 
Exercise of warrants 
Issue Cv Nts 
Sale of Units 
Issue Cv Nts
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49 Detection Systems Inc
50a Digital Biometrics Inc.
b Digital Biometrics Inc.
c Digital Biometrics Inc.
d Digital Biometrics Inc.
e Digital Biometrics Inc.
_. Dimensional Visions Group
51 Ltd__________
52a Dry Dairy International Inc.
















1 2/27/97 2/5/97 none 2.25 100,000 for services rec'd. Consideration for servic
2 9/24/97 9/9/97 NASD 1.69 $800,000 Issue Cv Pf
10/27/97 10/14/97 NASD 1.88 $250,000 Issue Cv Pf
9/18/97 1.5 $200,000 Issue Cv Pf
1 10/24/97 10/10/97 NASD NA 4,183,125 0.9562 $4,000,000 Issue CS (change cont
) 7/9/97 6/24/97 NASD 18 34,141 Exch Stock Acquisition
12/96-5 2/11/97 1/97 NASD 2.49 428,504 1.7503 Db $750,000 Conversion of debt
2/18/97 2/12/97 NASD 2.13 62,144 1.7845 Db $110,893 Conversion of debt
2/25/97 2/19/97 NASD 1.88 68,140 1.6308 Db $ 111,123 Conversion of debt
3/5/97 2/27/97 NASD 2.75 548,750 1.6215 Db $ 889,775 Conversion of debt
4/15/97 4/11/97 NASD 2.13 263,916 1,7000 Db $ 448,658 Conversion of debt
1 10/10/97 10/1/97 NASD 1.17 1,666,666 0.0450 $75,000 Issued CS
2 4/7/97 4/7/97 none 0.19 3,800,000 0.0750 $265,000 Issued CS
5/14/97 5/9/97 none 0.16 1,000,001 0.1000 $100,000 Issued CS
1 12/31/96 12/17/96 NASD 3.94 360,000 Acq Assets Acquisition
1 10/30/97 10/29/97 NYSE 18.63 300,000 16.2000 $4,860,000 Issued CS
11 1/2/97 12/2/96 none NA 10,000 0.3750 $3,750 Issued CS
2/27/97 2/11/97 none NA 96,300 0.3750 $36,112 Issued CS
3/25/97 3/3/97 none NA 79,250 1.3214 $104,718 Issued CS
4/11/97 3/31/97 none NA 223,250 0.3750 $83,719 Issued CS
4/29/97 4/14/97 none NA 74,095 0.3749 $27,775 Issued CS
5/20/97 5/5/97 none NA 119,924 0.3755 $45,031 Issued CS
6/17/97 6/2/97 none NA 14,500 0,3750 $5,437 Issued CS
7/7/97 6/20/97 none NA 603,605 1,0000 $603,605 Issued CS
12/20/96 NA 31,000 0,3800 $11,779 Issued CS
2/13/97 none NA 198,470 0.3749 $74,397 Issued CS
2/18/97 NA 176,650 0.3750 $66,243 Issued CS
2/24/97 NA 180,600 0.3750 $67,725 Issued CS
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Eftek Corp 3/12/97 NA 551,646 0.3750 5206,867 issued CS
Eftek Corp 3/17/97 NA 52,200 0.3750 $19,575 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 3/24/97 NA 220,477 0.3750 $82,679 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 4/9/97 NA 194,950 0.3750 $73,106 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 4/29/97 4/29/97 none NA 85,543 0.3750 $32,078 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 5/6/97 7.17 125,000 0.3750 $46,875 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 5/14/97 7.17 38,598 0.4041 $15,598 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 5/15/97 6.05 125,000 0.3750 $46,875 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 5/19/97 7.73 40,000 0,3750 $15,000 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 6/2/97 7.73 29,830 1.0000 $29,830 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 6/10/97 8.63 30,050 1,0000 $30,050 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 6/12/97 8.34 100,000 0.3750 $37,500 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 6/16/97 6.56 62,684 1.0000 $62,684 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 6/24/97 8.91 30,000 1.0000 $30,000 Issued CS
Eftek Corp 12/16/97 none 2 75,700 0.3750 $28,387 Issued CS
56 Empire Gold Inc 1 10/24/97 9/30/97 NASD NA 1,925,000 0.2500 $481,250 Sale of Units
57 Energy Optics Inc. 1 10/29/97 10/10/97 NASD 2.81 ' 9,643,878 Assets, Stock Acquisition
58 Energy Ventures Inc. 1 11/5/97 11/3/97 NYSE NA $950,000 Issue CvDb with 144A
59 Eurogas Inc 1 6/12/97 5/30/97 none 12.25 $15,000,000 Issue Cv Pf
60 EV Environmental Inc. 1 11/22/96 9/11/96 NASD 0.75 581,395 0.4300 Db $ 250,000 Conversion of debt
EV Environmental Inc. 11/15/96 0.69 828,912 0.3016 Db $ 250,000 Conversion of debt
61 Female Health Co. 1 3/7/97 2720/97 AMEX 2.88 $2,020'060 Issue Cv Db
62a Fields Aircraft Spares Inc. 3 1/10/97 12/27/96 NASD NA 12,883 13.0005 $167,485 Sale of Units
b Fields Aircraft Spares Inc. 2/21/97 2/11/97 none NA 30,800 6.5000 $200,200 Sale of Units
c Fields Aircraft Spares Inc. 10/14/97 9/30/97 NASD NA $10,000,000 Issue Cv Db
63 First American Railways Inc 1 6/17/97 6/2/97 none 2.81 337,500 7.7037 $2,600,000 Sale of Units
64 First American Scientific Corp. 1 11/7/97 8/18/97 None 0.25 1,100,000 0.2001 $220,092 Issued CS
65 First South Africa Corp., Ltd 1 10/31/97 10/31/97 NASD 8.06 $15,000,000 Issue Cv Db
66a Focus Enhancements Inc 2 1/16/97 12/9/96 NASD 2.13 150,000 1.6900 $253,500 Issued CS
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Focus Enhancements Inc 12/16/96 1,75 147,929 1.6900 $250,000 Issued CS
Focus Enhancements Inc 12/31/96 2 151,515 1.6500 $250,000 Issued CS
67a Fountain Oil Inc 4 1/9/97 11/27/96-12/11/96 NASD 13.91 248,000 1.5000 $372,000 Exercise of warrants
b Fountain Oil Inc 1/21/97 1/7/97 NASD 14 68,000 1.5000 $102,000 Exercised options
c Fountain Oil Inc 4/25/97 2/11/97 NASD 12.13 175,000 Rights in JV Consideration for mineral rights
d Fountain Oil Inc 5/30/97 5/19/97 NASD 8.31 36,000 1.5000 $54,000 Exercised options
68a Fremont Corp. 3 2/26/97 2/14/97 NASD 4.88 18,000 4.1667 Nts 75,000 Conversion of debt
b Fremont Corp. 3/11/97 2/28/97 NASD 4.38 10,000 3,0000 $30,000 Exercise of warrants
c Fremont Corp. 7/10/97 7/1/97 NASD 4.75 30,000 3.0000 $90,000 Exercise of warrants
680a Fremont Gold 2 10/14/97 9/29/97 NASD 0.922 3,432>27 0.5500 $1,888,000 issued CS
b Fremont Gold 10/14/97 10/9/97 NASD 1 90,909 0,5500 $50,000 Issued CS
69 General Automation Inc. 1 8/4/97 7/25/97 AMEX 1.69 122,143 assets Consideration for assets
70 Geron Corporation 1 5/8/97 4/25/97 NASD 8.38 341,880 11.7000 $4,000,000 issued CS
71a Global Diamond Resources Inc 2 4/28/97 Mar 97 NASD 0.55 802,931 0.6825 $548,020 Subscription
b Global Diamond Resources Inc 11/12/97 9/4/97 NASD 0.39 715,385
services,
equipment
Consideration for assets 
and services
72 Grand Havana Enterprises Inc 1 10/15/97 10/14/97 NASD 1.31 3,229,267 0.8206 $2,650,000 Sale of Units
73 Graphix Zone lnc./De 1 3/5/97 2/18/97 NASD 2.31 Ser A Pfd + wrts Trade A Pfd for B Pfd
74 Greenman Technologies Inc. 1 1/29/97 1/14-1/17/97 NASD 6.84 $1,525,000 Issue Cv Db
75a Guinness Telli-Phone Corp. 2 3/13/97 2/20/97 NASD NA 660,000 0.4900 $323,400 Issued CS
b Guinness Telli-Phone Corp. 3/19/97 3/12/97 NASD NA 15,680 1.2500 $19,600 Issued CS
76 HCIAInc 1 5/12/97 5/6/97 none 22.63 923 int. In acq. co Acquisition
77a Headstrong Group Inc. 2 12/3/96 11/3/96 none NA $190,000 Issue Cv Db
amends
b Headstrong Group Inc. 1/21/97 na none NA NA
b Headstrong Group Inc. 12/23/96 12/10/96 none NA $550,000 Issue Cv Db
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79 IAS Communications Inc 1 7/28/97
10/18/96-
6/15/97 none 2.9 130,000 2.2500 $292,500
Issue CS (with larger 
issue)
80 Imaging Diagnostic Systems Inc 1 10/15/97 10/6/97 NASD 1.55 $2,100,000 Sold units
81 Information Management Resources 1 3/14/97 2/27/97 NASD 10 71,708 shs of Link Acquisition
82 Intek Diversified Corp 1 2/18/97 2/6/97 NYSE NA $3,990,000 Sold Units
83 Interlink Electronics 1 10/1/97 9/22/97 NASD 9.13 324,349 6.9370 $2,250,000 Issued CS Private Placement
84 International Fibercon Inc. 
International Fibercon Inc.




1,323,242 Cv of Pfd 
$1,000,000
Conversion of preferred 
stock 
Conversion of debt
International Fibercon Inc. Oct 97 6.75 720,000 1.2500 Cv of $900,000Db Issue Cv Db
International Fibercon Inc. Oct 97 6.75 $1,000,000 Issue Cv Pf
85a International Semiconductor CC 2 12/16/96 11/28/96 NASD 0.75 $100,000 Issue Cv Db
b International Semiconductor CC 6/10/97 5/7/97 NASD 0.19 $100,000 Issue Cv Db
86a Interpublic Group of Companies 2 4/7/97 4/3/97 NYSE 35.92 6,741
shs of Spanish 
Co. Acquisition
b Interpublic Group of Companies 9/25/97 9/17/97 NYSE 48 35,710 49.0000
shs of Philippine 
Co. Acquisition
87 Interunion Financial Corp 1 11/17/97 6/30/97 NASD 6 60,000 3.0000 $180,000 Exercised options
Interunion Financial Corp 7/31/97 6.25 15,000 6.0000 $90,000 Exercise of warrants
88 Iridium LLC 1 10/23/97 10/17/97 NASD 43.25 $4,100,000 Sale of Units (Nts + Wrnts)
89 Juniper Features Ltd 1 11/14/97 6/15/97-10/31/97 NASD 6.3 2,017,682 0.0600 $121,061 Issued CS
90 KCD Holdings Inc. 1 2/10/97 1/27/97 none NA $750,000 Issue Cv Pf
91 Kestrel Energy Inc 1 5/8/97 4/30/97 NASD 2 2,502,000 2.0000 $5,004,000 Issued CS
92 Kollmorgen Corp 1 8/18/97 8/11/97 NYSE 17.31 86,522 Stock of sub Acquisition
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94a LaSalle Re Holdings Ltd 3 7/7/97 7/3/97 NYSE 31.75 429 29.4988 $12,655 Employee Stock Purchase Plan
b LaSalle Re Holdings Ltd 10/8/97 10/3/97 NASD 35 783 35.1252 $27,503 Employee Stock Purchase Plan
c LaSalle Re Holdings Ltd 11/3/97 10/16/97 NASD 35 9,650 35.1259 $338,965 Employee Stock Purchase 
Plan
95a Lithium Technology Corp. 6 12/10/96 11/25/96 none 0.75 64,575 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
b Lithium Technology Corp. 12/24/96 12/9/96 none 0.88 13,258 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
c Lithium Technology Corp, 1/14/97 12/30/96 none 0.81 11,824 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
d Lithium Technology Corp. 2/4/97 1/24/97 none 0.75 151,515 To extend Nts Compensation for ext. Nts.
e Lithium Technology Corp. 3/18/97 3/3/97 none 0.94 10,983 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
f Lithium Technology Corp. 4/8/97 3/24/97 none 1 12,963 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 12/2/96 1.19 13,285 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 12/16/96 1.5 11,589 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 12/23/96 1.28 13,780 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 1/6/97 1.5 11,785 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 1/13/97 1.5 10,595 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 1/13/97 1.25 8,249 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 1/20/97 1.02 7,415 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 1/27/97 0.88 7,830 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 3/10/97 0.8 11,628 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
Lithium Technology Corp. 3/17/97 0.8 12,111 Cv Nts Conversion of Notes
96 Long Distance Direct Holdings 2 11/21/96
8/29/96-
11/18/96 none 5.22 812,970 3.3000 $2,682,801 Sold Units (CS + warrants)
Long Distance Direct 
Holdings 12/11/96 11/29/96 none 3 166,667 3.0000 $500,000 Issued CS
97 Marquee Entertainment Inc 1 10/31/97 10/21/97 NASD NA $150,000 Sold Units (Db + Wrnts)
98 MBF USA Inc 1 10/27/97 10/24/97 NASD 2.25 Extend subscrip agmt of 5/20/97.
99 Med Waste, Inc. 1 11/10/97 11/7/97 NASD 5.06 551,725 3.6250 $2,000,000 Sold Units (CS + warrants)
100 Mediconsuit Com Inc 1 8/28/97 6/30/97 none 2.44 1,000,000 0.5000 Cv Db 500,000 Conversion of debt
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102a Metal Recovery Technologies 6 5/16/97 1/1/97 NASD 0.44 751,879 0.2660 $200,000 Issued CS
b Metal Recovery Technologies 7/8/97 6/12/97 NASD 0.25 2,550,000 Db & Pfd Compromise and settlement
c Metal Recovery Technologies 7/9/97 7/3/97 NASD 0.22 910,000 Db ($ not given) Conversion of debt
d Metal Recovery Technologies 9/25/97 9/16/97 NASD 0.27 1,113,420 LTdebt Conversion of debt
e Metal Recovery Technologies 10/21/97 10/14/97 NASD 0.16 910,000 Db ($ not given) Conversion of debt
f Metal Recovery Technologies 10/27/97 10/22/97 NASD 0.13 916,668 Conversion of debt
103a Moonlight International Corp 2 2/26/97 2/13/97 none NA 700,000 2.0000 $1,400,000 Exch consulting, debt,8> cash













In cancellation of note.
104 MYO Diagnostice, Inc 1 4/22/97 4/16/97 none NA 480,000 2.5000 $1,200,000 Sold Units (CS + warrants)
105 NACO Industries, Inc. 1 3/19/97 3/5/97 none NA 343,750 2.4000 $825,000 Sold Units (w/ warrants & Opt)
106
107












200,000 1,0500 nts $ 210,000 
$295,000
In cancellation of note. 


















Sold units (w/warrants) 
Issue CvDb with 144 A
111 Optical Security Group Inc. 1 4/11/97 3/31/97 NASD 8.13 1,667 6.0000 $10,000 Private offering with 144A
112a Orbital Sciences Corp 2 12/23/96 12/13/96 NASD 17.25 1,200,000 17.1300 $20,556,000 Issued CS Private Placement
b
113
Orbital Sciences Corp. 
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116 Petro Union Inc 1 10/24/97 10/10/97 NASD 255,500 $2,550,000 Sold Units (CS + warrants)
117 Petsmart Inc 1 11/13/97 11/4/97 NASD 7.03 $750,000 Issue cv nts with 144A
118 Philip Services Corp. 1 9/29/97 9/11/97 NYSE 19.31 354,430 Assets ACI Acquisition
118 Pixtech, Inc. 1 2/21/97 2/7/97 NASD 5.38 3,996,000 4.5000 $17,982,000 Issued CS
120a Platinum Technology, Inc 3 2/12/97 1/31/97 NASD 16.75 313,784 Shares of acq co Acquisition
b Platinum Technology, Inc 3/11/97 2/28/97 NASD 14.88 1,089,867 Shares of acq co Acquisition
c Platinum Technology, Inc 10/17/97 10/3/97 NASD 22.19 364,396 Shares of acq co Acquisition
121a Ponder Industries Inc. 3 4/15/97 3/31/97 NASD 1 511,200 0.8803 $450,000 Issued CS
b Ponder Industries Inc. 5/7/97 4/23/97 NASD 1 761,904 0.5906 $450,000 Sold Units (CS + warrants)
c Ponder Industries Inc. 6/26/97 6/19/97 NASD 0.77 560,015 0.5357 $300,000 Issued CS

















Consideration for assets 
Sale of Units (1 CS, 1 
Wrnts)
c Powertrader Inc 8/5/97 7/21/97 none NA 250,000 3.2500 $812,500 Sale of units (1 CS, 2 Wrnts)
124 Preiss Byron Multimedia Co Inc 1 11/3/97 10/17/97 NASD 0.84 $250,000
Sale of Units (Cv Db + 
wrnts)














3/21/97 NYSE, PSE 
4/14/97 NYSE, PSE 
7/8/97 NYSE, PSE 






















Exercised ESOS Options 
Exercised ESOS Options 
Exercised ESOS Options 
Sold units (w/ options) 
Exercised ESOS Options
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Per share # shs. Iss. Pr/sh Gross Proceeds Type o f transaction
b Procter & Gamble Co 12/3/96 11/18/96 NYSE 53.81 9,558 109.9226 $1,050,640
c Procter & Gamble Co 12/16/96 12/3/96 NYSE 52.38 6,877 106.3803 $731,577
d Procter & Gamble Co 12/20/96 12/18/97 NYSE 52.06 23,479 106.1940 $2,493,329
e Procter & Gamble Co 1/7/97 12/20/96 NYSE 54.06 4,759 109.6018 $521,595
f Procter & Gamble Co 1/17/97 1/3/96 NYSE 54.19 7,250 108.3403 $785,467
S Procter & Gamble Co 1/28/97 1/20/97 NYSE 56.31 6,154 113.7811 $700,209
h Procter & Gamble Co 2/21/97 2/3/97 NYSE 58 7,064 117.2636 $828,350
1 Procter & Gamble Co 3/4/97 2/18/97 NYSE 64.75 4,872 126.4411 $616,021
J Procter & Gamble Co 3/24/97 3/3/97 NYSE 60.19 6,243 121.0812 $755,910
k Procter & Gamble Co 4/7/97 3/25/97 NYSE 60.13 16,444 123.8688 $2,036,899
1 Procter & Gamble Co 4/23/97 4/3/97 NYSE 57.5 7,804 114.8857 $896,568
m Procter & Gamble Co 4/25/97 4/18/97 NYSE 61.5 6,444 121,5729 $783,416
n Procter & Gamble Co 5/2/97 4/25/97 NYSE 60.75 2,792 123.0150 $343,458
0 Procter & Gamble Co 5/15/97 5/6/97 NYSE 66.13 5,641 131.3767 $741,096
P Procter & Gamble Co 5/29/97 5/20/97 NYSE 66.75 10,168 133.5294 $1,357,727
q Procter & Gamble Co 6/16/97 6/3/97 NYSE 67.13 4,897 135.4054 $663,080
r Procter & Gamble Co 6/18/97 6/6/97 NYSE 68.13 8,410 140.5400 $1,181,941
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Employee Stock purchase 
plan
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Co.no. Company # 8-Ks Date filed Dateissued Exchange
Market Price 
Per share # shs. Iss. Pr/sh Gross Proceeds Type of transaction
8 Procter & Gamble Co 6/27/97 6/18/97 NYSE 69.38 5,018 139.5600 $700,312 Employee Stock purchase plan
t Procter & Gamble Co 7/11/97 6/25/97 NYSE 68.06 3,564 137.7191 $490,831 Employee Stock purchase plan
U Procter & Gamble Co 7/22/97 7/3/97 NYSE 72 4,367 144.6620 $631,739 Employee Stock purchase 
plan
V Procter & Gamble Co 8/27/97 8/18/97 NYSE 67,56 13,079 140.5933 $1,838,820 Employee Stock purchase plan
w Procter & Gamble Co 9/2/97 8/25/97 NYSE 68.13 2,859 141.0248 $403,190 Employee Stock purchase plan
X Procter & Gamble Co 9/11/97 8/4/97 NYSE 74.63 10,552 142,4423 $1,503,051 Employee Stock purchase plan
y Procter & Gamble Co 9/29/97 9/18/97 NYSE 71.38 13,906 111.8264 $1,555,058 Employee Stock purchase plan
z Procter & Gamble Co 10/27/97 10/2/97 NYSE 71.31 72,642 71.0611 $5,162,020 Employee Stock purchase plan
bb Procter & Gamble Co. 11/5/97 10/20/97 CSE, NYSE 70.69 14,615 70.4230 $1,029,232 Employee Stock purchase plan
126aa Proctor & Gamble Co. 10/30/97 10/24/97 NYSE 71.81 5,699 72.8300 $415,058 Employee Stock purchase plan
CC
127
Proctor & Gamble Co.














Employee Stock purchase 
plan
Acquisition
128a Quarterdeck Corp. 2 6/16/97 5/23/97 NASD 2.97 385,017 2.5973 10,000 sh Pfd Conversion of preferred stock
b Quarterdeck Corp. 10/7/97 9/24/97 NASD 3.15 1,485,332 2.6930 40,000 sh Pfd. Conversion of preferred stock
Quarterdeck Corp. 6/5/97 2.97 1,524,852 2.6232 40,000 sh Pfd. Conversion of preferred stock
Quarterdeck Corp. 9/30/97 3.03 366,542 2.7282 10,000 sh pfd Conversion of preferred stock
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to. no. Company # 8-Ks Date filed Dateissued Exchange
Market Price 
Per share # shs. iss. Pr/sh Gross Proceeds Type of transaction
b Queen Sand Resources Inc. 1/8/97 12/26/96 NASD 3.5 400,000 2.5000 $1,000,000 Issued CS
c Queen Sand Resources Inc. 2/12/97 1/29/97 NASD 3.5 660,000 2.5000 $1,650,000 Issued CS
d Queen Sand Resources Inc. 5/21/97 5/6/97 NASD 3.75 9,600,000 0.5208 $5,000,000 Sell significant ownership
e Queen Sand Resources Inc. 6/11/97 6/11/97 NASD 100,000 3.0500 $305,000 Issued CS
f Queen Sand Resources Inc. 8/1/97 7/16/97 NASD 4.38 100,000 3.0500 $305,000 Issued CS
g Queen Sand Resources Inc. 9/16/97 9/10/97 NASD 4.75 250,000 3.0500 $762,500 Issued CS
Queen Sand Resources Inc. 5.16 -9,600,000 0.5208 -$5,000,000 Buy significant ownership
130a Red Hot Concepts Inc. 2 11/20/96 11/8/96 NASD 9.38 1,000,000 0.5000 $500,000 Issued CS
b Red Hot Concepts Inc. 1/13/97 12/30/96 NASD 8.25 1,000,000 0.3000 $300,000 Issued CS
131 Regi U S Inc 1 5/12/97 10/16/96-4/31/97 none 1.63 110,000 1.5000 $165,000 Issue CS with Reg D
132 Registry Inc. 1 1/17/97 1/6/97 NASD 2.5 2,736 Acq agreement Acquisition
133 Ross Systems Inc/CA 1 2/24/97 2/24/97 NASD 5.38 200,000
All stock of 2 
Cos. Acquisition
Royal Canadian Foods Corp. 8/22/97 8/19/97 NASD NA 24,990 2.0000 $49,980 Issued CS
134a Royal Canadian Foods Corp. 4 1/27/97 1/9/97 NASD 4.25 79,982 2.0000 $159,964 Issued CS
b Royal Canadian Foods Corp. 6/24/97 6/9/97 NASD 5.25 89,000 2.0000 $178,000 Issued CS
c Royal Canadian Foods Corp. 8/22/97 8/10/97 NASD 5.25 49,980 2.0000 $99,960 Issued CS
d Royal Canadian Foods Corp. 9/23/97 9/8/97 NASD 5.25 24,990 2.0000 $49,980 Issued CS
135a RT Industries Inc. 4 12/20/96 12/5/96 NASD NA $750,000 Issue Cv Db
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Market Price 
Per share # shs. iss. Pr/sh Gross Proceeds Type of transaction
c RT Industries Inc. 3/24/97 3/20/97 NASD NA $5,500,000 Issue Cv Db
d RT Industries Inc. 8/27/97 8/25/97 NASD NA $5,000,000 Issue Cv Db
136a Saf T Lok Inc 4 6/11/97 5/9/97 NASD Z66 136,846 1.2200 $200,000 Issued CS
b SafTLok Inc 8/19/97 8/1/97 NASD 1.06 $75,000 Issue Cv Db
c Saf T Lok Inc 10/10/97 9/25/97 NASD 0.47 $100,000 Issue Cv Db
d Saf T Lok Inc 11/14/97 11/12/97 NASD 3.13 1,250,000 2.0000 $2,500,000 Sold Units (CS+ Warrants)
137a Scientific Measurement Systems 2 11/29/96 11/13/96 NASD 1.07 1,365,573 0.6078 $830,000 Issued CS
b Scientific Measurement Systems 12/16/96 12/3/96 NASD 1.32 595,159 0.7931 $472,000 Issued CS
138 Scriptel Holding Inc. 1 12/19/96 12/16/96 none 0.22 $90,000 Issue Cv Db
139 Seiler Pollution Control System 1 4/16/97 2/13/97 NASD 3.5 1,000,000 2.6000 $2,600,000 Issued CS
140a Service Systems International 4 4/30/97 2/18/97 none 1.64 75,000 0.7500 $56,250 Sold Units (CS + warrants)
b Service Systems International 9/26/97 7/10/97 NASD 1.56 $50,000 Issue Cv Db
d Service Systems International 10/21/97 10/6/97 NASD 1.25 $195,000 Issue Cv Db
c Service Systems International Ltd. 10/7/97 9/22/97 NASD 1.43 $210,268 Issue Cv Db
141 Sharon Energy Ltd 1 2/18/97 2/12/97 BSE 1,700,000 0.5000 $850,000 Sold Units (CS + warrants)
142 Silicon Graphics Inc ' 1 10/10/97 9/30/97 NYSE 26.25 367,232 shs of acq co. Acquisition
143 Silverado Gold Mines, Ltd. 1 11/5/97 10/31/97 NASD 4.06 2,750,000 0.2000 $550,000 issued CS
144 Sims Communications Inc 1 11/5/97 10/22/97 NASD 4.5 $910,000 Issue Cv Nts
145a Sitel Corp 4 1/31/97 1/16/97 NYSE 17.88 20,000 Shares of acq co Acquisition
b Sitel Corp 4/16/97 4/4/97 NYSE 12.75 683,687 Shares of acq co Acquisition
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146 Smartalk Teleservices, Inc. 1 9/26/97 9/17/97 NASD
147 Socket Communications, Inc. 1 10/1/97 9/16/97 NASD
148 Soiv Ex Corp 1 11/27/96 11/15/96 NASD





150 SPS Technologies Inc 1 10/20/97 10/14/97 NYSE
151a Stratford Acquisitions Corp. 2 8/28/97 8/13/97 OTC-BB
b Stratford Acquisitions Corp. 
Stratford Acquisitions Corp.
11/10/97 11/3/97 OTC-BB
152a Swissray International, Inc. 1/23/97 1/10/97 NASD
b Swlssray International, Inc. 3/6/97 3/5/97 NASD
c Swissray International, Inc. 8/13/97 7/31/97 NASD
153 Syncronys Softcorp 1 12/18/96 12/5/96 none
154a Tasty Fries Inc 2 6/16/97 6/3/97 NASD
154b Tasty Fries Inc 
Tasty Fries Inc 
Tasty Fries Inc
11/14/97 11/5/97 NASD
155 Tengtu International Corp. 1 2/11/97 1/31/97 none
156a TMP Worldwide Inc 2 10/30/97 10/21/97 NASD
b TMP Worldwide Inc 11/12/97 11/8/97 NASD
157 Tosco Corporation 1 12/27/96 12/13/96 NYSE
158 Trans Energy Inc. 1 4/17/97 3/26/97 NASD
159a Transglobe Energy Corp. 2 2/19/97 2/3/97 NASD
15.88 96,667 Shares of acq co Acquisition
10.81 78,510 Shares of acq co Acquisition
22.88 $1,600,000 Issue Cv Nts with 144A
0.66 Nts worth $200,000 Acquisition
2.38 $13,000,000 Issue Cv Db
4.13 1,133,334 Issued and cancelled in exchange
4.13 -1,133,334 Issued and cancelled in exchange
49.63 2,890 44.6100 Shs of Mohawk Acquisition
0.34 200,000 0.3500 $70,000 Issued CS
0.39 138,250 0.4000 $55,300 Issued CS
62,500 0.4000 $25,000 Issued CS
NA $3,500,000 Issue Cv Db
NA 1,000,000 2.0000 $2,000,000 Issued CS
NA CvDb $4,262,500 Exchange for CvDb issued 5/13/97
0.94 400,000 doesn't say Acquisition (not clear)
1.5 $1,000,000 Sold units (nts + wrnts)
2.05 $1,600,000 Sold units (nts + wrnts)
1.38 Sold units (nts + wrnts) 
Sold units (nts + wrnts)
3 220,888 2.2500 $497,000 Sold units (2CS +1 wrnt)
24.5 16,460 Acquisition
20.94 69,533 Acquisition
25.63 $300,000,000 Issue Cv Pf with 144A
11 $1,430,000 Issue Cv Db
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Date
issued
Exchange Market Price Per share # shs. Iss. Pr/sh Gross Proceeds Type of transaction
b Transglobe Energy Corp. 3/18/97 3/10/97 NASD 1.88 Announcement pursuant to Rule 135C.
c Transglobe Energy Corp. 4/3/97 3/26/97 NASD 1.88 4,400,000 1.3000 $5,720,000 Issued warrants in private placement
d Transglobe Energy Corp. 6/27/97 6/26/97 NASD 1.19 Exercise of warrants
160 Triangle Phamneceuticals Inc 1 6/18/97 6/6/97 NASD 24.38 2,000,000 15.0000 $30,000,000 Issue CS with Reg D issue
161 Unique Mobility, Inc 1 3/13/97 2/28/97 AM^ f E' 3.69 1,289,288 3.5000 $4,512,508 Issue CS with Reg D issue
162a Urethane Technologies, Inc. 2 2/11/97 1/29/97 NASD NA $115,000 Issue Cv Db
b Urethane Technologies, Inc. 2/12/97 1/29/97 NASD NA $25,000 Issue Cv Db
163a US Electricar Inc 2 1/30/97 1/15/97 none 0.16 $260,000 Issue Cv Nts
163b US Electricar Inc 2/26/97 2/13/97 none 0.14 $140,000 Issue Cv Nts
US Electricar Inc 2/21/97 0.27 $400,000 Issue Cv Nts
164 Video Jukebox Network Inc. 1 12/20/96 12/10/96 NASD NA 1,666,667 1.5000 $2,500,000 Issue Cv Pf
166 Videolan Technologies, Inc. 1 10/8/97 9/24/97 NASD 0.25 $200,000 Issue Cv Db
166 Wasatch Pharmaceutical Inc. 1 10/1/97 9/24/97 NASD 1.21 $50,000 Issue Cv Db
167 Waters Corp. 1 10/8/97 9/23/97 NYSE 42.88 375,108 Micromass Stock Acquisition
168 Wavetech Inc. 1 4/1/97 3/17/97 NASD 0.69
Exch. for other 
loan
Extends bridge loan of 
$200,000.
169 Wendt-Bristol Health Services Corp. 1 2/28/97 2/14/97 AMEX 1.44 $3,417,000
Sell Units (SF bonds 
+wrnts)
170 World Access Inc. 1 10/8/97 10/1/97 NASD 32.13 $3,830,000 Issue Cv Nts with 144A
171a XCLLTD 9 2/19/97 2/19/97 AMEX 375 1,340,200 0.2100 $281,442 Exercise of warranis
b XCL LTD 3/6/97 2/20/97 AMEX 3.75 184,800 0.2100 $38,808 Exercise of warrants
c XCL LTD 4/1/97 3/21/97 AMEX 2.81 73,000 0.2100 $15,330 Exercise of warrants
d XCL LTD 5/1/97 4/18/97 AMEX 3.75 440,289 0.1250 $55,036 Exercise of warrants
e XCL LTD 6/6/97 6/6/97 AMEX 3.75 870,000 0.2100 $182,700 Exercise of warrants
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9 XCL LTD 9/24/97 8/19/97 AMEX 3.75 Services
Compensation for 
financing services
XCL LTD 2/24/97 AMEX 2.81 105,100 0.2100 $22,071 Exercise of warrants
XCL LTD 4/22/97 4.69 66,900 0.2100 $14,049 Exercise of warrants
XCL LTD 4/30/97 4.69 2,559,711 0.1250 $319,964 Exercise of warrants
h XCL Ltd. 10/17/97 10/3/97 AMEX 6.56 360,000 0.1250 $45,000 Exercise of warrants
1 XCL Ltd. 11/5/97 10/21/97 AMEX 9.38 1,500,000 0.1875 $281,250 Exercise of warrants
XCL Ltd. 10/28/97 AMEX 8.44 800,000 Services Consideration for services.
172 Xiox Corp. 1 10/8/97 9/24/97 NASD 4.81 574,400 5.0000 $2,872,000 Issued CS Private Placement
680b Fremont Gold 
Total number of 8-Ks 339
11/3/97 10/17/97 NASD 0.813 363,636 0.5500 $200,000 Common Stock
Data is compiled from 8-K forms filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) between November 18,1996 through November 17,1997.
# 8-Ks - The number of 8-Ks filed by this company In the one year sample period.
Date Filed - the date the Regulation S issue Is reported to the SEC.
Date Issued- Regulation S securities were reported as issued on this date.
Exchange - Where the stocK is traded.
Market price per share - is the closing price the day before the issue per the Prophet Information Services Stock Data CD.
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Fees paid to 
underwriters / 
finders


















Berkshire Int'l Finance, Inc.
Rolcan Finance, Ltd. London
BS, LB, RS&co. Unterberg 
Harris
Select Capital Advisors, Inc. 
Select Capital Advisors, Inc.
XTC Inv. / Centrum Bank 
Vaduz









2.65% dsct. Underwriters who distribute. Cv Price $ 51.66
















Cv into .8914 sh of AES CORP,
Cv to CS at lessor of 1) 30 % dsct 5 day pt cv or 2) $0.7698.
Cv to CS at lessor of 1) 30 % dsct 5 day pt cv or 2) $0.9668.
Cv to CS at lessor of 1) 30 % dsct 5 day pt cv or 2) 15% dsct. 5 days 
Pt funding of debt.
Cv to CS at lessor of 1) 30 % dsct 5 day pt cv or 2) $1.86468
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underwriters / 
finders





















1 indiv. investor 
Securities Trading SA 
2 Australian investors
Lessor of 1) 60% Pr at 4/15/97 or 2) 60% Pr at Cv . not given






Meridian Equities, Inc. 
Domain Investments Inc.
2 Canadian Corp.
2 Canadian individuals 
2 Canadian individuals
9 Offshore Subscr. Agrmt.
Lesser of 1) 70% Mkt Price on CV DT or 2) 100% is dt.
60% bid 5 days pt conv.
80% of avg. close pr for 5 days PT Dt of Cv
4/22/98
9/12/99




Lower of 1)$2.775 or 70% of avg close 5 days Pt conv. 11/1/99









U.S. Milestone Corp. (distr) 
U.S. Milestone Corp. (distr) 
U.S. Milestone Corp. (distr) 
U.S. Milestone Corp. (distr) 
U.S. Milestone Corp. (distr)
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underwriters / 
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Investors Conversion price Maturity date 
of debentures
18 Goldman Sachs, Alex Brown &Sons #REF!
19 $100,000+17391sh+wrnts Value Mgt & Research GmbH
Goldman Sachs Inti, Bear
20 see Investors 3.35% dsct. Steams Inti Ltd.BT Alex. Brown Inti,Credit Suisse First Boston, 
J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd
1,7344 shs of CS / Pfd sh (CP: $28,828 per share) non listed
21 Shoreline Pacific Institutional Finance
Lesser of 1) $9.00 or 2) 80% of avg close price 10 days Pr 
conv.(Mandatory Cv at maturity). 2/4/99
22 Banca del Gottardo Z I 1  280000 Cv @ $3.25/sh from 11/1/97 to 8/11/02 8/11/02
23
_ _ _ _ _
Shareholders of Books Etc. 
Ltd.
6 offshore companies




26a Institutional Investors Dsct from mkt pr. at Cv (doesn't provide % disct.)
b an Institutional investor
27a
b Sole shareholder of acq. co.
28a Ceco Filters, Inc,
b Ceco Filters, Inc.
29
Bear Steams, Chase Secur 2.83% CP = $ 55.335 after 60 days and up to 10/11/02. 10/11/02
30 Willora Co. Ltd. Principle payable monthly can be paid with Reg S stock or cash at registrant's option. 2/19/00
31a Warrants exer. @ $0.0625 until 8/3/97. 8/3/97
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2 offshore investors 
1 offshore investor 
Hugo Wyrsch, Swiss idiv. 
Ocean Funding(BVI), Ltd.
3 non US entities 
12 non US
$ .50 per share (No maturity date provided)









PA Merchant Group, Ltd. 
La Jolla Capital Corp.
37,500
50,000
The Tailwind Fund, Ltd. 
Institutional Investors
it
Cv after 41 days @ 70% avg. close 5 days PT Cv.










a Hong Kong Corp. 
Holder of Pfd 
New investor
II
65% avg. price 10 days PT Cv.
Exer. @ lower of 80% of 1) Pr day wrnt issue or 2) exer. day.










Warrants ex. @ $1.15 / sh.
. . .









@ $ 1.0971 /sh.
Warrants Ex. @ $ 1.15/sh
Warrants Ex. @ $ 1.25/sh
CP = $ 0.9375 (75% closing price on May 7,1997)
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Fees paid to 
underwriters / 
finders
Investors ^  , Maturity date Conversion price . . . 'o f debentures
44 Bookook Securities CP = 90% avg. 30 days PT conversion (but between $ 3.00 and $ o«omn 6.00) 2/28/99
45 Deutsche MG, Prudential S, RS 2.75 % disct 2.75% CP = $ 23.625/sh any time up to maturity. 2002
46 no no Chase Financial Corp.
47a Transition Partners, Ltd. Boulder 15% 2 non US entities
Lesser of 1)avg pr 5 days before issue of Pfd (closing) or 2) 75% avg 5 
day stock price PT Cv.
b " 15% 2 non US persons ii
m 15% 1 non U.S. entity "
none OHL, Br W.lndies Corp.
49 no Shareholders of EssonneElectronique
60a 85% 5 day avg price PT Cv. ($1.838125 - $2.14625.)
b Lesser of $7.00 or 85% 5 day avg PT Cv.($1.816875 & $1.753125)
c Lesser of $7.00 or 85% 5 day avg PT Cv.($1.646875 & $1.615).
d Lesser of $7.00 or 85% 5 day avg PT Cv. ($1.66812 & $1,615)
e Lesser of $7.00 or 85% 5 day avg PT Cv. ($1.70)
51 Sutton Cap Mgt Ltd
52a 0 Basil Holdings, Ltd
b 0 Sage Cap Inv Ltd, Nassau
53 Pannolini de Mexico
54 Bay City Capital $260,460 5 Banks &  Trusts
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56 Dr. Kurt Dlmata, Swiss " “ 25,265 5 foreign investors @ $0.25 PT 3/31/98 or $ 0.30 PT 9/30/98.
57 Var. acquired Cos.
58 MSt, DLJ, CrSu, PrSc 2.75% Var. acquired Cos. Cv @ $ 80/sh, redeemable after 11/4/2000. 10170
59 1500000 +50000 shs Lesser of $13.20 or 82% 5 day avg pr PT Cv. Cv 1/4 in 7, 8, 9,10/97.
___60 CP 65% 5 day avg PT Cv ($0.43)
CP 65% 5 day avg PT Cv ($0.3016).
61 European American Securities 8% Lesser of 1) $ 3.00 or 2) 80% Mkt pr (5 day avg) PT Cv. 1/31/00
62a Estb. Pour Le Placement Prive Price includes 12,833 warrants to purchase CS @ $ 6.25.
b Estb, Pour Le Placement Prive Price includes 15,400 warrants to purchase CS @ $ 6.25.
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74 H.J. Meyers & Co.
312,000 7 for Inv, Banks
Magic Trading Ltd, Br.W. 
Indies
4.50% 2 offshore investor
21000 A Zurich Bank
38181 a Cayman Is Gr Fund
20710 A Geneva Banque
15152 a Cayman Is. Gr Fund
Australian corp.
Hong Kong resident 
10% Sangate Enterprises, Inc.
10% Sangate Enterprises, Inc.
Regional Investments, Inc., 
Robertson Stphens Orphan 
Fund, Casa de Oro 
Casa de Oro
Liberty Project Ltd Partnership
Pharmacia & Upjohn S.p.A.
Three parties
10 non-US investors 
6 accredited investors
60,000 CS + 
warrants





$ 3.50/sh. Those holding more than $2 million In Nts may be 
compelled to convert if i) shs are registered and ii) if price > $4.50 for 
20 consecutive trade days.




Lesser of 1) 80% 5 day avg. PT Cv or 2) $3,375.
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Non US persons 
Non US persons
76
77a Shane Henty Sutton 24620”
5 U.K. Indiv (Sh of sub) 
Oaxaca Family Holdings 40% dsct on 5 day avg PT Cv. 36159
amends b
b Shane Henty Sutton 80525 Karela Gisele Pty., Ltd. Lower of 1) 60% price day of Cv or 2) 60% 5 day avg PT Cv. 12/20/98













Shareholders of Link Grp 
Hldgs Ltd
3 foreign corps. Lesser of $3,825 or 80% 5 day avg PT Cv,, Wrnts exer. pr $4.59/sh after 4/6/98. 2/6/00
83 private placement to mfg. partners 2 Hong Kong corporations
84














Karlin investment Corp. 
Karlin Investment Corp.




Lower of 1)$6.48375 or 2)80% avg 5 day PT Cv.(with floor of $3.42 for 
1 yr.
Lower of 1)100% pr at closing dt or 2) 75% pr at Cv.
Lower of 1)100% pr at closing dt or 2) 75% pr at Cv.
10/1/97
10/2/97
88 CS, ML PFS, BTAB 2.25% discount Investment banks for resale NA 2005
~ 89 3 foreign Corps.
90 Net Financial International, Ltd. 15% 2 accredited investors
Lesser of 1) 70% 5 day avg PT Cv or 2) 100% mkt 5 day PT closing. If 















Appendix B Summary Information from 8-Ks filed with the SEC
Part 3 - Investors. Underwriters and Finders, and Conversion Premiums
Co. no. Placement Agent
Fees paid to 
underwriters I 
finders
















Shareholder of Servotronix Ltd 
Roche Int'l, Ltd, Bermuda









Capital Growth Int'l LLC 
Wingmead Securities, Ltd.




$20,000 Non US persons
Wembley Rubbewr Products 
$135,000 + Lancer Voyager & Lancer 
35090 wmts Offshore
A Cayman Is. Corp.
Lesser of 35% avg 5 days PT Cv or 35% 5 day avg at closing.















Appendix B Summary Information from 8-Ks filed with the SEC 
Part 3 - Investors. Underwriters and Finders, and Conversion Premiums
Co. no. Placement Agent


















Non US persons 
Non US persons
104 Griffiths McBurney (Canada) $84,000+ 43200 wrnts Canadian Institutional investors
105 James Czirr 10% Britannia Holdgs, Ltd. (U.K.)
106 none 0 single investor @ $1.05
lesser of l)$0.0875 or ii) 80% avg. closing bid 10 days following any
107 and each distribution in shares, subdivision, split-up, combination, 
reclassification or change
9/1/00
109 none 0 4 European Investors
110 Morgan Stanley & Co. 2.13% Non U.S. persons Cv after 90 days @ rate of 15.873 shs per $1,000 bond ($63/sh at issue date).
111 none 0 Non-U.S. persons
112a GEM Advisors, Inc. 275000 An Accredited Investor
b Deutsche Morg. Grenfell, JP Morg 3%disct. DMGrenfell & JPMorgan
Convertible into 3,571,429 sh common ($28/sh) current stock price 22 
11/16. 6/24/05
113 Finanzverwaltung des Kantons& others
114 Baliin & Partner
115
116 Gupo De Creacion Ltd. 7% Non-U.S. investors Units 2 CS and 1 wrnt @ $20.
117 DLJ, NaBc 3% dsct. Underwriters $8.75/sh. The Board of Directors may reduce the Cv price by any amount at any time. 11/4/04
118 A-C-l Holdings, Inc.
119 HQSD, CrLy, BeGr $1,258,740 Underwriters
120a Shareholders of ATR














Appendix B Summary Information from 8-Ks filed with the SEC
Part 3 - Investors. Underwriters and Finders, and Conversion Premiums
Co. no. Placement Agent
Fees paid to 
underwriters / 
finders
Investors Conversion price Maturity date 
o f debentures
121a U.S. Milestone Corp.,NY 
b






























English Co. shareholders 
Optimum Fund, Gr Cayman 
Corp.
Orez Ltd. (Bermuda) 
Kucey, Canadian citizen 
Non U.S persons 
Canadian Corp. 
Institutional Investor in Nule 
A Inst Investor .Bahamas
Reva Trading Ltd. 
Executives of co.
Co executive 
Executives of co. 
Employees of subsidiaries














Appendix B Summary Information from 8-Ks filed with the SEC
Part 3 - Investors. Underwriters and Finders, and Conversion Premiums
Co. no. Placement Agent
Fees paid to 
underwriters I 
finders



























Shareholders of Alma 
Intervention S.A.
lesser of a) 101% 40 day volume weighted avg Pt 2 days before Cv or 
b) 125% of first 5 day avg for that period. Resulted at CP $$2.5973
CP = $2,693 
CP $ 2.7282













(affil of Enron Fin Corp.; 
2 foreign cos.
Forsetti (Barbados Corp.) 
Retail customers 
Retail customers














Appendix B Summary Information from 8-Ks filed with the SEC
Part 3 - Investors. Underwriters and Finders, and Conversion Premiums
Co. no. Placement Agent
Fees paid to 
underwriters / 
finders
Investors Conversion price Maturity date 
o f debentures














Meridian Equities, inc. 
Meridian Equities, Inc. 
Meridian Equities, Inc. 
Domain Investments, Inc. 
Fin Consultant 
Alexander Wescott & Co. 







Non U.S. person 
Non U.S. person 
Non U.S. persons 
Non U.S. persons 
Single offshore investor
75% of i) avg 5 day PT cv or ii)110% 5day avg pt issue Db. 
75% of i) avg 5 day PT cv or ii)110% 5day avg pt issue Db. 
75% of i) avg 5 day PT cv or ii)110% 5day avg pt issue Db. 
75% of i) avg 5 day PT cv or ii)110% 5day avg pt issue Db.
70% Avg 5 days PT conversion 





d State Street Securities 13.5% +13.5% on exer. wmts 3 foreign purchasers
137a Berkshire Int'l Fin. $140,500+ 96078 wrnts 3 foreign equity funds
b
138
Berkshire Int'i Fin. 




2 Swiss banks 
A foreign company 60% Mkt price @ Cv
...
139 Rolcan Finance Ltd, London 291357 Non US persons
140a
b
0 Candaian Inv. Co 
Costa Rican investor Cv at share price of 80% closing bid on or around Cv. 7/31/98
d Lower of a) 80% close day before Cv or b) 80% avg 5 days PT Cv. 7/31/98





0 Cs + 350000 
Wrnts
Non U.S. persons














Appendix B Summary Information from 8-Ks filed with the SEC 
Part 3 - Investors. Underwriters and Finders, and Conversion Premiums
Co. no. Placement Agent
Fees paid to 
underwriters / 
finders
Investors Conversion price Maturity date o f debentures
143 Peerless Assoc., U.K. $16,000 on 1,000,000 sh 2 offshore investors
144 9% dsct on 1,000,000 nts 2 foreign Inv. funds 72% avg 5 days PT Cv. 10/15/99
145a Shareholder of B’sTelemarketing Ltd, U.K.
b Shareholders of Levita
c Shareholders of Svanbergh
H Shareholders of Telephoneu Mkt. Svcs. 
Shareholders of L&R
146 DLJ and Sal Br * 3% Cv In 90 days after 9/17/97 at CP of 26.25 9/15/04
147 Shareholder of Cetronic Aktiebolag Convertible at conversion price of $0.50/sh. 8/14/98
148 J W. Charles Sec & CIBC Wood Gundy
$1,040,000+wmt 
s Non U.S. persons Lesser of 1)$14.50 or 2)82% avg 5 day PT Cv. 11/30/98
149 Shareholders of Acq Co. SSL
160 Employees of Mohawk, Europa
151a Canadian indiv & Bahamas Institution
b 7 Canadians
Director of Co.
152a Targas Trading Ltd. $415,000 Non US persons 81% avg 5 day PT Cv, Mandatory Cv in 36 mo.
b Rolcan Finance Ltd, London $7,500
c Rolcan Financd Ltd. 80% avg 5 days PT Cv


















Appendix B Summary Information from 8-Ks filed with the SEC 
Part 3 - Investors. Underwriters and Finders, and Conversion Premiums
Co. no. Placement Agent
Fees paid to 
underwriters / 
finders
W«W| V I IW I «>• |*W| « ■»" ■
Investors
-----------  — — .. —
Conversion price Maturity date 
of debentures
154b $160,000+615,0OOWmts 6 non U.S. investors 
1 of 6 Investors reed wmts
70% of 5 day avg PT Cv.
Exer. @ $1.21 between 7/15/97 and 11/27/97
11/5/00
155 none 3 Cos.
156a 1 Shareholder of Acq Co.
b 3 Shareholders of Acq. Co.
157 MorSt,DLJ,FrSlz Cv @ 0.50633 CS per CvPfd share between 3/15/97 and 12/15/26.
158 2 foreign affiliated entities Lesser of 1) 80% avg 5 day PT offering or 2) 75% 5 day avg PT conv.
159a none European Inst Inv (existing Sh)
b Canadian Investment firms
C
d
Canadian Investment firms 6.50%
160 Canadian director as finder $500,000 2 non U.S. entities
161 Millenium Fin Grp, Italy $ 270,750+2756 25 wmts
Inst. Inv + Europ. & Canadian 
Indiv.
162a Astor Capital $6,500 Non U.S. persons Lesser o f '' a certain dsct or bid at date of sale of CvDb or a different dsct at date of conversion."
b Astor Capital 10% Non U.S. persons Lesser o f" a certain dsct or bid at date of sale of CvDb or a different dsct at date of conversion."
163a Fontal Int'l Ltd., Switzerland $ 0.30 per share 6 Mo.
163b Fontal Int'l Ltd., Switzerland 
ITOCHU Corp., Japan
$ 0.30 per share 
$ 0.30 per share
6 Mo. 
1 Yr.
164 Communications Equity Assoc, Inc. 125000 EMAP, pic. 1 Sh CS for 1 sh Pfd, Cumulative unpaid div @ $ 1.50/sh.
165 Consulting fee to J.P. Carey, Inc. 16000 Non U.S. persons
Lesser of 80% close bid 5 days PT i) date of issuance Db or ii) date of 
Cv. 9/1/99














Appendix B Summary Information from 8-Ks filed with the SEC
Part 3 - Investors. Underwriters and Finders, and Conversion Premiums
Co. no. Placement Agent
Fees paid to 
underwriters / 
finders
Investors Conversion price Maturity date 
of debentures
167 Micromass emplo/shareholders
168 Brent Swanick trust 80% Fair Mkt. Value at conversion
169 European Investors Bonds NOT convertible.
170 BT Alex. Brown & Prudential Sec. 3% disct. Investment cos. resold 10/1/02
171a Rauscher Pierce & Clark Ltd. $ 13,402 Sreedeswar Holdings, Inc.
b Rauscher Pierce & Clark Ltd. 1848 Sreedeswar Holdings, Inc.
c II 730 Sreedeswar Holdings, Inc.
d H 4403 Providence Capital, Ltd.
e 8700 Sreedeswar Holdings, Inc.
f Providence Capital, Ltd.
g




Providence Capital Ltd. 
Sreedeswar Holdings, Inc. 
Sreedeswar Holdings, Inc.
Wmts exercizable @ $0.1875, expire 8/13/01. 8/13/01
h
" 2560 Providence Capital, Ltd.
II
I Providence Capital Ltd., 
Cayman Is.
Resident of Taiwan
172 Private offer Flanders Language Valley













Table 1 - Comparative Characteristics of Similar Instruments
summarized from the literature
Eurobonds 
Kim and Stulz (1988) 
Marr and Trimble (1993)
Convertible Eurobonds 
Kim and Stulz (1993)
Euroequitv 
Marr, Trimble, and Varma (1991)
Private Placement 
Hertzel and Smith (1993)
RESEARCH SAMPLE K &  S 183 Eurobonds 1975 ■ 1985 
M &  T 118 Eurobonds 1977 • 1983 
All exchange listed companies.
166 convertible issues, NYSE, AM EX  
1965-1987
32 Euro-equity issues, NYSE, AMEX  
1985-1988




Foreign investor desiring anonymity and 
tax advantage prior to 1984.
Foreign investor desiring 
anonymity and tax advantage prior 
to 1984.
Dollar denominated “Bearer 
instruments” are attractive to investors 
who And anonymity and international 
diversification attractive.
It is the intent of the SEC that these 
unregistered shares will “rest abroad”.
O f 106 placements:
35 were to foreign investors, 
(30 foreign institutions 
generally multiple buyers) 
53 to institutions, 7 to other 
corporations, 6 to management.
TYPICAL 
ISSUING FIRM
Large, low risk Arms with good 
reputation, and often with signiftcant 
foreign holdings. U.S. companies raise 
capital overseas to ftnance foreign 
operations. Foreign investors prefer 
safer bonds than domestic investors 
because o f greater ambiguities regarding 
enforceability of covenants.
Large, low risk firms are more likely to 
issue offshore.
Large firms making large public offering 
supports views that issuers seek 
financing bargains in overseas market.
75% are over-the-counter firms, 
smaller firms and seek smaller amounts 
of new equity than public issues.
20% had signs of financial distress. 
Average CAR (-500, -30) is -14.8% 
contrasting with positive CAR before 
public issues.
EFFECTO FNEW  
ISSUE ON EXISTING  
SHAREHOLDERS
Signiftcantly positive and greater 
abnormal returns than comparable 
domestic issues.
No significant effect differs from 
significant negative effect for domestic 
issue before July 1984. Significant 
negative effect after June 1984. 
However, when control for conversion 
premium, the effect is positive and 
significant for all subperiods between 
1966 and 1987.
Eurocquity is issued simultaneously 
with a domestic tranche and the market 
reaction to the total issue is significantly 
negative. However, the negative stock 
price reaction is significantly reduced by 
increases in the offshore proportion of 
the total issue.
In spite of the large average discount on 
private placements there is a positive 
and signiAcant announcement effect. 
The average discount-adjusted abnormal 
return for the sample is 8.2% and 
consistently positive. The percentage of 
new equity, greater intangibles, and 




Not obligated to maintain market price 
above par until syndicate disbanded (as 
with domestics).
Fees 1.75% - 2.5% compared with < 1 
%  for domestic bond
Same as Eurobonds
Overseas financial institution must 
register with the SEC and follow 
elaborate certiAcation procedures. 
Dividends are paid to the registered 
financial institution which then forwards 
dividends to the owners.
None. (This compares with underwriter 
spread of 7.4% on average for public 















Kim and Stulz (1988) 
Marr and Trimble (1993)
Convertible Eurobonds 
Kim and Stulz (1993)
Euroeauitv 
Marr, Trimble, and Varma (1991)
Private Placement 
Hertzel and Smith (1993)
RESTRICTIONS
Shares can be sold on the U.S. market 
but revert to regular registered shares 
when repatriated.
2 year restriction for unregistered shares.
MEANS TO ALLOW  
QUICK ISSUE
Gray market (forward offshore market) 
or
Bought Deal (after 1978)
No waiting queue, may place in 3 weeks 
(Solnik)
Same as Eurobonds.
Sold with domestic registered offering 
so there is no quick way to benefit from 
temporary market imperfections.
Can place unregistered shares under 




Maturity < 10 years, generally.
Interest paid annually.
Smaller issue size than domestic issue.
Convertible to equity shares.
Much larger issue than straight domestic 
offering.
Much smaller ($5 -10  million) than 
public issues ( median $21 million). 
Average discount 20%.












Table 2 - Sample Characteristics
The sample contains 172 companies filing 339 8-Ks with the SEC from November 18, 1996 through November 17, 1997 reporting 406 Regulation S transactions. Regulation S 
offerings were identified from the SEC Edgar database 8-K filings, line 9. Panel A reflects selected issuing firm characteristics and offshore equity issue characteristics. Panel B 
provides a breakdown of several firm characteristics by industry. Financial information for 145 of the sample firms was collected from thcCampact Disclosure database. The Z- 
score is Altman’s (1968) Bankruptcy index which is calculated from the Compact Disclosure information. Issue characteristics (gross proceeds in U.S. dollar terms, discount from 
market value, number of shares issued) were extracted from the 8-Ks filed with the SEC. Where the discount was not provided, it was calculated as the percentage discount from 
the day’s market price per share. The size of the issue relative to the market value is the number of shares issued @ market price on the date of issue divided by the market value of 
the equity as given in the Compact Disclosure database. Market price per share is per the Prophet Information Services, Inc. compact disc of stock data. This data base was used 








percentile Istquartile Median 3rd quartile
95th
percentile Maximum
Financial Characteristics of Issuers
Market Value of Equity 
($ thousands)
104 1,516,528 8,685,187 257 2,041 11,049 36,670 357,392 4,093,637 85,987,850
Book Value Total Assets 
($ thousands)
144 508,640 2,613,073 5 282 4,019 11,873 52,411 1,478,277 27,730,000
Net Sales ($ thousands) 125 655,253 3,500,313 0 70 2,048 8,369 68,337 1,834,232 35,284,000
Net Income or loss 
($ thousands)
144 30,671 269,926 -211,100 -23,838 -4,888 -1,560 -2 113,288 3,046,000
Debt/Total Assets 144 1.6163 8.0967 0.0040 0.0624 0.2881 0.5183 0.8093 2.9339 94.4000
Retained Earnings 
($ thousands)
143 103,710 912,344 -219,432 -61,796 -17,351 •4,882 -779 322,358 10,382,000
Z-Score 
Characteristics of Issue
131 0.47 28.5 -203.75 -15.17 -2.13 1.32 4.55 19 134.19
Gross Proceeds ($ 
thousands)
315 4,338 25,252 -5,000 18 118 442 1,576 9,354 300,000
Size of issue relative to 
equity value
315 0.489013 6.805899 0.000001 0.000009 0.002271 0.023950 0.084423 0.574820 120.632280
Average Discount (- 
premium) percentage
285 26.02% 30.43% -174.00% -2.99% 8.02% 25.00% 44.83% 76.10% 130.00%
3 month holding period 
return - entire sample
341 -12.10% 45.04% -100.00% -75.00% -38.46% -11.97% 8.33% 46.46% 275.00%
3 month holding period 
return - losses only












Table 2- Sample Characteristics (continued)
Panel B - Financial Information by Industry
TOTAL MARKET NET NET Z-Score
ASSETS VALUE SALES INCOME (LOSS) One Year prior
Industry n (S000S) (S000S1 IS000S) ($000S) to Rea S issue
Building and Construction Mean 2 10,510 8,476 6,173 (8,012) -0.36
Median 10,510 8,476 6,173 (8,012) -0.36
Communications Mean 7 18,816 59,906 5,804 (2,866) 3.62
Median 8,310 28,479 4,884 (2,356) 2.80
Computer & Office Machine Manufacturing Mean 7 552,526 1,155,192 517,882 25,273 -26.73
Median 19,880 28,790 8,132 (2,961) 2.65
Computer Related Sen/ices Mean 24 86,247 206,413 79,112 (11,469) 0.36
Median 15,705 48,145 16,302 (1,304) 0.93
Financial Institutions and Insurance Mean 5 684,719 443,528 110,402 42,207 1.28
Median 597,350 443,528 107,846 44,468 1,28
Manufacturing/Production Mean 58 861,019 2,953,483 1,297,199 76,277 0.50
Median 9,734 32,161 8,695 (1.054) 0.91
Oil Extraction and Mining Mean 12 11,366 13,799 602 (2,265) 5.33
Median 4,598 3,818 367 (687) 2.57
Patent Owners and Lessors Mean 1 6,177 NA 14,079 (1,749) 2.10
Median 6,177 NA 14,079 (1,749) 2.10
Retail Mean 8 227,712 587,619 399,138 (33,871) -1.86
Median 5,857 12,121 2,240 (2,510) -2.95
Services Mean 19 568,836 1,598,887 453,682 21,501 9.17
Median 26,353 260,575 21,341 (1,163) 1.79
Transportation Mean 1 13,141 24,917 NA (2,596) 1.32
Median 13,141 24,917 NA (2,596) 1.32
Utilities and Public Service Mean 3 1,212,538 2,473,178 835,000 41,025 3.72
Median 15,046 2,473,178 835,000 (129) 1.99
Wholesale Mean 7 209,611 128,687 571,083 (8,461) 0.57
Median 14,833 34,883 307,508 (3,724) 2.40
TABLE 3 - Frequency Distribution of 8-K Filings and Where
Companies are Traded













1 106 16 8 2 60 21 106
2 52 1 1 20 4 26
3 45 10 5 15
4 44 11 11
5 10 1 1 2
6 24 1 2 1 4
7 14 2 2
11 11 1 1
13 13 1 1
15 15 1 1
16 16 1 1
28 28 1 1
29 29 1 1






Number of offerings was compiled from the 8-Ks filed with the SEC 
between November 18, 1996 through November 17, 1997 by companies issuing 
Regulation S Securities.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 4 - Frequency Distribution by Type of Transaction
Type o f Transaction Frequency
Common Stock Issue
As part of Employee Stock Ownership Plan 47
In consideration for services 6
In consideration for assets purchased 3
As compensation for financing services 2
In cancellation of note 2
As compensation for extending financing arrangements 3
To settle claims I
In exchange for stock of acquired company 39
On conversion of debentures 21
On conversion of notes 17
On conversion of preferred stock 9
On exercise of options 7
On exercise of warrants 21
As foreign portion of larger offering (Reg D or Rule 144A) 6
Bought and sold significant shares (change of control) 3
Other sales of common stock 101
Common Stock Transactions 288
Convertible Securities issued
Convertible Debentures as part of larger Rule 144A offer 1
Convertible Debentures 44
Convertible Notes as par of Rule 144A larger offering 7
Convertible Notes 7
Convertible Preferred as part of larger offering 4
Convertible Preferred 9
Warrants issued 2
Convertible Securities issued 74
Units 38
(generally common stock or convertibles issued with warrants)
Restructuring - Securities exchanged for other securities 4
Announcements to future offerings reported on 8-Ks 2
TOTAL REGULATION S TRANSACTIONS REPORTED 406
The transaction type was compiled by reviewing what was reported by issuing companies 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission on Forms 8-K, Item 9 from November 18, 
1996 through November 17,1997.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.




Computer & Office Machine 7
Manufacturing
Computer Related Services 24
Services 19






Utilities and Public 3
Service
Building and Construction 2
Patent Owners and Lessors 1
Z-Score for Prior Year
No. Obs. No. Obs.















Number in sample with 
financial information 
Less those with 
incomplete information
Percentage of sample with 
information
This table shows the distribution of sample companies by broad 
industry categories.
A further breakdown is made within the industry classes by Altman's Z 
scores:
Z-Score < 2.675 indicates companies which are financially distressed. 






Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 6 
Discounts on Restricted. Stocks
This table shows the average discounts on restricted securities of various 
studies (where restricted period is two years or more) and of the current study 
where the restricted period is 40 days.


























Silber (1991)3 Restricted 69 ★ 33.8%
FMV Opinions, Inc. (1994)3 Restricted >100 * 23.0%
Gelman (1972)3 Restricted 89 * 33.0%
Hertzel & Smith (1993)b Private
Placements
106 * 20.1%








159 40 Days 21.9%
Howard c Exercise or 
Conversion 
to Common
39 40 Days 24.5%
Howard d Convertible 79 40 Days 33.5%
* Not reported here, but restriction at issue is more than 2 years as
follows:
a) Rule 144 securities can be sold in limited amounts only after 
holding for at least 2 years (Solberg 1979).
b) Rule 237 holders must own securities 5 years and limited amounts 
can be sold during any one year period (Solberg 1979).
c) Letter Stock placed privately to institutional investors is 
restricted from trade on the open market for 24 months (Pratt, et. 
al. 1995).
** Median Discount (Average is not given).
3 From Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held 
Companies, 1995.
b Hertzel & Smith, 1993.
c Discounts are measured relative to closing share price on day prior to 
issue.
d Discount from market at conversion is usually detailed in Form 8-K. 
Where not provided, discount which is implied by the conversion price 
and current market price is used.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 7
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
Associated with the Issuance of Regulation S Offshore Equity Securities
Trading Day 0 Is the date Regulation S securities are issued.
Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns are calculated 
using the market model methodology adjusted for thin trading following 
Dimson and Marsh (1983). Returns are calculated between adjacent trades 
and the appropriate market returns (NASD, AMEX, or NYSE) are measured 
over the same calendar period. The observations are weighted to allow 
for different trading period lengths to ensure that the estimation 
parameters of the market model are efficient and unbiased. The sample 
includes 239 Regulation S issues which were reported to the SEC between 
November 18, 1996 and November 17, 1997.
Trading Day n AAR CAR
-5 208 -0.0055
-4 216 0.0022 -0.0030
-3 225 -0.0103 ** -0.0132 **
-2 231 -0.0070 -0.0199 ***
-1 235 0.0092 -0.0104
0 239 0.0022 -0.0080
1 235 0.0094 0.0013
2 221 -0.0129 ** -0.0107
3 201 -0.0034 -0.0135
4 177 -0.0016 -0.0147
5 157 0.0267 0.0028
6 144 0.0045 0.0055
7 126 0.0070 0.0092
8 113 -0.0163 ** 0.0015
9 91 0.0075 0.0044
10 65 0.087 6 0.0282
***, **, * denote significance (using a two-tailed test) at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively.
Window Cumulative Mean and Median Abnormal Returns
Trading
Window
Window CAR t-Statiatic % negative Median CAR Wilcoacon
Z-Statistic
0 0.0022 0.35 59. 0% -0.0051 -1.7730 *
-1 to 0 0.0111 1.34 50.2% -0.0009 -0.1710
-1 to + 1 0.0203 2.00 ** 51.0% -0.0043 -0.4168
0 to + 5 0.0129 0.76 53.1% -0.0072 -1.1767
0 to + 10 0.0384 1.20 55.0% -0.0123 -1.3169
-5 to + 5 0.0028 0.14 56.4% -0.0113 -0.9038
-5 to + 10 0.0282 .82 53.9% -0.0105 -0.8664
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 8
Average Abnormal Reburns (AARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Reburns (CARs) 
associated with the 8-K filing dabes between November 18, 1996 and 
November 17, 1997 where Regulation S issues are reported bo the SEC
Trading Day 0 is the day the 8-K is filed wibh the SEC.
An 8-K is filed with the SEC as the first public announcement of the 
issue. The sample includes 220 filings with the SEC (8-K, line 9) 
between November 18, 1996 and November 17, 1997.
Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns are calculated 
using the market model methodology adjusted for thin trading following 
Dimson and Marsh (1983). Returns are calculated between adjacent trades 
and the appropriate market returns (NASD, AMEX, or NYSE composite 
indices) are measured over the same calendar period. The observations 
are weighted to allow for different trading period lengths to ensure 
that the estimation parameters of the market model are efficient and 
unbiased.
Trading Day n AAR CAR
-5 146 0.0083 0.0106
-4 161 -0.0061 0.0037
-3 178 0.0026 0.0058
-2 197 -0.0065 0.0010
-1 209 0.0298 0.0307
0 220 -0.0073 0.0220
1 218 -0.0030 0.0187
2 208 -0.0171 *** 0.0038
3 200 -0.0012 0.0019
4 191 -0.0207 *** -0.0160
5 182 0.0051 -0.0118
6 177 -0.0023 * -0.0136
7 172 -0.0097 -0.0212
8 167 -0.0007 -0.0218
9 165 -0.0035 -0.0244
10 160 -0.1280 -0.0337
***, **, *** denote significance (using a two-tailed test) at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively.
Window Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and t-statistic
Trading
Window






0 -0.0071 -1.28 61.1% -0.0053 -2.8174 ***
-1 to 0 0.0211 0.7 57.0% -0.0068 -2.1921 **
-1 to + 1 0.0178 0.62 55.7% -0.0082 -1.8896 *
0 to + 5 -0.0409 -4.07*** 66.5% -0.0247 -4.6213 ***
0 to + 10 -0.0629 -3.97*** 65.6% -0.0466 -4.7175 ***
-5 to + 5 -0.0118 -0.48 65.6% -0.0391 -3.8236 ***
-5 to + 10 -0.0337 -0.95 64.3% -0.05317 -3.8553 ***
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 9
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
Associated with the end of the 40 day restricted trading period 
of Regulation S Offshore Equity Securities
Trading Day 0 is the end of the restricted period (40 days after issue) .
Sample includes 239 dates indicating the end of the required holding period for 
Regulation S securities reported between November 18, 1996 and November 17,
1997. Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns are calculated 
using the market model methodology adjusted for thin trading following Dimson 
and Marsh (1983). Returns are calculated between adjacent trades and the 
appropriate market returns (NASD, AMEX, or NYSE) are measured over the same 
calendar period. The observations are weighted to allow for different trading 
period lengths to ensure that the estimation parameters of the market model are 
efficient and unbiased.
Trading Day n Daily AAR CAR -10 to 
+10
CAR -5 to +10
-10 163 0
-9 171 -0.0025 -0.0025
-8 172 -0.0046 -0.0071
-7 180 -0.0046 -0.0114
-6 180 -0.0094 * -0.0208 **
-5 185 -0.0268 *** -0.047 *** -0.0268 ***
-4 202 -0.005 -0.0481 *** -0.0295 ***
-3 218 -0.0029 -0.0475 *** -0.0303 ***
-2 227 -0.0085 -0.0541 *** -0.0376 ***
-1 238 -0.002 -0.0536 *** -0.0379 ***
0 239 -0.0207 *** -0.074 *** -0.0583 ***
1 237 -0.0038 -0.0778 *** -0.0622 ***
2 231 -0.0133 * -0.0907 *** -0.0751 ***
3 224 -0.0057 -0.0961 *** -0.0805 ***
4 216 0.0022 -0.0941 *** -0.0784 ***
5 204 -0.0136 ** -0.1057 *** -0.09 ***
6 200 0.0012 -0.1047 *** -0.089 ***
7 197 -0.004 -0.108 *** -0.0924 ***
8 190 -0.0045 -0.1116 *** -0.0959 ***
9 188 -0.0027 -0.1137 *** -0.098 ***
10 179 -0.0054 -0.1177 *** -0.1021 ***
* * ★ * ★ * 
/ t denote significance (using a two-tailed test) at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively •
Cumulative Window Average and Median Abnormal Returns,
Percentage of negative observations and corresponding statistics
Trading day Average CAR t-statistic % negative Median Wilcoxon Z
CAR Statistic
0 -0 .0207 -2.57 *** 62.3% 0.0068 -4.2226 ***
-1 to 0 -0 .0225 -2.23 ** 60.0% -0.0134 -3.9628 ***
-1 to + 1 -0 .0263 -2.82 *** 62.9% -0.0196 -3.8768 ***
0 to + 5 -0. 05211 -3. 93 *** 70.8% -0.0335 -5.7965 ***
0 to + 10 -0. 06437 -3.23 *** 61.9% 0.0334 -3.8188 ***
-5 to + 5 -0. 09003 -5.19 *** 64.4% -0.0471 -5.6591 ***
-5 to + 10 -0 .1021 a4 * * * 63.3% -0.0490 -4.7011 ***














Cross-Sectional Regressions on Issue Date Cumulative Abnormal Returns (days -1 to +5) 
for Regulation S issues which were reported on 8-K filings between November 18, 1996 and 
November 17, 1997. The 0 day is the date that the securities were issued.
The dependent variable is the cumulative 7-day excess returns (market model residual) from the day prior to 
issue through the fifth day after the issue of 239 Regulation S securities. Independent variables include 
the following, Altman's Z-score measure of financial soundness, Size of Issue the dollar value of the issue 
divided by the market value of the equity before the issue, Mkt Equity the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity (number of shares X price/share), Discount is the percentage discount in relation to market 
value at the date common stock is issued. For convertible securities the Discount is the reduction allowed 
on conversion to common stock as disclosed in the 8-K filed with the SEC. OTC is a dummy variable whereby 
all over-the-counter traded companies are coded "1" and exchange traded companies are coded "0". Common and 
Conv. are dummy variables to indicate common stock or convertible securities, otherwise the issue is one of 
Units (missing dummy) of stock combined with warrants or options. One hundred and thirty observations have 
all variables available for the regression. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares and 
the t-statistics are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficient.
Intercept Z-score Sire of 
Issue
Mkt Equity Discount OTC Common Conv. F-Stat Adj. R2














2.0690 * * 0,0537










2.7180 * * 0.0611
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2.6424 * * 0.0474













Cross-Sectional Regressions on Filing Date Cumulative Abnormal Returns (days -1 to +5) 
for 8-K Filings with the SEC between November 18, 1996 and November 17, 1997. 
The 0 day is the date that the 8-K was filed with the SEC.
The dependent variable is the cumulative 7-day excess returns (market model residual) from the day prior to 
the filing through the fifth day after the 8-K SEC filings (220 8-Ks were filed) where Regulation S issues 
are reported. Independent variables include the following, Altman's Z-score measure of financial soundness, 
Size of Issue the dollar value of the issue divided by the market value of the equity before the issue, Mkt 
Equity the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (number of shares X price/share), Discount is the 
percentage discount in relation to market value at the date common stock is issued. For convertible 
securities the Discount is the reduction allowed on conversion to common stock as disclosed in the 8-K filed 
with the SEC. OTC is a dummy variable whereby all over-the-counter traded companies are coded ”1" and 
exchange traded companies are coded "0". Common and Conv. are dummy variables to indicate common stock or 
convertible securities, otherwise the issue was one of Units (missing dummy) of stock combined with warrants 
or options. One hundred observations have all variables available for the regression. The coefficients are 
estimated using ordinary least squares and the t-statistics are given in parentheses below the estimated 
coefficient.















































































Cross-Sectional Regressions on End of Restricted Holding Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(days -10 to +10) for Securities Issued under Regulation S and Reported on 8-K Filings between 
November 18, 1996 and November 17, 1997. The 0 day is the end of the 40-day holding period.
The dependent variable is the cumulative 21-day excess returns (market model residual) from ten days prior to the end 
of the restricted trading period through the tenth day after the event date for 239 Regulation S securities' issues. 
Independent variables include the following, Altman's Z-score measure of financial soundness, Size of Issue the dollar 
value of the issue divided by the market value of the equity before the issue, Mkt Equity the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity (number of shares X price/share), Discount is the percentage discount in relation to market value 
at the date common stock is issued. For convertible securities the Discount is the reduction allowed on conversion to 
common stock as disclosed in the 8-K filed with the SEC. OTC is a dummy variable whereby all over-the-counter traded 
companies are coded "1" and exchange traded companies are coded "0". Common and Conv. are dummy variables to indicate 
common stock or convertible securities, otherwise the issue was one of Units (missing dummy) of stock combined with 
warrants or options. One hundred and thirty observations have all variables available for the regression. The 
coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares and the C-statistics are given in parentheses below the 
estimated coefficient.
Intercept Z-score Size of 
Issue














































































Table 13 Issue date with Director and Officer Ownership Variables 
Cross-Sectional Regressions on Issue Date Cumulative Abnormal Returns (days -1 to +5) 
for Regulation S issues which were reported on 8-K filings between November 18, 1996 and 
November 17, 1997. The 0 day is the date that the securities were issued.
The dependent variable is the cumulative 7-day excess returns (market model residual) from the day prior to 
issue through the fifth day after the issue of 239 Regulation S securities. Independent variables include 
the following, Altman's Z-acore measure of financial soundness, Size of Issue the dollar value of the issue 
divided by the market value of the equity before the issue, Mkt Equity the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity (number of shares X price/share), Discount is the percentage discount in relation to market 
value at the date common stock is issued. For convertible securities the Discount is the reduction allowed 
on conversion to common stock as disclosed in the 8-K filed with the SEC. OTC is a dummy variable whereby 
all over-the-counter traded companies are coded "1" and exchange traded companies are coded "0". Common and 
Conv. are dummy variables to indicate common stock or convertible securities, otherwise the issue is one of 
Units (missing dummy) of stock combined with warrants or options. D&O is the percentage of outstanding 
common stock owned by officers and directors. One hundred and thirty observations have all variables 
available for the regression. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares and the t-
statistics are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficient.
Intercept Z-score Size of 
Issue
Mkt Equity Discount OTC Common Conv. D&O Adj. R2 
F-Stat
(1) 0.3179 .1013 -0.3660 *** -0.2638 * -0.2377 ** -0.1311 0.0051 -0.1323 0.2967 *** .2005
(1.027) (-3.746) (-1.680) (-2.149) (-1.038) (.037) (-.927) (2.747) 3.9778 ***
(2) .2622 0.1238 -0.3612 *** -0.2324 -0.2254 ** -0.1452 0.3193 *** .2006
(1.288) (-3.700) (-1.497) (-2.044) (-1.157) (2.991) 4.974 ***
(3) 0.3186 -0.3502 *** -0.2517 * -0.2611 ** -0.1163 -0.0184 -0.1953 0.2881 *** 0.2026
(-3.631) (-1.681) (-2.389) (-0.936) (.132) (-1.403) (2.720) 4.4838 ***
(4) -.0043 0.0722 -0.3127 *** -0.1935 ** 0.3875 *** 0.2058
(0.798) (-3.445) (-2.071) (4.175) 7.4120 ***
(5) 0.1283 0.2393 ** -0.3506 *** -0.1333 -0.2393 ** 0.3265 *** 0.1976
(2.180) (-3.601) (-1.028) (-2.180) (3.058) 5.6797 ***












Table 14 Filing Date with Director and Officer Ownership Variable 
Cross-Sectional Regressions on Filing Date Cumulative Abnormal Returns (days -1 to +5) 
for 8-K Filings with the SEC between November 18, 1996 and November 17, 1997. 
The 0 day is the date that the 8-K was filed with the SEC.
The dependent variable is the cumulative 7-day excess returns (market model residual) from the day prior to 
the filing through the fifth day after the 8-K SEC filings (220 8-Ks were filed) where Regulation S issues 
are reported. Independent variables include the following, Altman's Z-score measure of financial soundness, 
Size of Issue the dollar value of the issue divided by the market value of the equity before the issue, Mkt 
Equity the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (number of shares X price/share), Discount is the 
percentage discount in relation to market value at the date common stock is issued. For convertible 
securities the Discount is the reduction allowed on conversion to common stock as disclosed in the 8-K filed 
with the SEC. OTC is a dummy variable whereby all over-the-counter traded companies are coded "1" and 
exchange traded companies are coded "0". Common and Conv. are dummy variables to indicate common stock or 
convertible securities, otherwise the issue was one of Units (missing dummy) of stock combined with warrants 
or options. D&O is the percentage of common held by Directors and Officers of the corporation. One hundred 
observations have all variables available for the regression. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary 
least squares and the t-statistics are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficient.




Discount OTC Common Conv. D&O Adj R* 
F-Stat.
(1) -0.0527 -0.0554 -0.0341 0.1182 -0.0451 -0.0271 -0.1145 -0.3255 ** 0.1463 -.0092
(-.426) (-.280) (.602) (-.312) (-.158) (-.668) (-1.81) (1.097) .9147
(2) -0.1088 0.0251 -0.1047 0.1262 -0.0142 -0.0583 0.1559 -.0381
(.201) (-.887) (.634) (-.097) (-0.336) (1.155) .5409
(3) -0.0187 -0.0349 0.0824 -.0519 -0.0423 -0.1048 -0.3252 ** 0.1313 0.0119
(-.294) (.453) (-.368) (-.254) (-.620) (-1.913) (1.019) 1.1303
(4) -0.0580 -0.0351 0.1085 -.0585 -.1015 -.3250 * .1322 0.0251
(-.298) (.728) (-.425) (-.607) (1.926) (1.034) 1.326
(5) 0.0338 -0.0307 0.0064 -0.1101 -0.0057 -0.2469 0.1110 0.0136
(-.269) (.052) (-.867) (-.037) (-1.597) (.951) 1.1877













Table 15 - End of Restricted Period with Director and Officer Ownership Variable 
Cross-Sectional Regressions on End of Restricted Holding Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(days -10 to +10) for securities issued under Regulation S and reported on 8-K filings between 
November 18, 1996 and November 17, 1997. The 0 day is the end of the 40-day holding period.
The dependent variable is the cumulative 21-day excess returns (market model residual) from ten days prior to the end 
of the restricted trading period through the tenth day after the event date for 239 Regulation S securities' issues. 
Independent variables include the following, Altman's Z-acore measure of financial soundness, Size of Issue the dollar 
value of the issue divided by the market value of the equity before the issue, Mkt Equity the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity (number of shares X price/share), Discount is the percentage discount in relation to market value 
at the date common stock is issued. For convertible securities the Discount is the reduction allowed on conversion to 
common stock as disclosed in the 8 -K  filed with the SEC. OTC is a dummy variable whereby all over-the-counter traded 
companies are coded "1" and exchange traded companies are coded "0". Common and Conv. are dummy variables to indicate 
common stock or convertible securities, otherwise the issue was one of Units (missing dummy) of stock combined with 
warrants or options. DfiO is the percentage of common stock owned by officers and directors. One hundred and thirty 
observations have all variables available for the regression. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least 
squares and the t-statistics are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficient.
Intercept Z-acore Size of 
Issue












































































***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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